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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This Multi-Hazard Mitigation Plan for the City of Corvallis, Oregon covers each of 
the major natural and some of the  human-caused hazards that pose risks to the 
City.  The primary objectives of this Mitigation plan are to reduce the negative 
impacts of future disasters on the community:  to enhance life safety, increase 
public awareness, protect natural systems, and build partnerships.   This 
Mitigation Plan is a planning document, not a regulatory document. 
 
This mitigation plan meets FEMA’s planning requirements by addressing 
hazards, vulnerability and risk.  Hazard means the frequency and severity of 
disaster events.  Vulnerability means the value, importance, and fragility of 
buildings and infrastructure.  Risk means the threat to people, buildings and 
infrastructure, taking into account the probabilities of disaster events.  Adoption 
of a mitigation plan is required for communities to remain eligible for future FEMA 
mitigation grant funds. 
 
The Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan is a living document which will be 
reviewed at least annually and updated periodically.  The continuing active 
participation of citizens, agencies, and other Corvallis stakeholders is an 
essential part of the process of keeping the Corvallis Hazard Mitigation 
current.  Comments, suggestions, corrections and updates are  
encouraged from all interested parties throughout the life of the Plan. 
 
Please send comments to: 
 
Robert Fenner 
City of Corvallis  
Public Works Department 
PO Box 1083 
Corvallis, OR 97339 
541 754-1783 
541 766-6920 (Fax) 
bob.fenner@ci.corvallis.or.us 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 What is a Mitigation Plan? 
 
The City of Corvallis is subject to a wide range of natural and human-caused hazards, 
including: floods, winter storms, landslides, wildland/urban interface fires, 
earthquakes, dam failures, hazardous material spills, and many others.  The impact of 
a hazard event on a community may be minor - a few inches of water in a street - or it 
may be major - with damages reaching millions of dollars.   
 
There have been several recent events, all of which resulted in Presidential Disaster 
Declarations for Benton County, with significant damages and impacts in Corvallis: 
• The flooding in February 1996 affected many portions of Corvallis.   A 
combination of rain, warmer temperatures causing snow melt, and then more 
rain caused flooding in the southern part of Corvallis and southern Benton 
County.  Shelters were opened, some families were evacuated by boat, and 
massive sandbagging efforts were conducted to save governmental and private 
structures.  This winter storm also brought numerous landslides and resulted in 
the closure of a lifeline transportation route for about 24 hours. 
• The winter storm in December 2003 and January 2004 struck the Pacific 
Northwest and rapidly developed into a full-blown snowstorm in elevations as 
low as 500 feet.  There was significant snow fall and freezing rain across the 
county, including Corvallis, with widespread impacts in Benton County. Freezing 
rain fell along the coast and throughout the Willamette Valley causing 
widespread ice accumulations.  Critical services within the county were 
disrupted, with about 10,000 consumers without electricity for 3 to 4 days.  
Local governments were closed, and the local hospital discharged non-
critical patients due to an increase in patient admissions that were related to 
the storm.  Emergency snow removal was conducted to keep primary roads 
open.  Transport of emergency workers by Search and Rescue groups kept 
care facilities and medical facilities operational.  One person died as a result 
of the power outage.   
• The windstorm in December 2005 primarily affected electric utilities, with 
significant damage to Consumers Power Inc. which supplies Corvallis, 
resulting in widespread power outages in many Benton County locations. 
• The flooding in December 2005 and January 2006 affected many of the 
smaller streams and the Mill Race in Corvallis, with road closures and 
damage to some residential properties. 
 
This Mitigation Plan addresses all levels of natural hazard events and some human-
caused hazards as well.  The Plan includes minor events such as winter storms or 
localized storm water flooding that may happen in some locations almost every year and 
localized events such as landslides or mudslides.  The plan also includes larger events 
such as major floods, earthquakes, or major wildland/urban interface fires that may affect 
large numbers of residents in Corvallis, with very high levels of damages and losses, 
albeit with much lower probabilities of occurrence. 
 
11-12-07 1-2
Mitigation simply means actions that reduce the potential for negative impacts from 
future disasters.  Mitigation actions reduce future damages, losses and casualties. 
The Corvallis mitigation plan has several key elements.   
1. Each hazard that may impact Corvallis significantly is reviewed to 
determine the probability (frequency) and severity of likely hazard 
events. 
2. The vulnerability of Corvallis to each hazard is evaluated to determine 
the likely extent of physical damages, casualties, and economic 
impacts.  
3. A range of mitigation alternatives are evaluated to identify those with 
the greatest potential to reduce future damages and losses in Corvallis, 
to protect facilities deemed critical to the community’s well being, and 
that are desirable from the community’s political and economic 
perspectives. 
 
 
1.2  Why is Mitigation Planning Important for Corvallis? 
 
Effective mitigation planning will help the residents of Corvallis deal with natural and 
anthropogenic (human-caused) hazards realistically and rationally.  That is, it will help 
identify specific locations in Corvallis where the level of risk from one or more hazards 
may be unacceptably high and then find cost effective ways to reduce such risk.  
Mitigation planning strikes a pragmatic middle ground between unwisely ignoring the 
potential for major hazard events on one hand and unnecessarily overreacting to the 
potential for disasters on the other hand. 
 
Furthermore, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) now requires each 
local government entity to adopt a multi-hazard mitigation plan to remain eligible for future 
pre- or post-disaster FEMA mitigation funding.  Thus, an important objective in developing 
this plan is to maintain eligibility for FEMA funding and to enhance Corvallis’s ability to 
attract future FEMA mitigation funding. 
 
The Plan is specifically designed to help Corvallis gather the data necessary to compete 
successfully for future FEMA funding of mitigation projects.  FEMA requires that all FEMA-
funded hazard mitigation projects must be “cost-effective” (i.e., the benefits of a project 
must exceed the costs).   Benefit-cost analysis is thus an important component of 
mitigation planning, not only to meet FEMA requirements, but also to help evaluate and 
prioritize potential hazard mitigation projects in Corvallis, regardless of whether funding is 
from FEMA, state or local government or from private sources. 
 
Hazard mitigation planning is applicable to Corvallis as a whole, including the entire 
population and all of the built environment of buildings (residential, commercial, and 
public) and infrastructure (transportation and utility systems).  However, for mitigation 
planning purposes and for implementation of mitigation actions, facilities designated 
as critical for the well being of residents of Corvallis are given a higher priority.  A 
summary of the types of critical facilities in Corvallis is given below in Table 1.1.  A 
listing of specific critical and important facilities in Corvallis is given in Table 1.2.  
Maps of critical facilities in Corvallis are shown in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, with FEMA-
mapped floodplains also shown for reference. 
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Table 1.1 
Types of Critical Facilities in Corvallis 
 
Category Critical Functions High Priority Medium Priority 
Emergency Services Facilities critical for immediate emergency response, including life safety 
    Fire Stations   YES   
    Police Stations   YES   
    Ambulance Services   YES   
    Emergency Operations Centers   YES   
    Emergency Shelters     YES 
Medical Facilities Facilities providing direct patient care, including hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes 
    Hospitals and Urgent Care Facilities   YES   
    Other Medical Facilities     YES 
Special Needs Populations Facilities housing people that may need assistance is evacuation from emergencies 
   Elderly Housing   High occupancy facilities Low occupancy facilities 
   Schools (K-12)   YES   
   Schools (Higher Education)   YES   
   Jails   YES   
Utilities  
    Water Facilities for treatment and distribution of potable and irrigation water 
Major treatment plants, water 
transmission lines, major reservoirs,  
Smaller reservoirs and pumping 
plants 
    Wastewater Facilities for pumping and treatment of wastewater Treatment plants and pumping plants   
    Electric Power Facilities for generation, transmission and distribution of electric power 
High voltage substations and 
transmission lines 
Other substations and 
transmission lines, trunk 
distribution lines 
    Telecommunications Facilities for transmission, switching and distribution of telephone traffic 
PSAPs (911 centers) and Central 
Offices (switching) Trunk lines 
    Natural Gas Facilities for transmission and distribution of natural gas   
Transmission lines and 
compressor stations 
Dams Facilities to impound water for flood control, power generation and water supply 
Major dams upstream of population 
centers 
Smaller dams and dams not 
upstream of population centers 
Transportation Systems  
    Roadways Necessary for emergency response, public safety and disaster recovery 
Major highways, arterials, and bridges 
on such roads Secondary roads and bridges 
    Air, rail, and water transport These transport modes are of secondary importance for Corvallis Not at this time Not at this time 
Hazmat Facilities Facilities that manufacture, store, use, or transport hazardous materials 
Sites with large inventories of 
hazardous materials 
Sites with smaller inventories of 
hazardous materials 
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Table 1.2 
Corvallis Critical and Important Facilities 
 
City Buildings and Facilities
City Hall
Fire Stations 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
Public Works Maintenance Facility
Corvallis Public Schools
Corvallis Senior Center
Madison Building
Majestic Theater
Corvallis Municipal Airport
City Water System
Taylor Water Treatment Facility
Rock Creek Water Treatment Facility
Marys River Bridge Crossings (Water Transmission Pipes)
Water Reservoirs
Water Pump Stations 
City Wastewater System
Wastewater Treatment Facility
Wastewater Lift Stations
Benton County Buildings
Law Enforcement Building
Benton County Courthouse
Benton County Public Works
Benton County Health Department
Medical and Care Facilities
Good Samaritan Hospital
Samaritan Heart of the Valley
OSU Health Center
Regent Retirement Residence
Corvallis Manor
Conifer House Nursing Home
Boyter's Golden Horizon Inc.
Stoney Brook Assisted Living
West Hills Assisted Living Community
Corvallis Caring Center
Utility Systems
Consumers Power Inc.
Pacific Power
US West
Northwest Natural Gas.
City Buildings and Facilities
Parks and Recreation Admin Building
Parks and Recreation Maintenance Compound
City Hall Annex
Transit Mall
Art Center
Other Facilities
Group Shelters
Important Facilities
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Figure 1.1 
Critical Facilities in Corvallis and FEMA-Mapped Floodplain Boundaries 
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Figure 1.2 
Care Facilities in Corvallis and FEMA-Mapped Floodplain Boundaries 
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1.3 The Corvallis Mitigation Plan 
 
This Corvallis Mitigation Plan is built is upon a quantitative assessment of each of the 
major hazards that may impact Corvallis, including their frequency, severity, and areas of 
the City likely to be affected.  The hazards addressed include:  floods, severe winter 
storms (including windstorms), landslides, wildland/urban interface fires, earthquakes, 
volcanic eruptions, dam failures, and utility and transportation disruptions. 
 
The Corvallis Mitigation plan includes a quantitative assessment of the vulnerability of 
buildings, infrastructure, and people to each of these hazards, to the extent possible with 
existing data.  The plan also includes an evaluation of the likely magnitude of the impacts 
of future disasters on Corvallis. 
 
These reviews of the hazards and the vulnerability of Corvallis to these hazards are the 
foundation of the mitigation plan.  From these assessments, high hazard areas where 
buildings, infrastructure, and/or people may be at high risk are identified whenever 
possible.  These high risk situations then become priorities for future mitigation actions to 
reduce the negative impacts of future disasters on Corvallis. 
 
The Corvallis Mitigation Plan deals with hazards realistically and rationally and also strikes 
a balance between suggested physical mitigation measures to eliminate or reduce the 
negative impacts of future disasters and enhancements in land use planning to reduce the 
potential for negative impacts of disasters on new development.  Finally, the plan 
suggests better emergency planning to help prepare the community to respond to and 
recover from disasters for which physical mitigation measures are not possible or not 
economically feasible. 
 
 
1.4  Key Concepts and Definitions 
 
The central concept of mitigation planning is that mitigation reduces risk.  Risk is 
defined as the threat to the built environment posed by the hazards being considered.  
That is, risk is the potential for damages, losses and casualties arising from the impact 
of hazards on the built environment. 
 
The extent of risk depends on the combination of hazard and exposure as shown in 
Figure 1.3 below. 
Figure 1.3 
Hazard and Exposure Combine to Produce Risk 
 
HAZARD EXPOSURE RISK
Frequency + Value and = Threat to the
and Severity Vulnerability Built Environment
of Hazard Events of Inventory
 
 
Thus, there are four key concepts that govern hazard mitigation planning: hazard, 
exposure, risk and mitigation.  Each of these key concepts is addressed in turn. 
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HAZARD refers to natural or anthropogenic events that potentially may cause 
damages, losses or casualties (e.g., floods, winter storms, landslides, earthquakes, 
hazardous material spills, etc.).  Hazards are characterized by their frequency and 
severity and by the geographic area affected.  Each hazard is characterized 
differently, with appropriate parameters for the specific hazard.  For example, floods 
may be characterized by the frequency of flooding, along with flood depth and flood 
velocity.  Winter storms may be characterized by the amount of rainfall in a 24-hour 
period, by the wind speed, by the amount of snow or ice associated with a storm.  
Earthquakes may be characterized by the severity and duration of ground motions 
and so on. 
 
A hazard, by itself, may not result in any negative impacts on a community.   For 
example, a highly flood-prone five acre parcel may typically experience several 
shallow floods per year, with several feet of water expected in a 50-year flood event 
and more than six feet of water expected in a 100-year flood event.   However, the 
parcel may be wetlands adjacent to a tidal marsh that floods daily, with no 
development (structures or infrastructure) on the parcel.  In this case, the frequent 
flooding does not have any negative impacts on the community.  Indeed, in such 
circumstances, the very frequent flooding (i.e., high hazard) may be beneficial in 
providing wildlife habitat. 
 
The important point here is that hazards do not produce risk, unless there is 
vulnerable inventory exposed to the hazard.  In the context of mitigation planning, 
“inventory” means simply people, buildings, or infrastructure exposed to damages 
from one or more natural or manmade hazards. 
 
EXPOSURE is the quantity, value and vulnerability of the built environment (inventory 
of buildings and infrastructure) in a particular location subject to one or more hazards.  
Inventory is described by the number, size, type, use, and occupancy of buildings and 
by the infrastructure present.  Infrastructure includes roads and other transportation 
systems, utilities (potable water, wastewater, natural gas, electric power), 
telecommunications systems and so on. 
 
Inventory varies markedly in its importance to a community and thus varies markedly 
in its importance for hazard mitigation planning.  Some types of facilities, “critical 
facilities,” are especially important to a community, particularly during disaster 
situations.  Examples of critical facilities include police and fire stations, hospitals, 
schools, emergency shelters, 911 centers, and other important buildings.  Critical 
facilities may also include infrastructure elements that are important links or nodes in 
providing service to large numbers of people such as a potable water source, an 
electric power substation and so on.  “Links” are elements such as water pipes, 
electric power lines, telephone cables that connect portions of a utility or 
transportation system.  “Nodes” are locations with important functions, such as 
pumping plants, substations, or switching offices. 
 
For hazard mitigation planning, inventory is characterized not only by the quantity and 
value of buildings or infrastructure present but also by its vulnerability to each hazard 
under evaluation.  For example, a given facility may be vulnerable to flood damages 
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and earthquake damages or to flood damages only or to earthquake damages only. 
Depending on the hazard, different measures of vulnerability must be used. 
 
RISK is the threat to the built environment (buildings and infrastructure) and people - 
the potential for damages, losses and casualties arising from hazards.  Risk results 
from the combination of Hazard and Exposure.  That is, when the geographic areas 
affected by one or more hazards contain people, buildings, and infrastructure 
vulnerable to damage from the hazard(s).  For mitigation planning, evaluation of risk 
generally emphasizes the built environment and people.  However, risk also includes 
the potential for environmental damage. 
 
Risk is the potential for future damages, losses or casualties.  A disaster event 
happens when a hazard event is combined with vulnerable inventory (that is when 
hazard event strikes vulnerability inventory exposed to the hazard).  The highest risk 
in a community occurs in high hazard areas (frequent and/or severe hazard events) 
with large inventories of vulnerable buildings or infrastructure. 
 
However, high risk can also occur with only moderately high hazard, if there is a large 
inventory of highly vulnerable inventory exposed to the hazard.  For example, seismic 
hazard is lower in Oregon than in the seismically active areas of California.  However, 
for some buildings, seismic risk in Oregon may be comparable to or even higher than 
seismic risk in California, due to the very recent adoption in Oregon of seismic design 
standards commensurate with current understanding of seismic hazards in Oregon. 
Much of the building inventory in Oregon is vulnerable to earthquake damages 
because older buildings were generally designed and built to much lower seismic 
standards than currently required in Oregon.   Conversely, a high hazard area can 
have relatively low risk if the inventory is resistant to damages (e.g., elevated to 
protect against flooding or strengthened to minimize earthquake damages). 
 
Figure 1.4 
Risk Results from the Combination of Hazard and Exposure 
RISK . . .
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MITIGATION means actions to reduce the risk due to hazards.  Mitigation actions reduce 
the potential for damages, losses, and casualties in future disaster events.  Repair of 
buildings or infrastructure damaged in a disaster is not mitigation because repair simply 
restores a facility to its pre-disaster condition and does not reduce the potential for future 
damages, losses, or casualties.  Hazard mitigation projects may be initiated proactively - 
before a disaster, or after a disaster has already occurred.  In either case, the objective of 
mitigation is always to reduce future damages, losses or casualties. 
 
A few of the most common types of mitigation projects are shown below in Table 1.3. 
 
Table 1.3 
Common Mitigation Projects 
 
Hazard Mitigation Project
Flood Build or improve levees or flood walls
Improve channels for flood control
Improve drainage systems and culvert capacities
Create detention ponds for storage
Relocate, elevate or floodproof flood-prone structures
Acquire and demolish highly flood-prone structures
Winter Storms Add emergency generators for critical facilities
Improve redundancy of utility systems
Trim trees to reduce failures of utility lines
Earthquakes Upgrade seismic performance of buildings
Upgrade seismic performance of infrastructure
Landslides Remediate slide conditions
Relocate utility lines or structures
Wildland/Urban Interface Fires Increase fire safe construction practices
Vegetation (fuel load) control
General Enhance emergency planning and mutual aid
Expand public education programs  
 
The mitigation project list above is not comprehensive and mitigation projects can 
encompass a broad range of other actions to reduce future damages, losses, and 
casualties. 
 
 
1.5 The Mitigation Process 
 
The key element for all hazard mitigation projects is that they reduce risk.  The benefits of a 
mitigation project are the reduction in risk (i.e., the avoided damages, losses, and casualties 
attributable to the mitigation project).  In other words, benefits are simply the difference in 
expected damages, losses, and casualties before mitigation (as-is conditions) and after 
mitigation.  These important concepts are illustrated below in Figure 1-5. 
11-12-07 1-11
Figure 1.5 
Mitigation Projects Reduce Risk 
 
RISK
BEFORE
MITIGATION
BENEFITS
OF
MITIGATION
REDUCTION
RISK IN RISK
- AFTER =
MITIGATION
 
 
Quantifying the benefits of a proposed mitigation project is an essential step in hazard 
mitigation planning and implementation.  Only by quantifying benefits is it possible to 
compare the benefits and costs of mitigation to determine whether or not a particular project 
is worth doing (i.e., is economically feasible).  Real world mitigation planning almost always 
involves choosing between a range of possible alternatives, often with varying costs and 
varying effectiveness in reducing risk.   
 
Quantitative risk assessment is centrally important to hazard mitigation planning.   When the 
level of risk is high, the expected levels of damages and losses are likely to be 
unacceptable and mitigation actions have a high priority.  Thus, the greater the risk, the 
greater the urgency of undertaking mitigation actions. 
 
Conversely, when risk is moderate both the urgency and the benefits of undertaking 
mitigation are reduced.  It is neither technologically possible nor economically feasible to 
eliminate risk completely.  Therefore, when levels of risk are low and/or the cost of 
mitigation is high relative to the level of risk, the risk may be deemed acceptable (or at least 
tolerable).  Therefore, proposed mitigation projects that address low levels of risk or where 
the cost of the mitigation project is large relative to the level of risk are generally poor 
candidates for implementation. 
 
The overall mitigation planning process is outlined in Figure 1.6 on the following page. 
 
The flow chart below outlines the major steps in Hazard Mitigation Planning and 
Implementation for Corvallis. 
 
The first steps are quantitative evaluation of the hazards (frequency and severity) impacting 
Corvallis and of the inventory (people, buildings, infrastructure) exposed to these hazards.  
Together these hazard and exposure data determine the level of risk for specific locations, 
buildings or facilities in Corvallis. 
 
The next key step is to determine whether or not the level of risk posed by each of the 
hazards impacting Corvallis is acceptable or tolerable.  Only the residents of Corvallis can 
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make this determination.  If the level of risk is deemed acceptable or at least tolerable, then 
mitigation actions are not necessary or at least not a high priority.   
 
On the other hand, if the level of risk is deemed not acceptable or tolerable, then mitigation 
actions are desired.  In this case, the mitigation planning process moves on to more 
detailed evaluation of specific mitigation alternatives, prioritization, funding and 
implementation of mitigation measures.  As with the determination of whether or not the 
level of risk posed by each hazard is acceptable or not, decisions about which mitigation 
projects to undertake can be made only by the residents of Corvallis. 
 
Figure 1.6 
The Mitigation Planning Process 
 
Risk Assessment
Quantify the Threat
to the Built Environment
Is Level of Risk
Acceptable?
YES: Risk is Acceptable
Mitigation Not Necessary
NO: Risk is Not Acceptable
Mitigation Desired
Implement Mitigation Measures
Reduce Risk
Mitigation Planning Flowchart
Prioritize Mitigation Alternatives
Benefit-Cost Analysis
and Related Tools
Obtain Funding
Find Solutions to Risk
Identify Mitigation Alternatives
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1.6 The Role of Benefit-Cost Analysis in Mitigation Planning 
 
Communities that are considering whether or not to undertake mitigation projects must 
answer questions that don’t always have obvious answers, such as: 
 
What is the nature of the hazard problem? 
 
How frequent and how severe are hazard events? 
 
Do we want to undertake mitigation measures? 
 
What mitigation measures are feasible, appropriate, and affordable? 
 
How do we prioritize between competing mitigation projects? 
 
Are our mitigation projects likely to be eligible for FEMA funding? 
 
Benefit-cost analysis is a powerful tool that can help communities provide solid, defensible 
answers to these difficult socio-political-economic-engineering questions.  Benefit-cost 
analysis is required for all FEMA-funded mitigation projects, under both pre-disaster 
and post-disaster mitigation programs.  Thus, communities seeking FEMA funding 
must understand benefit-cost analysis.  However, regardless of whether or not FEMA 
funding is involved, benefit-cost analysis provides a sound basis for evaluating and 
prioritizing possible mitigation projects for any natural hazard. 
 
Benefit-cost analysis software, technical manuals and a wide range of guidance documents 
are available from FEMA at no cost to communities.   A Benefit-Cost Analysis Toolkit CD 
which contains all of the FEMA benefit-cost materials is available from FEMA.  The 
publication What is a Benefit?  Draft Guidance for Benefit-Cost Analysis is particularly 
recommended as a general reference for benefit-cost analysis.  This publication includes 
categories of benefits to count for mitigation projects for various types of buildings, critical 
facilities, and infrastructure and has simple, standard methods to quantity the full range of 
benefits for most types of mitigation projects. 
 
The principles of benefit-cost analysis are briefly summarized in the Appendix at the end of 
the Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan. 
 
 
1.7 Hazard Synopsis 
 
To set the overall context of hazard mitigation planning, we briefly review the major hazards 
that impact Corvallis.   Different parts of Corvallis vary in topography, climate, population, 
development patterns and so on.  Similarly, the impact of many hazards on communities in 
Corvallis varies with location within the City.   Some hazards affect the entire City, while 
some hazards have only localized potential consequences.   
 
Floods.  Portions of Corvallis have areas of flood plains mapped by FEMA.  
These include areas along the Willamette River, as well as areas along 
smaller tributary creeks. There are over 3,000 buildings located within the 
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footprint of these FEMA-mapped floodplain. Furthermore, other portions of 
Corvallis, outside of the mapped floodplains, are also subject to significant, 
repetitive flooding from local storm water drainage. 
 
Winter Storms.  All of Corvallis is subject to the effects of winter storms, 
including wind, rain, snow and ice, as well as secondary effects such as 
power outages.   
 
Landslides.  Portions of the hilly areas of Corvallis, especially the in the hilly 
portions of North Corvallis, are subject to landslides or debris flows 
(mudslides), which may affect buildings, roads, and utilities.   
 
Wildland/Urban Interface Fires.  Parts of Corvallis are subject to the risk of 
wildland fires, including the hilly forested areas of North Corvallis.  As a result, 
many residential areas bordering or impinging into forested areas near the 
edges of the developed areas of Corvallis may have high levels of risk from 
wildland/urban interface fires.   
 
Earthquakes.  All of Corvallis is subject to the impacts of earthquakes, 
including not only major earthquakes on the Cascadia Subduction Zone off 
the Oregon coast, but also smaller crustal earthquakes within western 
Oregon.   
 
Volcanic Hazards.  All of Corvallis is subjected, to a minor degree, to 
volcanic hazards from eruptions in the Cascades (e.g., Mount Hood, the 
Three Sisters).  For Corvallis, the impacts of volcanic events are likely to be 
only minor ash falls, with perhaps some impact on public water supplies from 
ash causing high turbidity in drinking water supplies. 
 
Dam Failures.  Many heavily populated portions of Corvallis along the 
Willamette  River are in the inundation areas from dam failures.  While dam 
failures are highly unlikely, the consequences of failure would be high. 
 
Disruption of Utility and Transportation Systems.   All of Corvallis is also 
subject to disruption of utility and transportation systems from winter storms 
and other natural hazards, as well as from anthropogenic causes. 
 
In evaluating these natural or human-caused hazards, it is important to recognize that the 
risk to Corvallis (i.e., the potential for damages, economic losses, and casualties) varies 
markedly from one hazard to another.  As discussed in more detail in Section 1.4, risk 
depends on the combination of the frequency and severity of hazard events and on the 
value and vulnerability of infrastructure, buildings, and people to each potential hazard.  
Risk is thus always probabilistic in nature.  Some hazard events, such as winter storms, 
happen every year to at least some extent.  Other hazard events, such as major 
earthquakes may happen only once every few hundred years.  However, the level of risk 
from earthquakes is high, even though the frequency of occurrence is low, because the 
potential consequences (damage, economic losses, and casualties) are very high. 
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The relative risk posed to Corvallis by each of the 8 hazards covered in this mitigation plan 
is summarized below in Table 1.4.   
Table 1.4 
Relative Risk to Corvallis 
 
Hazard Risk
Earthquake High
Flood High
Dam Failure High
Winter storms (Severe weather) Moderate
Wildand/Urban Interface Fires Moderate
Disruption of Utility and 
Transportation Systems Moderate
Landslides Low
Volcanic Eruptions (Ash Falls) Low  
 
In summary, there are many natural and human-caused hazards which affect all or large 
portions of Corvallis.   
 
The remaining chapters of this mitigation plan include the following. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a brief community profile for Corvallis.   
 
Chapter 3 documents the community involvement and public process involved in developing 
this mitigation plan.   
 
Chapter 4 outlines the mitigation plan goals, mitigation strategies, and action items. 
 
Chapter 5 documents the formal process of plan adoption, implementation, and 
maintenance. 
 
Chapters 6 through 13 cover each of the major hazards addressed in this mitigation plan, 
including:  floods, winter storms, landslides, wildland/urban interface fires, earthquakes, 
volcanic hazards, dam safety, and disruption of utility and transportation systems. 
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2.0 COMMUNITY PROFILE:  CITY of CORVALLIS, OREGON 
 
2.1 Geography and Climate 
 
Corvallis, Oregon is a compact city located along the Willamette River in western 
Oregon, covering about 14 square miles.  The geography of Corvallis includes gentle 
hills and flat topography.  The City has flood prone areas along the Willamette River 
and its tributaries and smaller areas that are subject to wildland/urban interface fire 
and landslide risks. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The climate for Corvallis is moderate.  Mean daily temperatures range from highs of 
about 81 degrees and lows of about 51 degrees in July and August to highs of about 
46 degrees and lows of about 33 or 34 degrees in December and January (Corvallis, 
Oregon State University weather station data).  The average annual rainfall is about 
43 inches.  Average monthly precipitation varies from about 6 to seven inches in 
November through January to about 0.4 inch in July.  It rarely snows in Corvallis, and 
most snow melts on the same day it falls. 
 
 
2.2 Population and Demographics 
 
Originally founded as the City of Marysville in 1851, the City was renamed Corvallis in 
1853, and incorporated as one of Oregon’s oldest cities in January 1857.  Oregon 
State University is a land, sea, sun, and space grant institution, one of only two 
institutions of higher education in the United States to hold all four titles.  OSU, first 
chartered as Corvallis College in 1868, currently covers 400 acres of land in and 
around Corvallis.  Student enrollment in the 2006-2007 academic year was over 
19,300, with more than 3,500 in graduate programs. 
 
Corvallis is a medium-sized city with a 2000 decennial census population of 49,332.  
Portland State University estimates the 2006 population was 53,900.  Corvallis is the 
largest city in Benton County, with about two-thirds of the County’s population living in 
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Corvallis.  As a result, Corvallis remains the heart of both the Willamette Valley and 
Benton County. 
 
More detailed population and demographic data for Corvallis from the 2000 census 
are shown below, along with similar data for Oregon.  The age and ethnicity 
categories in Table 2.1 below intentionally include overlapping subsets of categories 
for planning purposes. 
 
Table 2.1 
Corvallis Demographic Data (2000 Census Data) 
 
City of 
Corvallis Oregon
Age
Under 5 years 5.1% 6.5%
Under 18 years 19.2% 24.7%
18 years and over 80.2% 75.3%
18 years to 65 years 70.2% 62.5%
65 years and over 10.0% 12.8%
Ethnicity of Households
White 87.1% 86.6%
Black or African American 1.1% 1.6%
American Indian or Alaska Native 0.8% 1.3%
Asian 5.6% 3.0%
Native Hawiian and Pacific Islander 0.3% 0.2%
Other or two or more races 5.1% 7.3%
Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 5.4% 8.0%
Language spoken at Home
English Only 88.3% 87.9%
Language other than English 11.7% 12.1%
  Speak English less than very well 4.9% 5.9%
  Spanish 4.6% 6.8%
  Other Indo-Eurpoean languages 2.6% 2.6%
  Asian and Pacific Island languages 3.9% 2.4%
Demographic Data
 
 
2.3 Employment and Economics 
 
Corvallis is a regional center for higher education, industrial technology, engineering, 
research, commerce, and health care.  Corvallis is the home of Oregon State 
University, the state's leading research university.  In a 2002, USA Today list, 
Corvallis ranked fourth in the number of patents issued by location, reflecting the 
impact of both Oregon State University and the research done at the Hewlett-Packard 
complex located in Corvallis.  In 2004, the Harvard Business Review ranked Corvallis 
15th (tied with Atlanta) in its Creativity Index, which looks at Technology, Talent, and 
Tolerance.  In 2005, Expansion Management selected Corvallis as a "Five-Star 
Knowledge Worker Metro Area," the highest rating achievable, and in 2006 Corvallis 
was named number two on the National Science Foundation’s list for percentage of 
scientists in the population.   
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The City of Corvallis and Benton County have maintained a strong employment base, 
even as Oregon has had the highest unemployment rate in the United States for the 
last several years.  Benton County consistently holds the state’s lowest unemployment 
rate; in December 2006, Benton County’s seasonally adjusted unemployment rate 
was 4.3% while the state was at 5.4%.  The top ten employers in Corvallis as of the 
most recent compilation by the Corvallis-Benton Chamber Coalition are shown below 
in Table 2.2: 
 
Table 2.2 
Largest Employers in Corvallis 
 
Number of Employees 
 
        Oregon State University       7,393 
        Hewlett Packard       3,440 
        Good Samaritan Hospital      1,800 
        Corvallis School District 509-J       749 
        Holiday Tree Farm          700 
        Corvallis Clinic          600 
        City of Corvallis          440 
        Benton County          379 
        CH2M Hill           378 
        Summit Information Systems         310 
 
Selected economic data for Corvallis from the 2000 census are summarized in Table 
2.3 below.  Corresponding data for Oregon are also shown for reference. 
 
Table 2.3 
Selected Economic Data (2000 Census Data) 
 
City of 
Corvallis Oregon
Population 16 years and older 47,917 3,472,867
In labor force 62.1% 65.2%
Employed 58.5% 61.0%
Unemployed 3.4% 4.2%
Not in Labor Force 37.9% 34.8%
Commuting to Work
Drove alone 68.0% 73.2%
Carpooled 9.6% 12.2%
Public transportation 2.1% 4.2%
Walked 9.8% 3.6%
Other means (including bicycles) 6.8% 1.9%
Worked at home 3.6% 5.0%
Housing Data
Homeownership rate 53.4% 64.3%
Housing units in multi-unit structures 43.3% 23.1%
Incomes and poverty levels
Median household income $52,742 $40,916
Per capita money income $19,968 $20,940
Families below the poverty level 8.6% 7.9%
  with children under 18 years 12.0% 12.4%
  with children under 5 years 15.3% 16.6%
Demographic Data
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2.4 Housing in Corvallis 
 
Housing demographic data from the 2000 census are summarized below.  The data 
reflect the impact of Oregon State University in the city; OSU provides housing on 
campus for fewer than 4,000 of the 19,000 student population, with the vast majority 
of students living off campus in rental housing units. 
 
Table 2.4 
Corvallis Housing Data 
 
City of 
Corvallis Oregon
Total Housing Units 24,218 1,452,709
Occupied units 22,869 1,333,723
Vacant units 1,349 118,986
Vacancy percentage 5.6% 8.2%
Owner-occupied units 48.7% 53.5%
Renter-occupied units 51.3% 38.2%
Demographic Data
 
 
 
The age distribution of Corvallis housing stock is shown below.  Age of housing stock 
is relevant for mitigation planning purposes because older construction is less likely to 
conform to current building codes for fire and earthquake safety standards and are 
less likely to conform to flood plain management regulations.  For example, 42% of 
Corvallis housing stock was built before 1960, with nine percent built before 1940. 
 
Table 2.5 
Corvallis Housing Stock by Year Built 
 
City of 
Corvallis
1990 - March 2000 18.7%
1980 - 1989 9.6%
1970 - 1979 29.3%
1960 - 1969 15.4%
1940 - 1959 18.0%
1939 or earlier 9.0%
Corvallis Housing Stock by Year Built
Demographic Data
 
 
 
2.5 Land and Development 
 
Land use and development patterns in the City of Corvallis are documented by the 
zoning map show below as Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 
Corvallis Zoning Map 
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2.6 Regulatory Context 
 
 2.6.1 Overview 
 
Oregon land use laws require land outside Urban Growth Boundaries (UGBs) to be 
protected for farm, forest, and aggregate resource values.  For the most part, this law 
limits the amount of development in the rural areas.  However, the land use 
designation can change from resource protection in one of two ways: 
 
• The requested change could qualify as an exception to Statewide 
Planning Goals, in which case the city must demonstrate to the State 
that the change meets requirements for an exception.  These lands, 
known as exception lands, are predominantly designated for residential 
use.  
 
• Resource land can also be converted to non-resource use when it can 
be demonstrated to Corvallis that the land is no longer suitable for farm 
or forest production.  
 
Local and state policies currently direct growth away from rural lands into UGBs, and, 
to a lesser extent, into rural communities.  If development follows historical 
development trends, urban areas will expand their UGBs, rural unincorporated 
communities will continue to grow, and overall rural residential density will increase 
slightly with the bulk of rural lands kept in farm and forest use.   The existing pattern of 
development in the rural areas, that of radiating out from the urban areas along rivers 
and streams is likely to continue.  Most of the “easy to develop” land is already 
developed, in general leaving more constrained land such as land in the floodplains or 
on steep slopes to be developed in the future, perhaps increasing the rate at which 
development occurs in natural hazard areas.   
 
2.6.2 Oregon Statewide Planning Goal 7 
 
Oregon State Planning Overview 
Since 1973, Oregon has maintained a strong statewide program for land use planning. 
The foundation of that program is a set of 19 statewide planning goals that express 
the state's policies on land use and on related topics, such as citizen involvement, 
land use planning, and natural resources.  
Most of the goals are accompanied by "guidelines," which are suggestions about how 
a goal may be applied.  Oregon's statewide goals are achieved through local 
comprehensive planning.  State law requires each city and city to adopt a 
comprehensive plan and the zoning and land-division ordinances needed to put the 
plan into effect.  The local comprehensive plans must be consistent with the statewide 
planning goals.  Plans are reviewed for such consistency by the state's Land 
Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC).  When LCDC officially approves 
a local government's plan, the plan is said to be "acknowledged."  It then becomes the 
controlling document for land use in the area covered by that plan.  
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Goal 7 
 
Goal 7: Areas Subject to Natural Disasters and Hazards has the overriding purpose to 
“protect people and property from natural hazards”.  Goal 7 requires local 
governments to adopt comprehensive plans (inventories, policies and implementing 
measures) to reduce risk to people and property from natural hazards.  Natural 
hazards include floods, landslides, earthquakes, tsunamis, coastal erosion, and 
wildfires.    
 
To comply with Goal 7, local governments are required to respond to new hazard 
inventory information from federal or state agencies.   The local government must 
evaluate the hazard risk and assess the: 
a. frequency, severity, and location of the hazard; 
b. effects of the hazard on existing and future development; 
c. potential for development in the hazard area to increase the frequency and 
severity of the hazard; and 
d. types and intensities of land uses to be allowed in the hazard area. 
 
Local governments must adopt or amend comprehensive plan policies and 
implementing measures to avoid development in hazard areas where the risk cannot 
be mitigated.  In addition, the siting of essential facilities, major structures, hazardous 
facilities and special occupancy structures should be prohibited in hazard areas where 
the risk to public safety cannot be mitigated.  The state recognizes compliance with 
Goal 7 for coastal and riverine flood hazards by adopting and implementing local 
floodplain regulations that meet the minimum National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) requirements.    
 
Goal 7 provides local jurisdictions with the following guidelines for planning and 
implementation: 
 
In adopting plan policies and implementing measures for protection from natural 
hazards local governments should consider: 
a. the benefits of maintaining natural hazard areas as open space, 
recreation, and other low density uses; 
b. the beneficial effects that natural hazards can have on natural resources 
and the environment; and 
c. the effects of development and mitigation measures in identified hazard 
areas on the management of natural resources.  
 
Local governments should coordinate their land use plans and decisions with 
emergency preparedness, response, recovery and mitigation programs.  Given the 
numerous waterways and forested lands throughout Corvallis, special attention should 
be given to problems associated with river bank erosion and potential for wild 
land/urban interface fires.   
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Goal 7 guides local governments to give special attention to emergency access 
when considering development in identified hazard areas, including: 
a. Consider programs to manage stormwater runoff as a means to 
address flood and landslide hazards, 
b. Consider non-regulatory approaches to help implement the goal, 
c. When reviewing development requests in high hazard areas, require 
site specific reports, appropriate for the level and type of hazards.  Site 
specific reports should evaluate the risk to the site, as well as the risk 
the proposed development may pose to other properties.  
d. Consider measures exceeding the National Flood Insurance Program.. 
 
Corvallis Compliance With Goal 7 
 
The City evaluates emergency access when considering development.  For the most 
part (with few acceptations), developers are required to build dwellings near the 
roadway in part to provide easier access for emergency vehicles.   Larger 
development proposals must include a stormwater management plan for stormwater 
discharge and development cannot alter an existing waterway.  In conformance with 
NFIP regulations, Corvallis requires that new development in mapped floodplains be 
at least one foot above the base flood elevation, reducing the risk of flood damage.    
 
 
2.7 Community Rating System 
 
Jurisdictions that regulate new development in their floodplains are able to join the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). In return, the NFIP provides federally 
backed flood insurance for properties in participating areas.  Corvallis participates in 
the NFIP program and 414 flood insurance policies are held within Corvallis, per NFIP 
data as of August 31, 2007.   
 
The Community Rating System (CRS) is a part of the NFIP.  The CRS reduces flood 
insurance premiums to reflect what a community does above and beyond the NFIP’s 
minimum standards for floodplain regulation.  Community participation in the CRS is 
voluntary.  Corvallis does participate in CRS with a current rating of 7, which results in 
a 15% discount for flood insurance in Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs, as defined 
by FEMA) and a 5% discount in areas outside SFHAs.   
 
If Corvallis achieved a higher CRS rating, residents would obtain greater discounts (up 
to 45% for the highest rating) for flood insurance and, more importantly, the level of 
flood risk in Corvallis would be reduced. 
 
The objective of the CRS is to reward communities for what they are doing, as well as 
to provide an incentive for new flood protection activities. The reduction in flood 
insurance premium rates is provided according to a jurisdiction’s CRS classification, 
which is dependent upon the number of points awarded the jurisdictions for flood 
reduction activities implemented.   To apply, a jurisdiction submits documentation that 
shows what it is doing and that its activities deserve at least 500 points.  By 
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participating in the CRS program, a jurisdiction not only reduces the risk of loss due to 
flood damage but policy holders gain up significant reductions in flood insurance 
premiums.    
 
There are 18 floodplain management activities credited by the CRS organized under 
four series: 
1. Public Information, 
2. Mapping and Regulations, 
3. Flood Damage Reduction, and 
4. Flood Preparedness. 
 
All but two of the 18 management activities are optional.  The two required activities 
are the elevation certificate and repetitive loss requirements.   Following are the 18 
activities from which a jurisdiction can receive CRS credits.  The City Practice 
comments are verbatim from the 2006 ISO CRS Rating Survey. 
 
1. Elevation Certificates:  This activity provides credit for maintaining records 
of flood data and elevations of new, substantially improved and 
substantially damaged buildings on FEMA’s elevation certificate form.   
Using the FEMA elevation certificate form for all construction after applying 
for the CRS is required of all jurisdictions under the program.  Maintaining 
records prior to applying for the CRS is optional.  
 
City Practice:  Community Development maintains elevation certificates for 
new and substantially improved buildings.  Copies of elevation certificates 
are available upon request.  Elevation certificates are also kept for post-
FIRM buildings.   
   
2. Map Information:  This activity credits assisting the public in reading and 
understanding Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) in response to requests 
from the public.  This service must be publicized and records kept of its 
use.    
 
City Practice:  Credit is provided for furnishing inquirers with flood zone 
information from the community’s latest Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM), 
publicizing the service annual and maintaining records. 
 
3. Outreach Projects:  Credit is provided for advising people every year of 
the flood hazard, the availability of flood insurance, and/or flood protection 
methods. Credit points are based on two factors: the type of outreach 
project and the topics covered by each project. 
 
City Practice:  A community brochure is mailed to all properties in the 
community on an annual basis.  An outreach brochure is mailed annually to 
all properties in the community’s Special Flood Hazard Area (SFHA)> 
 
4. Hazard Disclosure:  Various ways of telling people that a property is in a 
floodplain are credited under the CRS. No credit is given if the information 
is provided only if a person asks. The disclosure information must be 
volunteered or appear on a document, such as a Multiple Listing Service 
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printout, fact sheet, or offer to purchase contract, that house hunters see 
before they have committed to buying or renting the property. 
 
City Practice:  Credit is provided for state and community regulations 
requiring disclosure of flood hazards. 
 
5. Flood Protection Information:  This activity’s credit points are provided 
for two approaches to providing detailed flood-related information to 
residents: through a local public library or through a local governments 
website. Both locations can contain a great deal of information and both 
offer alternatives for people who are hesitant or unable to go to a planning 
office or talk to a local official.  Credit is available for either approach or 
both. 
 
City Practice:  Documents related to floodplain management are available 
in the reference section of the Corvallis-Benton County Library. 
 
6. Flood Protection Assistance:  The objective of this activity is to provide 
interested property owners with general information that responds to their 
needs. Providing construction plans or specifications that should be 
prepared by an architect or engineer is not necessary. This activity must be 
publicized annually in a newsletter, telephone book, or other outreach 
project that reaches everyone in the community or everyone in the 
floodplain. The publicity must meet the same criteria as an outreach project 
that is credited. The assistance office need not be local staff if other 
agencies have agreed to answer inquiries.  Assistance can be provided by 
a combination of offices to secure a range of expertise. This activity does 
not give credit for floodplain ordinance enforcement activities normally 
conducted by a building department, like providing base flood elevations, 
making site visits, and/or reviewing plans to ensure that they comply with 
the building code. 
 
City Practice:  The community provides technical advice and assistance to 
interested property owners and annually publicizes the service. 
 
7. Special Hazard Areas:  FEMA and many states and communities have 
long recognized that the mapping and regulatory standards of the NFIP do 
not adequately address all of the flood problems in the country. There are 
many special local situations in which flooding or flood-related problems do 
not fit the national norm. Therefore, there are situations in which the NFIP’s 
floodplain management criteria do not adequately protect property from 
flood damage.  To encourage local jurisdictions to address these hazards, 
the CRS provides credit for mapping, preserving open space, and 
regulating new development in areas subject to the following eight special 
hazards: 
 
• Uncertain flow paths—alluvial fans, moveable bed streams and 
other floodplains where the channel moves during a flood. 
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• Closed basin lakes—lakes that have a small or no outlet that may 
stay above flood stage for weeks, months, or years. 
• Ice jams—flooding caused when warm weather and rain break up a 
frozen river. The broken ice floats downstream until it is blocked by 
an obstruction, such as a bridge or shallow area, creating a dam. 
• Land subsidence—lowering of the land surface caused by 
withdrawal of subsurface water or minerals or by compaction of 
organic soils. 
• Coastal dunes and beaches. 
• Mudflow hazards—a river, flow, or inundation of liquid mud down a 
hillside, usually as a result of a dual condition of loss of brush cover, 
and the subsequent accumulation of water on the ground preceded 
by a period of unusually heavy or sustained rain. 
• Coastal erosion—areas subject to the wearing away of land masses 
caused primarily by waves on the oceans, Gulf of Mexico, and the 
Great Lakes. 
• Tsunamis—large ocean waves caused by an underwater 
earthquake or volcano. 
 
City Practice: No comments in the ISO survey. 
 
8. Additional Flood Data: “Flood data” include base flood elevations and 
delineation of floodways and coastal velocity zones. This activity credits (1) 
studies conducted outside the SFHA, (2) studies conducted in the SFHA 
where base flood elevations were not shown on the FIRM, (3) restudying 
an area shown on the FIRM where the new study produced higher base 
flood elevations and (4) studies that were conducted to higher standards 
than the normal FEMA mapping criteria.   No credit is provided unless      
(1) the flood study has been adopted by the jurisdiction for regulatory 
purposes and (2) the study either meets or exceeds the criteria in Flood 
Insurance Study Guidelines and Specifications for Study Contractors. 
 
City Practice:  Credit is provided for conducting and adopting flood studies 
for areas not included on the flood insurance rate maps and that exceed 
minimum mapping standards. 
 
9. Open Space Preservation:  This activity credits preserving vacant land in 
the floodplain as open space, i.e., as areas where there will be no buildings 
and no filling. The areas must be preserved as open space either through 
public ownership or by development regulations that prohibit buildings and 
filling. The areas can be public parks, private preserves, playing fields, golf 
courses, or other uses provided that the owner documents that the land will 
stay as open space.  The open space must not be federal land and it must 
not be water (i.e., not a lake or river).  There must be no buildings on the 
land, although parcels larger than 10 acres may have one building that is a 
necessary appurtenance to open space use, such as a restroom facility, 
ranger’s cabin, or bleachers. Open space is not credited in FIRM Zones 
A99 or AR. 
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City Practice:  Credit is provided for preserving approximately 33.48 acres 
in the special flood hazard areas as open space. 
 
10. Higher Regulatory Standards: This activity provides credit for regulations 
that require new development to be protected to one or more standards 
stricter than the NFIP’s minimum requirements.   
• Floodplain management regulations that require freeboard for all new 
buildings and substantial improvements (i.e., all new buildings (and their 
furnaces, utilities, ductwork, etc.) must be elevated or floodproofed to a 
level at least 1 foot above the base flood elevation). 
• Adopt and enforce the soil testing and compaction requirements of the 
Standard, Uniform, National, or International Building Codes (also 
known as the Southern, ICBO, BOCA, and I-Codes). 
• Regulations that require ALL improvements, modifications, additions, 
and reconstruction projects to an existing building to be counted 
cumulatively over a period of at least five years. 
• Establish a threshold for substantial improvements at less than 50%. 
• Prohibit or restrict critical facilities in the floodplain. 
• Regulations that prohibit fill in the floodplain (not just in the floodway) or 
that require compensatory storage.  
• Regulations that prohibit activities in the floodplain that are hazardous to 
public health or water quality or that require that new floodplain 
developments avoid or minimize disruption to shorelines or stream 
channels and their banks. 
• Regulations that prohibit or restrict building enclosures, including 
breakaway walls, below the base flood elevation. 
• Regulations are mandated by state law.  
• Building Code Effectiveness Grading Schedule of class 6 or better. Add 
points if the community has adopted either the International Residential 
Code or the International Building Code (50 points if your community 
adopted both codes). 
• All proposed development projects in the floodplain and the certificates 
of occupancy for such projects are reviewed by a Certified Floodplain 
Manager (CFM). 
• Manufactured home parks in the floodplain where the base flood 
elevation is more than 3 feet deep, require that newly placed 
manufactured homes be elevated above the base flood elevation. 
• Map or otherwise designate the community’s coastal AE Zone (i.e., the 
coastal SFHA that is not mapped as V Zone) and require that all new 
buildings in the coastal AE Zone meet the requirements for buildings in 
V Zones and for openings in A Zones. 
 
 City Practice:  Credit is provided for enforcing regulations that require 
freeboard for new construction and substantial improvement, foundation 
protection, natural and beneficial functions and state mandated regulatory 
standards.  Credit is also provided for a Building Code Effectiveness 
Grading Schedule (BCEGS) Classification of 2/2. 
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11. Land Development Criteria:  This section credits regulatory provisions 
that encourage developers to avoid the floodplain or to minimize the 
amount of construction in the floodplain.  The areas designated for this 
credit cannot be the same as the areas designated for open space credit 
under the open space criteria.   
 
 City Practice: No comment in the ISO survey. 
  
12  Flood Data Maintenance:  Credit is provided for keeping the community’s 
floodplain maps and elevation reference marks more current, useful, or 
accurate in order to improve local regulations, planning, disclosures, and 
property appraisals. 
 
City Practice:  Credit is provided for maintaining and using digitized maps 
in the day to day management of the floodplain.  Credit is also provided for 
establishing and maintaining a system of elevation reference marks. 
 
13. Stormwater Management: This activity credits regulating new 
development in the watershed (not just the floodplain) to minimize the 
adverse impacts of stormwater runoff on downstream flooding and water 
quality. 
 
City Practice:  The community enforces regulations for freeboard in non-
SFHA zones, soil and erosion control, and water quality..   
 
14. Repetitive Loss Requirements: Repetitive loss requirements are 
mandatory for any jurisdiction with at least one repetitive loss property.  A 
repetitive loss property has had two or more claims of at least $1,000 paid 
by the NFIP over a 10-year period since 1978.  A jurisdiction with 10 or 
more repetitive loss properties must review and describe its repetitive loss 
problem, undertake an outreach project, and prepare a floodplain 
management plan. 
 
City Practice:  No comments in the ISO survey. 
  
15. Floodplain Management Planning:  The CRS provides credit for 
preparing, adopting, implementing, evaluating, and updating a 
comprehensive floodplain management plan. The CRS does not specify 
what activities a plan must recommend, but it credits plans that have been 
prepared according to a standard 10-step planning process.  The 10-step 
CRS process is consistent with hazard mitigation planning regulations, 
pursuant to the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (44 CFR 201.6).    
 
City Practice:  No comments in the ISO survey. 
 
16. Acquisition and Relocation:  Credit is provided for acquiring, relocating, 
or otherwise clearing buildings out of the floodplain. This activity credits any 
approach as long as an insurable building is removed from the path of 
flooding. Credit is not provided for structural flood control projects that 
result in revisions to floodplain boundaries.  Acquisition and relocation 
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credit is provided only if the property qualifies for preserved open space.  
CRS credit is provided only for acquisition or relocation projects undertaken 
after the date of the community’s initial FIRM. Credit is provided only if the 
lot is still vacant, even if a new building was built to flood protection 
standards. Credit is provided only for removing the main building on a lot, 
not for removing garages, sheds, or other accessory structures. 
 
City Practice:  No comments in the ISO survey. 
 
17. Drainage System Maintenance:  Under this activity, a local government 
receives credit for defining its drainage system, inspecting it, removing 
debris, correcting drainage problem sites, and regulating dumping in the 
system.  For the purposes of this activity, a jurisdiction’s drainage system 
consists of all natural and human-made watercourses, conduits, and 
storage basins that must be maintained in order to prevent flood damage to 
buildings (including repetitive loss properties) from smaller, more frequent 
storms. In some areas, this will include streets, roadside ditches, 
underground storm sewers, and inlets, as well as open channels and 
detention and retention basins. The defined drainage system must also 
cover those areas having repetitive loss properties, where the cause of the 
losses was due to local drainage problems or smaller, more frequent 
storms. 
 
City Practice:  All of the community’s drainage systems are inspected 
regularly throughout the year and maintenance is performed as needed by 
the Corvallis Public Works Department. Records are being maintained for 
both inspections and required maintenance.  Credit is also given for an 
ongoing Capital Improvements Program. 
 
18. Flood Warning Program:  Credit is provided for a program that provides 
timely identification of impending flood threats, disseminates warnings to 
appropriate floodplain occupants, and coordinates flood response activities. 
The local government must have a flood threat recognition system that 
identifies an impending flood in order to receive credit under this activity.  
  
City Practice:  Credit is provided for a program that provides timely 
identification of impending flood events, disseminates warnings to 
appropriate floodplain residents, and coordinates flood response activities. 
 
 
2.9 Regulatory Context:  Summary Comments 
 
Sections 2.6 to 2.8 above reviewed regulatory programs and issues related to hazard 
mitigation planning.  The state land use planning requirements, Goal 7, and the CRS 
regulations are all regulatory programs.  That is, these programs impose legal 
requirements and restrictions on development that are intended to provide for public 
safety and to minimize the future impacts of disaster events on Corvallis. 
 
In contrast, this Hazard Mitigation Plan is not a regulatory document.  That is, a 
Hazard Mitigation Plan is intended to educate the public about hazards and to 
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encourage prudent practices but it does not mandate practices or regulate 
development.  However, a Hazard Mitigation Plan is closely related so some 
regulatory processes in the sense that greater awareness about and better data on 
hazards may subsequently lead to changes in regulations. 
 
An important objective of developing a Hazard Mitigation Plan is to start the long term 
process of acquiring better data on hazards, vulnerability and risk in Corvallis.  
Acquiring better data may eventually lead to more regulation of identified high hazard 
areas.   However, better data with higher spatial resolution may also result in 
reclassifying areas tentatively mapped as being in potential hazard areas as, in fact, 
not being in hazard areas.   For example, the spatial resolution of mapping of potential 
landslide areas or areas subject to liquefaction in earthquakes is generally low.  More 
refined mapped of such hazards is likely to reduce the areas designated as being 
potentially subject to these hazards. 
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3.0 PUBLIC PROCESS 
 
3.1 Overview 
 
City of Corvallis has a strong history of mitigation planning and involving citizens and 
community partners in many of its planning activities.   
 
Public participation allows a range of public interests to participate and express their 
ideas, thoughts, and opinions on matters that are important to their way of life.  As 
government stewards of the people, City of Corvallis Government has an obligation to 
solicit and receive the view of its citizenry.  Additionally, the State of Oregon and 
FEMA have requirements to receive public input during the development of Land Use 
Plans and flood mitigation plans, respectively. 
 
Corvallis’ mitigation planning activities began well before the City initiated 
development of the Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan, including the City’s’: 
• Active participation in the development of the FEMA-approved Benton 
County Hazard Mitigation Plan.  Three of the 15 Benton County Mitigation 
Plan Steering Committee members represented the City of Corvallis, with 
representatives from the Corvallis Fire, Public Works, and Community 
Developments.  In addition, several more of the Steering Committee 
represented other Corvallis-based organizations, including Good Samaritan 
Regional Medical Center, Oregon State University, ODOT, and CH2M Hill. 
• Active and ongoing focus on implementing Oregon’s Goal 7. 
• Participation in the National Flood Insurance Program, including the 
Community Rating System. 
• Long history of considering natural hazards for land use and zoning 
planning. 
 
The City of Corvallis was also a charter member of the Benton County Emergency 
Management Council (BCEMC).  BCEMC has been exceptionally active in planning 
for and responding to disasters events.  BCEMC has received numerous awards 
including being named Outstanding Regional Task Force by FEMA, two Exemplary 
Practices Awards from Oregon Emergency Management, and an Excellence Award 
from the Western States Seismic Policy Council.  BCEMC was one of the few initial 
organizations granted Project Impact Community status and funding.  Many BCEMC 
members played an active role in the development of the Corvallis Hazard Mitigation 
Plan. 
 
Corvallis also played a major role in Benton County’s unusually active and successful 
Project Impact mitigation programs.  For Benton County overall, $300,000 in Project 
Impact funding was leveraged with other grant funds and over $6.5 million in related 
community projects for a total of over $7.2 million in hazard assessment, education/ 
outreach and mitigation activities.  Many of these projects were in the City of Corvallis, 
including seismic risk assessment for public schools, nonstructural seismic mitigation 
in public schools and other facilities, including the Corvallis Senior Center. The City of 
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Corvallis’ effort included over $5.5 million in mitigation projects, including Dixon Creek 
flood mitigation, Willamette River bank stabilization, and stormwater system upgrades. 
 
 The involvement of the public throughout the plan development process has resulted 
in a Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan that includes the concerns and ideas of 
individuals, organizations, and other agencies and reflects these concerns and ideas 
in the Goals, Objectives, Strategies and Action Items within the plan. 
 
3.2 Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan Steering Committee 
 
A 13-member Steering Committee was formed from City departments with a vested 
interest in mitigation planning, along with one Benton County Representative.  
Members of this committee included: 
 
 Bob Fenner  City of Corvallis Public Works Department 
 Jim Mitchell  City of Corvallis Public Works Department 
 Steve Rogers  City of Corvallis Public Works Department 
 Tom Penprase City of Corvallis Public Works Department 
 John Olson  City of Corvallis Public Works Department 
 Jerry Smith  City of Corvallis Public Works Department 
 Nancy Brewer City of Corvallis Finance Department 
 Ken Gibb  City of Corvallis Community Development Department 
 Dan Carlson  City of Corvallis Community Development Department 
 Roy Emery  City of Corvallis Fire Department 
 Julie Conway  City of Corvallis Parks and Recreation Department 
 Carolyn Rawles-Heiser  City of Corvallis Library Department 
 Mary King  Benton County Emergency Management 
 
 
3.3 Documentation of Corvallis Mitigation Plan Meetings 
 
 Meeting #1 September 6, 2007:  Public Meeting 
5:00 to 7:00 PM, Main Meeting Room Downtown Corvallis Fire Station 
 
The first public meeting was advertised by three notices in the Corvallis Gazette-
Times:  one notice on Sunday August 28th and two notices on September 6th, as 
well as by an extensive e-mail notification list.  The meeting notice was also 
posted on the City of Corvallis website in the “What’s New” Section: 
 
Public Notice 
 
The City of Corvallis is seeking input on the development of a Pre-
Disaster Mitigation Plan. A public meeting will be held 5:00 pm - 7:00 
pm on Thursday, September 6, 2007, in the main meeting room of Fire 
Station 1, 400 NW Harrison Blvd. This meeting will introduce the 
planning process to develop a local hazard mitigation plan, detail the 
purpose and key elements of the Plan, and gather public comment on 
the needs to be included in the Plan. Topics to be discussed include a 
review of the major hazards posing risk to Corvallis such as earthquake, 
flood, wildland/urban interface fires; identify goals, objectives, and 
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mitigation action items; identify data and data sources needed for the 
plan; and outline the steps and schedule to submit the plan to the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency. For more information, 
contact the Public Works Department at 541-766-6916. 
 
The purpose of the meeting, as documented by the meeting notice above and by 
the meeting handouts was to: 
1) Review the context of a local hazard mitigation plan – what it is, what is 
included, why it is important to Corvallis (“Corvallis” in the broadest sense of 
public entities, private entities, and residents). 
2) Review the major hazards posing risk to Corvallis:  earthquake, flood, 
wildland/urban interface fires, etc., drawing on the Benton County Plan. 
3) Present first cut Corvallis-specific goals, objectives and action items to 
provoke thinking and discussion from the stakeholders. 
4) Identify Corvallis-specific data needed for the Corvallis plan, and identify the 
sources of such data. 
5) Outline the steps and schedule necessary to submit the Corvallis  Hazard 
Mitigation Plan to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as 
soon as possible. 
 
The meeting was attended by 12 people, with very active discussions taking up 
two full hours.  The meeting attendance list is included at the end of this chapter. 
 
 
 Meeting #2, September 7, 2007:  City Staff and Other Stakeholders 
 9:00 to 11:00 AM, Madison Building Meeting Room 
 
The second meeting was held the morning after the first meeting, primarily for City of 
Corvallis staff, but with other community stakeholders also present.  The purpose and 
scope of this meeting was very similar to the first public meeting as documented 
above, with a more detailed focus on assigning data collection efforts for Corvallis-
specific data to specific Corvallis staff.   
 
The meeting was attended by 13 people, with very active discussions taking up two 
full hours.  The meeting attendance list is included at the end of this chapter. 
 
 
 Meeting #3, October 15, 2007:  City Staff and Other Stakeholders 
 9:00 AM to 12:00 Noon, Madison Building Meeting Room 
 
The third meeting focused on refining Corvallis-specific mitigation priorities and action 
items, for each of the natural hazards considered in the Corvallis Hazard Mitigation 
Plan. 
 
The meeting was attended by 14 people, with very active discussions taking up three 
full hours.  The meeting attendance list is included at the end of this chapter. 
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 Meeting #4: October 15, 2007:  Public Meeting 
 5:00 to 7:00 PM, Madison Building Meeting Room 
 
This meeting was advertised, as was the first Public Meeting on September 6, but 
multiple notices in the Corvallis Gazette-Times and by notices on the City of Corvallis 
website.  Draft Hazard Mitigation Plan chapters and maps were posted on the City of 
Corvallis website to facilitate review and comment by all stakeholders. 
 
The meeting was attended by 5 people and focused mostly on seismic issues, which 
were of most concern for the audience.  The meeting attendance list is included at the 
end of this chapter. 
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Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan:  Attendance Lists for Meetings 
 
Meeting #1 September 6, 2007:  Public Meeting 
 
 Peggy Pierson, Benton County Emergency Management 
 Mary King, Benton County Emergency Management  
LueAnn Belknap, Linn Benton Food Share 
Jim Mitchell, Corvallis Public Works Transportation Division Mgr.  
Diane Merten   
Roy Emery, Corvallis  Fire Chief 
Robert Fenner, Corvallis Public Works Buildings and Fleet Supervisor 
 John Olson , Corvallis Public Works Utility Services Supervisor 
Sanja Tripathi 
Kevin Harding, Hewlitt Packard 
Brian Leeper 
Ed Pieterick 
 
 
Meeting #2, September 7, 2007:  City Staff  Meeting 
 
Gary Boldizsar, Corvallis Police Chief 
Nancy Brewer, Corvallis Finance Director 
Jim Mitchell, Corvallis Public Works Transportation Division Mgr 
Karen Emery, Corvallis Division Mgr for Parks & Recreation 
Ellen Vollmert, Corvallis Assistant City Mgr. 
John Olson, Corvallis Public Works Collections and Storm Supervisor 
Mike Fegles, Corvallis Development Services Supervisor 
Roy Emery, Corvallis Fire Chief 
Jerry Smith, Corvallis Public Works Communications and GIS Supervisor 
Carolyn Rawles-Heiser, Corvallis Library Director 
Steve Rogers, Corvallis Public Works Director 
Robert Fenner, Corvallis Public Works Buildings & Fleet Supervisor 
Ken Gibb, Corvallis Community Development Director 
 
 
Meeting #3, October 15, 2007:  City Staff and Other Stakeholders 
 
John Olson, Corvallis Public Works Utility Services Supervisor 
Al Warde, Corvallis Public Works Utility Services Supervisor 
Brian Rigwood, Corvallis Public Works Utility Supervisor 
Kevin Harding, Hewlitt Packard 
Sanja Tripathi 
Nancy Brewer, Corvallis Finance Director 
Steve Rogers, Corvallis Public Works Director 
Steve Deghetto, Corvallis Parks Maintenance Supervisor 
Roy Emery, Corvallis Fire Chief 
Dan Henslee, Corvallis Police 
Robert Fenner, Corvallis Public Works Buildings and Fleet Supervisor  
Jim Mitchell, Corvallis Public Works Transportation Division Mgr. 
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Mary King, Benton County Emergency Supervisor 
Ken Gibb, Corvallis Community Development Director 
 
 
Meeting #4: October 15, 2007:  Public Meeting 
 
Jim Mitchell, Corvallis Public Works Transportation Division Mgr. 
Robert Fenner, Corvallis Buildings and Fleet Supervisor 
Ellen Volmert, Corvallis Assistant City Manager 
Roy Emery, Corvallis Fire Chief 
Name, American Legion/Veterans of Foreign Wars 
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4.0 MISSION STATEMENT, GOALS, OBJECTIVES and ACTION 
ITEMS 
 
 
4.1 Overview and 
 
The overall purpose of the Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan is to reduce the impacts of 
future natural or human-caused disasters on Corvallis.  That is, the purpose is to 
make Corvallis more disaster resistant and disaster resilient, by reducing the 
vulnerability to disasters and enhancing the capability to respond effectively to and 
recover quickly from future disasters. 
 
Completely eliminating the risk of future disasters in Corvallis is neither technologically 
possible nor economically feasible.  However, substantially reducing the negative 
impacts of future disasters is achievable with the adoption of this pragmatic Hazard 
Mitigation Plan and ongoing implementation of risk reducing action items.   
 
Incorporating risk reduction strategies and action items into the city’s existing 
programs and decision making processes will facilitate moving Corvallis toward a 
safer and more disaster resistant future. This mitigation plan provides the framework 
and guidance for both short- and long-term proactive steps that can be taken to: 
• Protect life safety, 
• Reduce property damage, 
• Minimize economic losses and disruption, and 
• Shorten the recovery period from future disasters. 
 
In addition, the Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan is intended to meet or contribute 
towards meeting various regulatory requirements, including: 
1. FEMA’s (Federal Emergency Management Agency) mitigation planning 
requirements so that Corvallis remains eligible for pre- and post-disaster 
mitigation funding from FEMA, 
2. Oregon Emergency Management’s mitigation planning evaluation criteria, 
and 
3. Oregon’s Goal 7 natural hazard planning guidelines. 
 
Meeting these regulatory requirements is an essential step to facilitate implementation 
of mitigation measures and in making progress towards achieving the primary 
mission, goals and objectives summarized below. 
 
The Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan is based on a four-step framework that is 
designed to help focus attention and action on successful mitigation strategies:  
Mission Statement, Goals, Objectives and Action Items. 
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• Mission Statement.  The Mission Statement states the purpose and defines 
the primary function of the Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan.  The Mission 
Statement is an action-oriented summary that answers the question “Why 
develop a hazard mitigation plan?” 
• Goals.  Goals identify priorities and specify how Corvallis intends to work 
toward reducing the risks from natural and human-caused hazards.  The Goals 
represent the guiding principles toward which the City’s efforts are directed.  
Goals provide focus for the more specific issues, recommendations and 
actions addressed in Objectives and Action Items. 
• Objectives.  Each Goal has Objectives which specify the directions, methods, 
processes, or steps necessary to accomplish the plan’s Goals.  Objectives lead 
directly to specific Action Items. 
• Action Items.  Action items are specific well-defined activities or projects that 
work to reduce risk.  That is, the Action Items represent the steps necessary to 
achieve the Mission Statement, Goals and Objectives. 
 
4.2 Mission Statement 
 
The mission of the Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan is to: 
 
Proactively facilitate and support city-wide policies, practices, 
and programs that make Corvallis more disaster resistant and 
disaster resilient. 
 
Making Corvallis more disaster resistant and disaster resilient means taking proactive 
steps and actions to: 
• Protect life safety, 
• Reduce property damage, 
• Minimize economic losses and disruption, and 
• Shorten the recovery period from future disasters. 
 
 
4.3 Mitigation Plan Goals and Objectives 
 
Mitigation plan goals and objectives guide the direction of future policies and activities 
aimed at reducing risk and preventing loss from disaster events.  The goals and 
objectives listed here serve as guideposts and checklists as agencies, organizations, 
and individuals begin implementing mitigation action items in Corvallis. 
 
Corvallis’s mitigation plan goals and objectives are based broadly on the goals 
established by the State of Oregon Natural Hazards Mitigation Plan, and are 
consistent with goals and objectives in the Benton County Hazard Mitigation Plan.  
However, the specific priorities, emphasis and language are Corvallis’s.  These goals 
were developed with extensive input and priority setting by agencies, the mitigation 
plan steering committee, stakeholders and citizens from Corvallis. 
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Goal 1:  Reduce the Threat to Life Safety 
Objectives:  
A. Enhance life safety by minimizing the potential for deaths and injuries in 
future disaster events. 
B. Enhance life safety by maximizing the access of emergency services to 
all parts of the city.  
 
 
Goal 2: Protect Critical Buildings, Facilities, and Infrastructure  
 Objective: 
A. Implement activities or projects to protect critical facilities and 
infrastructure in both the public- and private-sectors. 
 
Goal 3:  Enhance Emergency and Essential Services 
A. Seek opportunities to enhance, protect, and integrate emergency and 
essential services.  
B. Strengthen emergency operations plans and procedures by increasing 
collaboration and coordination among public agencies, non-profit 
organizations, business, and industry. 
 
Goal 4: Reduce the Threat to Property 
 Objectives: 
A. Identify buildings and infrastructure at high risk from one or more 
hazards. 
B. Use GIS mapping of hazards and inventory to identify and highlight at 
risk buildings, facilities and infrastructure. 
C. Conduct risk assessments for critical buildings, facilities and 
infrastructure at high risk to determine cost effective mitigation actions 
to eliminate or reduce risk. 
D. Encourage home- and business-owners to evaluate and mitigate risk to 
their properties. 
 
Goal 5: Create a Disaster-Resistant and Disaster-Resilient Economy 
Objectives: 
A. Develop and implement activities to protect economic well-being and 
vitality while reducing economic hardship in post disaster situations. 
B. Reduce insurance losses and repetitive claims for chronic hazard 
events. 
C. Work with State and Federal partners to reduce short-term and long-
term recovery and reconstruction costs.  
D. Expedite pre-disaster and post-disaster grants and program funding. 
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Goal 6: Increase Public Awareness, Education, Outreach, and Partnerships 
 Objectives: 
A. Coordinate and collaborate, where possible, risk reduction outreach 
efforts with both public and private organizations. 
B. Develop and implement risk reduction education programs to increase 
awareness among citizens, local, county, and regional agencies, non-
profit organizations, business, and industry. 
C. Promote insurance coverage for catastrophic hazards 
D. Strengthen communication and coordinate participation in and between 
public agencies, citizens, nonprofit organizations, business, and 
industry.  
 
Goal 7: Vigorously Seek Funding Sources for Mitigation Actions 
 Objectives: 
A. Explore both private and public (local, state and federal) funding 
sources for mitigation actions. 
B. Consider financial and tax incentives to encourage private sector 
mitigation actions in Corvallis. 
 
4.3 Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan Action Items 
 
The Mission Statement, Goals and Objectives for Corvallis, as outlined above, are 
achieved via implementation of specific mitigation action items.  Action items may 
include refinement of policies, data collection to better characterize hazards or risk, 
education, outreach or partnership-building activities, as well as specific engineering 
or construction measures to reduce risk from one or more hazards at specific 
locations within Corvallis. 
 
Action items identified and prioritized during the development of the Corvallis Hazard 
Mitigation Plan are summarized in the following tables.  
 
Individual action items may address a single hazard (such as flood, earthquake, or 
windstorm) or they may address two or more hazards concurrently.  The first group of 
action items is for multi-hazard items that address more than one hazard, followed by 
groups of action items for each of the eight hazards considered in this plan , as 
addressed in Chapters 6 to 13.
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Multi-Hazard Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Establish a formal role for the Corvallis Hazard 
Mitigation Steering Committee to develop a 
sustainable process to encourage, implement, 
monitor, and evaluate citywide mitigation actions
Public Works, Community 
Development, Fire Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Identify and pursue funding opportunities to 
implement mitigation actions
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Participate in public and private sector partnerships to 
foster hazard mitigation activities
Public Works, Community 
Development, City Manager's Office Ongoing X
Short-Term     
#4
Develop separate detailed inventories of at-risk public 
and private buildings and infrastructure and prioritize 
mitigation actions
Public Works, Community 
Development 1-2 Years X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Develop education programs aimed at mitigating the 
risk posed by hazards
Emergency Management, Capital 
Planning and Development Ongoing X
Long-Term     
#2
Integrate the Mitigation Plan findings into planning 
and regulatory documents and programs as 
appropriate
Public Works, Community 
Development, Fire Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#3
Integrate hazard, vulnerability and risk Mitigation Plan 
findings into enhanced Emergency Operations 
planning.
Public Works, Fire, Police Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#4
Update website to include mitigation activities, 
opportunities, and success stories
Emergency Management, Planning, 
Information Services Ongoing X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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Flood Mitigation Action Items:  Within FEMA-Mapped Floodplains
Short-Term     
#1
Inventory critical facilities (if any) within mapped 
floodplains or other high flood risk areas and identify 
mitigation options if such facilities are identified.
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Survey elevation data for buildings within mapped 
floodplains, evaluate flood risk quantitatively, and 
explore mitigation options with property owners.
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X
Flood Mitigation Action Items:  Outside of FEMA-Mapped Floodplains
Short-Term     
#1
Complete the inventory of locations in Corvallis 
subject to frequent storm water flooding
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
For locations with repetitive flooding and significant 
damages or road closures, determine and implement 
mitigation measures such as upsizing culverts or 
storm water drainage ditches
Public Works Ongoing X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
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Winter Storms Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Inventory and remove hazardous trees in City right of 
way Public Works, Parks Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Complete an inventory of locations in Corvallis subject 
to frequent storm water flooding or repetitive tree fall 
problems from wind/ice
Public Works, Parks Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Enhance tree trimming efforts especially for 
transmission lines and trunk distribution lines and 
consider tree trimming ordinance
Public Works, private utilities Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Encourage property owners to trim trees near service 
drops to individual customers Public Works Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#5
Ensure that all critical facilities in Corvallis have 
backup power and emergency operations plans to 
deal with power outages
Public Works, Benton County 
Emergency Management, 
Community Development and 
private owners
1-2  Years X X X
Long-Term     
#1
For locations with repetitive flooding and significant 
damages or road closures, determine and implement 
mitigation measures such as upsizing culverts or 
storm water drainage ditches
Public Works Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
Consider upgrading electric lines and poles to 
improve wind/ice loading, undergrounding critical 
lines, and adding interconnect switches to allow 
alternative feed paths and disconnect switches to 
minimize outage areas
Private utilities 5 Years X X X X X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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Landslide Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete a detailed inventory of locations where 
critical facilities and infrastructure are subject to 
landslides
Public Works, Community 
Development 1-5 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Consider landslide mitigation actions for slides 
seriously threatening critical facilities, other buildings 
or infrastructure
Public Works, Community 
Development 5 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
Limit future development in high landslide potential 
areas Community Development Ongoing X X X X X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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Wildland/Urban Interface Fire Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Identify specific parts of Corvallis at high risk for 
urban/wildland interface fires because of fuel loading, 
topography and prevailing construction practices
Fire 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Identify evacuation routes and procedures for high 
risk areas and educate the public Fire Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#3 Develop Corvallis Wildfire Protection Plan Fire 1-2 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Encourage fire-safe construction practices for existing 
and new construction in high risk areas Fire, Community Development Ongoing X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
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Earthquake Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete seismic retrofits for City Hall and the Marys 
River bridge crossings for water transmission lines, 
both of which are critical facilities for Corvallis, 
urgently requiring retrofit
Public Works 1-2 Years X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Complete seismic retrofit for North Hill 1st Level East 
Reservoir Public Works 1-2 Years X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Complete seismic vulnerability analyses of critical 
facilities with significant seismic vulnerabilities, 
including fire, police, medical, and other emergency 
communication/response facilities
Public Works, community partners 1-5 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Complete seismic vulnerability analyses for lifeline 
utility and transportation systems, including: water, 
wastewater, natural gas, electric power, 
telecommunications and bridges
Public Works, ODOT, private 
utilities 1-5 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#5
Support/steer a project using outside 
support/consultants to complete an inventory of 
public, commercial and residential buildings that may 
be particularly vulnerable to earthquake damage
Public Works, Community 
Development 2-5 years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#6
Educate homeowners about structural and non-
structural retrofitting of vulnerable homes and 
encourage retrofit
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X
Long-Term     #1
Obtain funding and retrofit critical public buildings and 
lifeline utility and transportation facilities with 
significant seismic vulnerabilities
Public Works, ODOT, private 
utilities 10 years X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
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Volcanic Hazards Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Update public emergency notification procedures for 
ash fall events
Public Works, Fire, Police, City 
Manager's Office 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Update emergency response planning for ash fall 
events Public Works, Fire, Police 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Evaluate capability of water treatment plants to deal 
with high turbidity from ash falls and upgrade 
treatment facilities and emergency response plans to 
deal with ash falls
Public Works 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Prepare/pre-script public messages about protection 
from and disposing of volcanic ash Public Works, Fire, Police X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
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Dam Safety Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Prepare high resolution maps of the dam failure 
inundation areas and update emergency response 
plans, including public notification and evacuation 
routes.
Public Works, City Manager's 
Office, Benton County Emergency 
Management
1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Encourage the Corps of Engineers to undertake a 
though seismic risk evaluations for dams upstream of 
Corvallis and to make seismic and/or flood 
improvements as necessary
Benton County Emergency 
Management Ongoing X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
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Utility and Transportation System Disruption Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Educate and encourage residents to maintain several 
days of emergency supplies for power outages or 
road closures
Public Works, Fire, Police, Benton 
County Emergency Management Ongoing X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Review and update emergency response plans for 
disruptions of utilities or roads Public Works, Fire, Police 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Ensure that all critical facilities in Corvallis have 
backup power and emergency operations plans to 
deal with power outages
Public Works, Fire, Police 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Write procedures for maintaining water supply during 
extended power outages Public Works 1-2 years X X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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5.0 PLAN ADOPTION, MAINTENANCE and IMPLEMENTATION 
 
 
5.1 Overview 
 
For a hazard mitigation plan to be effective, it has to be implemented gradually over 
time, as resources become available, continually evaluated and periodically updated.  
Only through developing a system which routinely incorporates logical thinking about 
hazards and cost-effective mitigation into ongoing public- and private-sector decision 
making will the mitigation action items in this document be accomplished effectively.  
The following sections depict how Corvallis has adopted and will implement and 
maintain the vitality of the Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan. 
 
5.2 Plan Adoption 
 
FEMA approval of the Plan was received on ….TBD…..  FEMA approval means that 
Corvallis’s Hazard Mitigation Plan meets national standards and that the City will 
continue to be eligible for hazard mitigation funding from FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation 
Grant Program, the Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program and the Flood Mitigation 
Assistance Program. 
 
The Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan was adopted by the Corvallis City Council on  
….TBD……, making this the effective date of the plan.      
 
Corvallis has the necessary human resources to ensure the Plan continues to be an 
active planning document.  City staff have been active in the preparation of the plan, 
and have gained an understating of the process and the desire to integrate the plan 
into the Corvallis Comprehensive Plan Land Use Plan.  In 2006 the City of Corvallis 
was included in the Benton County’s Hazard Mitigation Plan.  The City of Corvallis is 
required by the Oregon Director of Emergency Services to develop a Multi- Hazard 
Plan for the City of Corvallis.  The Plan will provide the City, private business and the 
public information on how to minimize potential hazard risks in the City.   The city has 
experienced several disasters, flooding, earthquakes of minimal size and winter 
storms.  Through this linkage, the plan will be kept active and be an ongoing working 
document.  
 
Recent major high-profile disasters, including hurricanes on the Gulf Coast and the 
earthquake/tsunami in Indonesia, have raised public awareness about disasters.  
These events, and the growing understanding of the threats posed to Corvallis from 
various national and anthropogenic hazards, have kept the interest in hazard 
mitigation planning and implementation alive at the City Council level, at the city staff 
level, among private sector entities and among the citizens of Corvallis. 
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5.3 Implementation 
 
 Coordinating Body   
 
The Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee will ensure the successful 
implementation of the plan.  Members of Community Development, Public Works, 
Fire, Police, Parks and Recreation, Library, Finance, and City Council will coordinate 
the implementation of the plan and be responsible for periodically monitoring, 
evaluating and updating the plan.  The city will continue to provide staffing to 
accomplish this.  Consistent staffing allows for well-organized meetings and will 
ensure that the right people are involved at the meetings.  The existing active interest 
in mitigation and emergency planning that exists within Corvallis will help to ensure 
the successful implementation of the plan. 
 
Integration of the Hazard Mitigation Plan into Ongoing Programs, 
Policies, and Practices 
 
The mission statement, objectives, goals and action items outlined in Chapter 4 of the 
Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan provide a strong framework and guidance for the 
identified mitigation priorities for Corvallis.  However, the Mitigation Plan is a guidance 
document, not a regulatory document; and thus implementation of the objectives, 
goals and action items can be accomplished most effectively by fully integrating this 
guidance into ongoing city-wide programs, policies and practices.   
 
The City of Corvallis government structure includes a mayor and city council as well 
as numerous departments, boards and commissions, as outline in Figure 5.1 on the 
following page.  Many, indeed most, of the governmental entities have functions which 
overlap with awareness of or education and outreach about hazards posing risk to 
Corvallis and and/or to implementation of hazard mitigation actions in either/or the 
public and private sectors. 
 
The City of Corvallis currently addresses statewide planning goals and legislative 
requirements through its comprehensive land use plan, capital improvement plans, 
and implementation of building codes. The Hazard Mitigation Plan provides a series of 
action items – many of which are closely related to the objectives of these existing 
City programs.  To the extent possible, Corvallis will work to incorporate the 
recommended mitigation action items into existing programs and procedures.  These 
action items will help the City address various other statewide requirements, such as 
land-use planning Goal 7, which was developed to protect life and property from 
natural disasters and hazards through planning strategies that restrict development in 
areas of known hazards.  
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Figure 5.1 
Structure of Corvallis Government 
 
Departments and Divisions: Boards, Commissions and Committees1:
City Manager's Office Airport Commission
Finance Budget Commission
Parks and Recreation Capital Improvement Program Commission
Public Works Citizens Advisory Commission on Civic
Administration    Beautification and Urban Forestry
Engineering Citizens Advisory Commission on Transit
Transportation Committee for Citizen Involvement
Utilities Core Services Committee
Fire Corvallis-Benton County Library Board
Police Downtown and Economic Vitality Plans
Community Development   Implementation Commission
Development Services Historic Resources Commission
Planning Housing and Community Development Commission
Housing Land Development Hearings Board
Administration Open Space Advisory Board
Corvallis-Benton County Public Library Parks, Natural Areas, and Recreation Board
Planning Commission
Riverfront Commission
Watershed Management Advisory Commission
   1 related to hazards and planning
Mayor
City Council
 
 
 
Goal 7 requires that local governments base development plans on inventories of 
known areas of natural disasters and hazards and that the intensity of development 
should be limited by the degree to which the natural hazard occurs within the areas of 
proposed development.  The City’s Planning Department will be responsible for land 
use reviews, and assuring compliance with the zoning codes.  The department will be 
able to use the resources and actions identified in this plan as an avenue to update 
statewide land-use planning Goal 7: Natural Hazards element of the City’s 
comprehensive plan and to integrate mitigation into existing zoning and planning 
documents when applicable. 
 
Additionally, the City is also responsible for issuing building permits and promoting 
compliance with city-adopted construction codes.  After the adoption of this Hazard 
Mitigation Plan, the Development Services Division will review the city’s adopted 
building code to ensure it is sufficient to support its goals and objectives. In addition, 
the Development Services Division will promote safe building practices in an effort to 
have structures more resistant to the impacts of all hazards. 
 
This integration of the Plan with ongoing activities will continue for other plans and 
projects within the City.  As development plans come into the Planning Division, 
reviewers will need to keep in mind potential hazard mitigation actions that may need 
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to be implemented.  The adopted building codes for the City include many standards 
that mitigate potential hazard damage.  The City stays current in adoption of upgraded 
codes, ensuring that the new construction activities will meet the highest standard 
available for hazards such as floods and seismic.  
 
Capital improvement planning that occurs in the future will also contribute to the goals 
in the Hazard Mitigation Plan. Various City Departments, including Finance, Public 
Works, Community Development and Parks and Recreation, develop Capital 
Improvement Programs (CIPs) and review them on an annual basis. The Hazard 
Mitigation Planning Committee will work with these departments to identify any 
relevant action items from Hazard Mitigation Plan and work to incorporate such 
actions into the appropriate sections of the City’s CIP’s. 
 
Within six months of formal adoption of the City’s Hazard Mitigation Plan, the 
procedures listed above will be incorporated into the process of existing planning 
mechanisms at the City level. The meetings of the Hazard Mitigation Planning 
Committee will provide an opportunity for committee members to report back on the 
progress made on the integration of mitigation planning elements into City planning 
documents, policies, procedures, and programs. 
 
 
 Cost Effectiveness of Mitigation Projects 
 
As Corvallis and other entities, public or private, within the City consider whether or 
not to undertake specific mitigation projects or evaluate how to decide between 
competing mitigation projects, they must answer questions that don’t always have 
obvious answers, such as: 
What is the nature of the hazard problem? 
How frequent and how severe are hazard events? 
Do we want to undertake mitigation measures? 
What mitigation measures are feasible, appropriate, and affordable? 
How do we prioritize between competing mitigation projects? 
Are our mitigation projects likely to be eligible for FEMA funding? 
 
Corvallis recognizes that benefit-cost analysis is a powerful tool that can help 
communities provide solid, defensible answers to these difficult socio-political-
economic-engineering questions.  Benefit-cost analysis is required for all FEMA-
funded mitigation projects, under both pre-disaster and post-disaster mitigation 
programs.  Thus, communities seeking FEMA funding must understand benefit-cost 
analysis.  However, regardless of whether or not FEMA funding is involved, benefit-
cost analysis provides a sound basis for evaluating and prioritizing possible mitigation 
projects for any natural hazard.  Thus, Corvallis will use benefit-cost analysis and 
related economic tools, such as cost-effectiveness evaluation, to the extent 
practicable in prioritizing and implementing mitigation actions.  See the Benefit-Cost 
Appendix at the end of the Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan for details on the benefit-
cost analysis process. 
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 5.4 Plan Maintenance  
 
  Periodic Monitoring, Evaluation and Updating 
 
The Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan will be monitored and evaluated annually and 
updated at least every five years.   As the community gradually implements the action 
items within the Plan, remaining action items may evolve or priorities may change.  
The hazards that exist in Corvallis will continue to exist, but the conditions within the 
community, such as the population and development patterns, will undoubtedly 
continue to change.  As such changes occur gradually over time, the Plan will be 
regularly monitored, evaluated, and updated to ensure that it remains up-to-date and 
retains its vitality and relevance. 
 
Local, state and federal agencies will conduct or refine studies that may lead to new or 
better information on specific hazards.  For example, flood plan maps are periodically 
updated and new studies may better define landslide or debris flow areas or areas 
subject to liquefaction during earthquakes.  The new information will need to be 
incorporated not only into the Hazard Mitigation Plan but also into other documents, 
such as the Comprehensive Plan.    
 
Changes in the priorities of citizens of Corvallis may also affect the effectiveness of 
the Plan.   Community values are regularly monitored through the Comprehensive 
Plan update process.   As the Comprehensive Plan is implemented and updated, the 
Hazard Mitigation Plan will be reviewed as well. 
 
The Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee will meet at least annually to review and 
evaluate the Plan.  This will be the opportunity to incorporate new information into the 
Plan and remove outdated items and completed actions.  This will also be the time to 
recognize the success of the community in implementation of action items.  All 
revisions of the Plan will be taken to the City Council for formal acknowledgement as 
part of Corvallis’s Plan maintenance and implementation program.  The Hazard 
Mitigation Planning Committee will also have lead responsibility for the formal updates 
of the plan every five years. 
 
 
Continued Public Involvement and Participation 
 
Implementation of the mitigation actions identified in the Plan must engage the 
community.  The participation that led to the Plan was the result of existing community 
networks, and these networks will continue to participate as the community-wide 
mitigation activities identified in the plan are implemented.  Some projects can be 
done at the volunteer level, and others will require technical expertise.  The 
stakeholders in the planning process will become project partners, as needed, on 
specific items.   
 
There are many organizations within the City that have common interests and 
concerns, including hazard mitigation.  Organizations such as Benton County, Good 
Samaritan Hospital, Benton County Emergency Services, Hewitt Packard, Corvallis 
Chamber Commerce and various other large and small businesses will be important 
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partners in the implementation of the Plan over time.  Successful completion of high 
priority mitigation action items will require ongoing project planning with active 
participation from all stakeholders. 
 
Corvallis has a proven history of involving, and continues to involve, multiple partners 
in planning and mitigation work.  These partnerships with local, state, and federal 
partners have resulted in comprehensive plans and projects that could not have been 
completed by any agency alone.  This cooperation is also demonstrated by the broad-
based makeup of the Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee. 
 
Corvallis is dedicated to involving the public directly in the ongoing monitoring, 
evaluating and updating of the Hazard Mitigation Plan.  Copies of the Plan will be 
posted on the City’s website, which will also contain an email address and phone 
number to which people can direct their comments and concerns about hazard 
mitigation issues and priorities. 
 
Public meetings will also be held after each annual evaluation or when deemed 
necessary by the Hazard Mitigation Planning Committee, The meetings will provide 
the public a forum at which they can express their concerns, opinions, or ideas about 
the Plan. The representatives from Public Works, Community Development and Fire 
Department will maintain public involvement and advertise for the public meetings 
through existing community organizations such as. The City’s represenatives will be 
responsible for using City resources to publicize the annual public meetings and 
maintain public involvement, to include the City’s website, informational posters, City 
newsletter, email distribution lists, and local newspapers. 
 
STAPLE/E Approach 
 
Corvallis will also use the STAPLE/E methodology developed by the State of Oregon: 
“State of Oregon’s Local Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan: An Evaluation Process”.  
Using STAPLE/E criteria, mitigation activities can be evaluated quickly in a systematic 
fashion based on the Social, Technical, Administrative, Political, Legal, Economic, and 
Environmental (STAPLE/E) considerations and opportunities for implementing 
particular mitigation action items in the City.  The STAPLE/E approach is helpful for 
doing a quick analysis of mitigation projects. Most projects that seek federal funding 
and others often require more detailed Benefit/Cost Analyses. 
 
The following are suggestions for how to examine each aspect of the STAPLE/E 
Approach.  
 
Social: Planning Division staff, local non-profit organizations, or local planning groups 
can help answer these questions. 
• Is the proposed action socially acceptable to the community?  
• Are there equity issues involved that would mean that one segment of the 
community is treated unfairly? (Or one segment more favorably?) 
• Will the action cause social disruption? 
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Technical: Public Works, Engineering and Development services Division staff can 
help answer these questions. 
• Will the proposed action work? 
• Will it create more problems than it solves? 
• Does it solve a problem or only a symptom? 
• Is it the most useful action in light of other goals? 
 
Administrative: Elected officials can help answer these questions. 
• Is the action implementable? 
• Is there someone to coordinate and lead the effort? 
• Is there sufficient funding, staff, and technical support available? 
• Are there ongoing administrative requirements that need to be met? 
 
Political: City Council members and planning officials can help answer these 
questions. 
• Is the action politically acceptable? 
• Is there public support both to implement and to maintain the project? 
 
Legal: Include legal counsel, land use planners, and risk managers in this discussion. 
• Who is authorized to implement the proposed action? 
• Is there a clear legal basis or precedent for this activity? 
• Are there legal side effects? Could the activity be construed as a taking? 
• Is the proposed action allowed by the comprehensive plan, or must the   
comprehensive plan be amended to allow the proposed action? 
• Will the City be liable for action or lack of action? 
• Will the activity be challenged? 
 
Economic: City Economic Development staff, civil engineers, Building Department, 
and the County Assessment and Tax Assessor Office can help answer these 
questions. 
• What are the costs and benefits of this action? 
• Do the benefits exceed the costs? 
• Are initial, maintenance, and administrative costs taken into account? 
• Has funding been secured for the proposed action? If not, what are the 
potential funding sources (public, non-profit, and private)? 
• How will this action affect the fiscal capability of the City? 
• What burden will this action place on the tax base or economy? 
• What are the budget and revenue effects of this activity? 
• Does the action contribute to other goals, such as capital improvements or 
economic development? 
• What benefits will the action provide? (This can include dollar amount of 
damages prevented, number of homes protected, credit under the CRS, 
potential for funding under the HMGP or the FMA program, etc.) 
 
Environmental: Environmental groups, land use planners, public works, and natural 
resource managers can help answer these questions. 
• How will the action impact the environment? 
• Will the action need environmental regulatory approvals? 
• Will it meet local and state regulatory requirements? 
• Are endangered or threatened species likely to be affected? 
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6.0  FLOOD HAZARDS 
 
Corvallis is subject to flooding from several different types of flood sources, including: 
1) over bank flooding from the Willamette River and the Marys River, 
2) over bank flooding from numerous smaller creeks which are tributaries to 
the above rivers, and 
3) local storm water drainage flooding. 
 
Flooding on streams and rivers within Corvallis generally results from large winter 
storms from the Pacific, which often result in simultaneous flooding on many rivers 
and streams in an affected area.  However, because of geographic variations in 
rainfall amounts and differences in drainage areas, slopes, and other watershed 
characteristics, the severity of flooding in any given rainfall event often varies 
significantly from stream to stream and location to location.  Historically, most major 
floods in Corvallis have occurred in the months of December, January and February, 
although flooding in other months is certainly possible. 
 
 
6.1 Historical Floods in Corvallis 
 
Historically, flooding has occurred in Corvallis throughout the recorded history of the 
area, ever since the first European settlers arrived in the area in the mid-1800s. 
 
The FEMA Flood Insurance Studies for Corvallis (August 5, 1986) and for Albany (July 
7, 1999) have a brief history of major historical floods in Corvallis.  Major floods on the 
Willamette River occurred in 1861, 1890, 1901, 1909, 1923, 1964, 1972, and 1974.   
Lesser floods occurred in 1943, 1945, 1946, 1948, 1953, 1961, and 1977.   
 
The 1861 was the greatest flood event along the Willamette.  Without flood control 
measures, the 1964 flood would have been the greatest flood of the 20th century; 
however, flood control measures greatly reduced the peak flood discharge and flood 
elevations and thereby greatly reduced areas affected by the flood.  Even so, 
extensive flooding occurred in North Albany, South Corvallis and other areas along 
the river. 
 
Flooding potential along the Willamette River has been substantially reduced by the 
11 major flood control reservoirs on the Willamette with about 1.7 million acre feet of 
flood control storage.  Despite the reduction in flood potential from construction of the 
dams, portions of Corvallis continue to have a significant level of flood risk from the 
major rivers as well as from the numerous streams running through Corvallis.  The 
dams on the Willamette have not reduced flood risk on the Marys River or on the 
smaller streams. 
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6.2 The 1996 Flood 
 
The most recent significant flood event in Corvallis occurred in February 1996.  
Unusually heavy rains over the four-day period from February 5th to February 8th 1996 
resulted in significant flooding on numerous rivers and streams throughout western 
Oregon.  In Corvallis, flood impacts continued for several days after the end of heavy 
rainfall. 
 
The following narratives about the 1996 flood are from:  The Cascades West Region 
of Oregon and the February Flood of 1996:  A Regional Flood Recovery Plan for 
Benton, Lane, Lincoln, and Linn Counties (November 1996). 
 
The already saturated ground caused the rain to flow into the creeks and soon 
overflow their banks in the north and south ends of Corvallis.  147 people were 
rescued by rubber raft in north Corvallis on Tuesday Feb 6.  The situation continued to 
worsen throughout the county, but specifically in the City of Corvallis.  The Marys 
River (Philomath/Corvallis) and overtopped their banks and isolated homes and 
motorists, prompting more rescues throughout Tuesday and Wednesday.  The 
Willamette River in Corvallis came within 6 inches of flood stage, but did not flood.  
However, it affected the Marys River, which could not feed into the Willamette and 
discharge their flood waters. 
 
Shelters were established in Corvallis.  Dixon, Oak and Squaw Creeks overflowed 
their banks, and storm runoff flooded many streets.  The Marys River and Mill Race 
also overflowed their banks and affected south Corvallis.  The sewer and storm drains 
were over capacity and sewage contaminated much of the water.  The main north-
street through town was closed at 8 pm, after many vehicles were stalled in the high 
water.  Drainage ditches overflowed onto the highway and flooded homes and 
businesses in south Corvallis.  Sandbagging attempts kept some of the water at bay, 
but not all of it.  On Thursday morning, south Corvallis was cut off from the rest of the 
city.  As the day worsened, the bridges over the Willamette (Hwy 34/20) were closed.  
The waters continued to back up into basements and began to flood key facilities 
(Pacific Power control station and Corvallis Law Enforcement Building).  On Friday, 
the waters crested and shuttles were used to bring residents to and from south 
Corvallis.  Cost estimates of the flood for the City of Corvallis totaled $465,091. 
 
 
6.3 Flood Hazards and Flood Risk: Within Mapped Floodplains 
 
 6.3.1 Overview    
 
FEMA Floodplain Maps show areas where the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) has determined that a flood hazard exists.   Nearly all communities in 
Corvallis have at least some portion of the mapped hazard areas, or floodplains, 
within their jurisdiction.   The FEMA-mapped floodplains in Corvallis are summarized 
below in Table 6.1 from the FEMA Flood Insurance Studies (FIS) for Corvallis.  Each 
FIS includes a summary of historical flood experience along with quantitative data on 
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stream discharges (volume of water flowing in the river or stream) and flood 
elevations.  
 
For the most part, the FEMA-mapped floodplains in Corvallis include only areas along 
the larger rivers and streams, which also have significant concentrations of 
development and population.  Throughout Corvallis, there are many other localized 
areas that have significant flood risk but are not included in the FEMA mapped 
floodplains because the streams are too small and/or because the flood-prone 
population is too small.  Furthermore, there are additional localities within Corvallis 
were flooding occurs because of local storm water drainage, rather than overbank 
flooding from rivers and streams.  Such, local storm water drainage areas are not 
mapped by FEMA.  Thus, evaluation of flood hazards in Corvallis must consider not 
only the FEMA-mapped floodplains, but also the other localized areas of repetitive 
flooding or high flood risk outside of the mapped floodplains (see Section 6.4). 
 
Table 6.1 
FEMA-Mapped Floodplains in Corvallis 
 
Flood 
Insurance 
Study
Flood Sources with           
Detailed Studies1
Flood Sources with Approximate 
Studies1
Willamette River Sequoia  Ditch
Marys River North Fork Squaw Creek2
Millrace and Millrace Overflow South Fork Squaw Creek2
Steward Slough Oak Creek
Dixon Creek North Fork Dixon Creek
South Fork Dixon Creek South Fork Dixon Creek
Squaw Creek2 Unnamed tributary to Dixon Creek
South Fork Squaw Creek
Oak Creek
Corvallis (July 2, 1984)
1 Detailed and approximate studies include specific portions of the reaches along 
these flood sources as listed in each Flood Insurance Study.
2 Subsequent to the FEMA Flood Insurance Study, Squaw Creek has been 
renamed Dunawi Creek.  
 
FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRMs) for the above mapped areas show flood 
plain details such as the 100-year and 500-year flood plain boundaries.  For Corvallis, 
there are six FIRMs (effective date January 3, 1985), which are the most recent maps.  
 
FEMA-mapped floodplains in Corvallis include: 
1) a broad swath of the lowlands along the reach of the Willamette River, and 
2) bands along the smaller FEMA-mapped rivers and creeks in Corvallis.  
 
A synopsis of these FEMA mapped flood-prone areas in Corvallis is given below in 
Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 
Synopsis of FEMA-Mapped Flood-Prone Areas in Corvallis 
 
FIRM Maps Flood Source Geographic Area
Willamette River
band along the west bank of the river, extending to or near 1st Street, 
with wider flood-prone areas in the vicinity of Marys River and the 
Millrace and in the vicinity of Dixon Creek
Dixon Creek, including 
North and South Forks
Narrow bands along these creeks, extending to a wider band 
downtown in vicinity of Polk and Buchanan to the Willamette River
Sequoia Ditch Area in vicinity of Sycamore Ave., Sequoia Ave. and 9th St. and area along Circle Blvd, east of the railroad tracks
Steward Slew area in northeast Corvallis west of Canterbury, south to Plymouth Circle and Sherwood Way and west to the railroad tracks
Oak Creek Area north of Highway 20/34 west of 27th Street
Marys River Areas north and south of Highway 20/34
Squaw Creek, including 
North and South Forks1
narrow bands along these creeks, extending to the Marys River
Mill Race and Marys River Area between Marys River and Millrace, east of the railroad tracks, south to vicinity of Tunison Ave.
Corvallis (6 FIRMs)
1 Subsequent to the FEMA Flood Insurance Study, Squaw Creek has been renamed Dunawi Creek.  
 
An important caveat in interpreting the FEMA floodplain maps (and the synopsis 
above) is that there are additional areas of Corvallis, not within the mapped 
floodplains, that are also at flood risk.  These flood-prone areas are discussed later in 
this chapter (Section 6.4). 
 
Full details of the FEMA-mapped flood plains in Corvallis are shown on the six FIRMs 
referenced above.   The following maps give an overview of these mapped flood-
prone areas.  Figure 6.1 shows a city-wide overview of floodplains while Figures 6.2 
through 6.6 show more localized areas.  For full details of the FEMA-mapped 
floodplains in Corvallis see the FEMA FIRM maps.  
 
From an overlay of Corvallis GIS data with the FEMA floodplain maps, it has been 
determined that there are 1679 buildings in Corvallis whose footprint is within the 
mapped 100-year floodplain and an additional 1439 buildings whose footprint is above 
the 100-year floodplain, but within the 500-year floodplain.  Thus, in total, there are 
over 3100 buildings in Corvallis that may be at significant flood risk.  These building 
data include a few greenhouses, miscellaneous structures, and buildings under 
construction.  
 
These data do not consider the elevation of the structures.  Many of these structures 
may be within the floodplain, but with first floor elevations above the flood levels.  
More detailed quantitative flood risk assessment for these buildings requires elevation 
data. 
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Figure 6.1 
FEMA Mapped Floodplains in Corvallis 
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Figure 6.2 
Downtown Corvallis FEMA Floodplain 
(with Critical Facilities also shown) 
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Figure 6.3 
Central Downtown Area with FEMA Floodplain and 1996 Flood Boundaries 
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Figure 6.4 
North Corvallis FEMA Floodplain 
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Figure 6.5 
Dixon Creek FEMA Floodplain 
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Figure 6.6 
Marys River FEMA Floodplain 
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 6.3.2 Flood Hazard Data 
 
For mapped floodplain areas, the flood hazard data included in the Flood Insurance 
Study (FIS) allow quantitative calculation of the frequency and severity of flooding for 
any property within the floodplain.  Such calculations are very important for mitigation 
planning, because they allow the level of flood risk for any structure to be evaluated 
quantitatively.  The example below illustrates these concepts. 
 
For example, for the Willamette River between the westbound and eastbound 
Highway 34 Bridges, the 1999 FEMA FIS for Albany includes the following data:   
 
Table 6.3 
Flood Hazard Data 
Willamette River at Highway 34 
 
Flood Frequency 
(years)
Discharge 
(cfs)
Elevation 
(feet)
10 107,000 214.2
50 153,000 218.3
100 177,000 219.8
500 246,000 222.9  
 
The stream discharge data shown above are from the table on page 12 of the FIS for 
Corvallis, for the Willamette River stream gage at Highway 34  Stream discharge 
means the volume of water flowing down the river and is typically measured in cubic 
feet of water per second (cfs).  The flood elevation data are from the Flood Profile 
Graph 01P in the FIS.  Flood elevation data vary with location along the reach of the 
river and thus separate flood elevation data points must be read from the graph at 
each location along the river.  The flood elevation data above for the Willamette River 
are at the Highway 34 Bridge. 
 
Quantitative flood hazard data, such as shown above, are very important for mitigation 
planning purposes because they allow quantitative determination of the frequency and 
severity (i.e., depth) of flooding for any building or other facility (e.g., road or water 
treatment plant) for which elevation data exist.  For example, a building located in 
Corvallis near the Highway 34 Bridge  (cf. Table 6.3 above), with a first floor elevation 
of 214 feet is expected to flood about once very 10 years, on average.  50-year, 100-
year, and 500-year flood events would result in about 4.2 feet, 5.8 feet and 7.9 feet of 
water above the first floor, respectively.  Thus, such a structure would demonstrably 
be at significantly high flood risk.   However, another structure in the same vicinity with 
a first floor elevation of 220 feet would still be at flood risk, albeit at a much lower level 
of risk, with flooding reaching the first floor only about once every 100 years, on 
average. 
 
Such quantitative flood hazard data also facilitate detailed economic analysis (e.g., 
benefit-cost analysis) of mitigation projects to reduce the level of flood risk for a 
particular building or other facility.   
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 6.3.3 Interpreting Flood Hazard Data for Mapped Floodplains 
 
The level of flood hazard (frequency and severity of flooding) is not determined simply 
by whether the footprint of a given structure is or is not within the 100-year floodplain. 
A common error is to assume that structures within the 100-year floodplain are at risk 
of flooding while structures outside of the 100-year floodplain are not.  Some 
importance guidance for interpreting flood hazard is given below. 
 
A. Being in the 100-year floodplain does not mean that floods happen 
once every 100 years.  Rather, a 100-year flood simply means that 
the probability of a flood to the 100-year level or greater has a 1% 
chance of happening every year. 
 
B. Much flooding happens outside of the mapped 100-year floodplain.  
First, the 100-year flood is by no means the worst possible flood.  
For example, for flooding along the Willamette River in Corvallis, the 
500-year flood is about three feet higher than the 100-year flood (cf. 
data in Table 6.3 above).  Thus, floods greater than the 100-year 
event will flood many areas outside of the mapped 100-year 
floodplain.  Second, many flood prone areas flood because of local 
storm water drainage conditions.  Such flood prone areas have 
nothing to do with the 100-year floodplain boundaries. 
 
C. The key determinant of flood hazard and flood risk for a structure or 
other facility is the relationship of the elevation of the structure or 
facility to the flood elevations for various flood events.  Thus, homes 
with first floor elevations below or near the 10-year flood elevation 
have drastically higher levels of flood hazard and risk than other 
homes in the same neighborhood with first floor elevations near the 
50-year or 100-year flood elevation. 
 
The FEMA FIRM maps use a variety of nomenclature to describe different 
types of flood-prone area and flood plain classifications have changed over 
time.  For reference, definitions of some important flood plain terms commonly 
used on FIRMs are given below. 
 
The FEMA floodplain maps include the following types of flood-prone areas: 
 
1. Zone AE, within the 100-year floodplain, with base flood elevation (100-
year flood) and detailed flood hazard data.  On older FIRMs, numbered A-
Zones (A1 to A30) have similar flood information. 
 
2. Zone A, within 100-year flood plain, but without base flood elevation or 
detailed flood hazard data. 
 
3. Zone AH, flood depths of 1 to 3 feet (usually areas of ponding), base flood 
elevations determined. 
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4. Zone AO, flood depths of 1 to 3 feet (usually sheet flow on sloping terrain). 
 
5. Zone A99, to be protected from 100-year flood by Federal flood protection 
system under construction, no base flood elevations determined. 
 
6. Zone X (shaded), areas of 500-year flood, areas of 100-year flood with 
average depths less than 1 foot or with drainage areas less than 1 square 
mile, and areas protected by levees from 100-year flood.  On older FIRMS, 
Zone B areas have similar meaning. 
 
7. Zone X (unshaded), areas outside 500-year flood plain. 
 
8. Zone D, areas in which flood hazards are undetermined. 
 
 
6.3.4 Caveats for Corvallis Flood Insurance Study 
 
The Flood Insurance Studies (FIS) for Corvallis were published in 1984.  Flood hazard 
conditions often change with time as channels and watersheds evolve with increasing 
development and other changes.  Over time, the accuracy of a FIS typically 
diminishes with time and any FIS should be redone periodically to ensure that data 
are accurate and up to date for flood zoning and mitigation planning purposes.   
 
In many cases, increasing development within watersheds (which increases runoff), 
and gradual accumulation of sediment and debris in channels results in higher flood 
levels with time.  In other cases, however, improvements in storm water management 
or channel improvements may results in lower flood levels. 
 
Simply because an FIS is old, does not necessarily mean that a FIS is obsolete or 
inaccurate.  However, the older a study is, the more likely it is that channel or 
watershed conditions have changed over time.  Therefore, as time passes, care 
should be taken in interpreting and using data from the FIS, especially in reaches of 
rivers or streams where substantial channel changes are documented or flood control 
measures have been added. 
 
FEMA has recognized that may FIS’s are old and is in-process with a nationwide map 
modernization program which is intended to update all of the FIS’s and FIRMs and 
map additional areas.  However, this map modernization program will not be 
completed for several years at the earliest.  Meanwhile, the existing FIS’s and FIRMs 
for Corvallis are generally the best available flood data. 
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6.4 Flood Hazards and Flood Risk:  Outside of Mapped Floodplains 
 
The discussion above in Section 6.3 above applies only to the limited portions of 
Corvallis that are within the FEMA-mapped floodplains of the major rivers and portions 
of some of the smaller streams.  For mitigation planning purposes, it is very important 
to recognize that flood risk for a community is not limited only to areas of mapped 
floodplains.  Other portions of Corvallis outside of the mapped floodplains may also at 
relatively high risk from over bank flooding from streams too small to be mapped by 
FEMA or from local storm water drainage.   
 
Some areas of Corvallis outside of mapped floodplains may also subject to repetitive, 
damaging floods from local storm water drainage, separate from overbank flooding 
from creeks too small to be mapped.  In many cases, local storm water drainage 
flooding occurs along unnamed gullies or simply in low spots.  There are probably 
numerous such flood prone sites in Corvallis; some of these sites may have 
experienced repetitive flooding over many years.  Unlike FEMA-mapped floodplains 
for larger rivers and creeks, areas subject to storm water drainage are not 
systematically mapped.   
 
The storm water management system in Corvallis includes nine storm water detention 
facilities, about 160 miles of storm water pipes, 4,872 catch basins and 2,499 
manholes.  The City also maintains about 14 miles of urban streams (open 
drainageways).   
 
Most storm water drainage systems, including those in Corvallis, are designed to 
handle small to moderate size rainfall events.  Storm water systems are sometimes 
designed to handle only 2-year or 5-year flood events, and are rarely designed to 
handle rainfall events greater than 10-year or 15-year events.   
 
For local rainfall events that exceed the collection and conveyance capacities of the 
storm water drainage system, some level of flooding inevitably occurs.  In many 
cases, local storm water drainage systems are designed to allow minor street flooding 
to carry off storm waters that exceed the capacity of the storm water drainage system.  
In larger rainfall events, flooding may extend beyond streets to include yards.  In major 
rainfall events, local storm water drainage flooding can also flood buildings.  In 
extreme cases, local storm water drainage flooding can sometimes result in several 
feet of water in buildings, with correspondingly high damage levels.   
 
 
6.5 Inventory Exposed to Flood Hazards in Corvallis 
 
Critical facilities such as emergency communications, fire stations, police stations, 
medical care facilities are, by definition, particularly important to a community.  
Similarly, key transportation and utility infrastructure are also particularly important to 
a community.  One important action item for Corvallis Hazard Mitigation Plan is to 
compile an inventory of such critical facilities that are at high risk for each hazard, 
including floods.  A list of critical facilities located within the FEMA-mapped 100-year 
or 500-year floodplains is given below in Table 6.4.  These facilities are also shown in 
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Figure 6.7.  Transportation routes in or near Corvallis which are subject to flooding are 
shown Figure 6.8 following the critical facilities map. 
 
Table 6.4 
Critical Facilities in Corvallis within 100-Year and 500-Year Floodplains  
 
 
Public Buildings
1205 - 1245 NE 3rd St. Public Works
1205 - 1245 NE 3rd St Fire Dept. Drill Tower
365 SW Tunison Ave. Fire Station
1310 SW Avery Park Drive Parks
360 SW Avery Benton County
1315 SW E Ave Corvallis School District
Utility Facilities
3140 SE Clearwater Dr. Corvallis Water Treatment
900 NE 2nd St. AT&T Telephone
1221 SW 15th St. KLOO/KFAT Radio Transmitter
Hwy 20 & Garden Ave Northwest Natural Gas
5 locations Corvallis Wastewater Lift Stations
6 locations Fiber optics communications 
Care Facilities
1780 SW 3rd St. Vocational Care
165 NE Conifer Residential Care
1940 SE Stone St. Residential Care  
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Figure 6.7 
Critical Facilities in Corvallis within 100-Year and 500-Year Floodplains 
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Figure 6.8 
Flood Hazards to Transportation Routes 
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To quantify the level of flood hazard for buildings, other facilities or infrastructure, 
within mapped floodplains, it is necessary to determine the elevations of these 
structures.  Only by determining the elevation of each potentially flood-prone structure, 
can the level of flood hazard (frequency and severity of flooding) be calculated 
accurately.  Similarly, acquiring elevation data for additional structures within the 500-
year flood plain as well as for structures in other flood-prone areas outside of mapped 
floodplains would greatly increase the accuracy of hazard, inventory, and vulnerability 
assessments for floods in Corvallis. Compiling and interpreting such elevation data, 
especially for critical facilities is encouraged as a high priority action item. 
 
The best structure elevations (first floor elevations) are those determined accurately 
by surveying.  Flood insurance certificates generally include survey elevation data.  
Absent survey data, however, useful estimates of elevations for structures can often 
be made by reference to elevations of nearby structures or public infrastructure with 
surveyed elevation data.  In addition to elevation data, quantifying the level of risk 
faced by these structures requires basic data about each structure, including building 
data (square footage, number of stories, with or without basement), and information 
on the type and importance of function (residential, commercial, public). 
 
As noted above, many localized areas of Corvallis, outside of the mapped floodplains, 
may also be subject to relatively high levels of flood risk.  To quantify the level of flood 
risk posed by these areas, historical data should be systematically compiled to include 
documentation of the frequency and severity of flooding.  Severity of flooding can 
include dollar estimates of past damages, if available, and/or simple narratives 
reporting whether the flooding in a given area is limited to minor street and yard 
flooding only, or whether flooding is severe enough to produce road damages, road 
closures, or damages to other infrastructure or buildings as well. 
 
 
6.6 Flood Loss Estimates and Flood Risk 
 
 6.6.1 Flood Loss Estimates 
 
The FEMA Q3 digital flood maps for Corvallis show the geographic areas within 
mapped floodplains for 100-year and 500-year flood events. The geographic extent of 
these mapped flood plains is tabulated below in Table 6.5. 
 
Table 6.5 
100-year and 500-year Floodplain Data for Corvallis 
 
 
County 
 
Area 
(sq. miles) 
 
Area in  
100-year 
floodplain 
(sq. miles) 
 
Percentage 
in 100-year  
floodplain 
 
Area 
 in 500-year 
floodplain 
(sq. miles) 
 
Percentage 
in 500-year 
floodplain1 
 
Corvallis 
 
14.19 
 
1.62 
 
11.42% 
 
0.628 
 
4.43% 
 
  1 Areas and percentages in 500-year floodplain are areas beyond those in the 100-year floodplain. 
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For Corvallis, about 11.42 % and 4.43% of the total area of the city are located within 
the 100-year and 500-year floodplains, respectively.  Thus, for Corvallis, nearly 16% 
of the city’s area is within the FEMA-mapped floodplains. 
 
Rough estimates of the magnitude of potential flood losses in Corvallis can be made 
from estimates of the number of buildings located within mapped-floodplains. 
 
To estimate the approximate level of damages in a major flood affecting many of the 
flood-prone properties in Corvallis, we assume that a 100-year flood affects about 
75% of the buildings within the mapped 100-year flood plain, or about 1259 buildings.  
We assume 75%, rather than 100% because some of these buildings are likely to be 
sufficiently elevated above grade that they will experience minimal or no damages in a 
100-year flood event. 
 
Estimated damages per flooded building are shown below in Table 6.6.   
 
Table 6.6 
Rough Estimate of Damage per Building for 100-Year Flood 
 
Category 100-Year Flood
Average Building Replacement Value $200,000
Average Contents Value $45,000
Flood depth above first floor 2 feet
Building damage (22%) $44,000
Contents damage (33%) $15,000
Other damages $4,000
Displacement costs $4,000
Total Damages and Losses $67,000  
 
These estimates are based on an average building replacement value of $200,000 
($100/sf for 2,000 sf), with an average contents value of $54,000 (30% of building 
replacement value, a typical FEMA assumption for benefit-cost analysis of residential 
flood mitigation projects).  For an assumed flood water depth of 2 feet above the first 
floor, building and contents damage percentages are estimated as 22% and 33%, of 
building replacement value and contents replacement value, respectively, using 
typical FEMA values for one-story structures without basements.  Other damages, 
including damages to yards, vehicles, and outbuildings are estimated roughly at 
$4,000 per structure.   Displacement costs for temporary housing are estimated 
roughly at $4,000 per structure.  With these input data/assumptions, estimated 
damages and losses total about $67,000 per flooded building.   The above estimates 
assume mostly residential buildings with some commercial buildings also experiencing 
first floor flooding. 
 
For the 1259 flooded buildings, the total flood losses are estimated roughly as shown 
below in Table 6.7.  These rough estimates, about $150,000,000 in flood damages 
and losses, should not be interpreted literally, but rather simply as an approximate 
measure of the order of magnitude of flood damages and losses that might be 
experienced in a major flood event in Corvallis.  The estimated amounts for 
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infrastructure damages and economic losses are based roughly on typical amounts 
(vs. building damages) in past flood events.  Actual damages and losses in any 
specific major flood may be more than or less than these estimates, depending on the 
severity of the specific flood event, as well as on the actual building elevations for 
buildings identified as being within the footprint of the 100-year floodplain. 
 
Table 6.7 
Total Flood Losses 
 
Category Estimate
Building and Contents per Table 6.7 $84,353,000
Infrastructure Damages1 $42,176,500
Economic Losses2 $21,088,250
Total Damages and Losses $147,617,750
1 Infrastructure damages estimated roughly as 50% of 
building and contents damages.
2 Economic losses to the community estimated roughly 
as 25% of building and contents damages.  
 
The above estimates assume that all of the 100-year floodplains in Corvallis are 
affected by a 100-year flood, which may or not actually occur.  Finally, these estimates 
of potential flood damages are for the FEMA-mapped floodplains only.  Although the 
FEMA-mapped floodplains include much of the flood-prone inventory of buildings and 
infrastructure in Corvallis, there may be additional flood-prone areas outside of the 
mapped floodplains. 
 
For a 500-year flood, similar estimates were made, assuming that 90% of the 
structures in the 100-year floodplain have an average of 3 feet of water and that 75% 
of the structures in the 500-year floodplain have an average of 1 foot of water.  The 
estimated total damages and economic losses are about $300,000,000.  The higher 
damage estimate for the 500-year flood arises from more building being flooded and 
from higher water depths.  The same caveats as noted above for the 100-year flood 
estimates also apply to the 500-year estimates. 
 
Similar approximate flood damage and loss estimates can be made using loss 
estimation calculation tools such as FEMA’s HAZUS-MH loss estimation software.  
However, making more accurate flood loss estimates for Corvallis would require more 
detailed data as discussed below in the following section. 
  
 
 6.6.2 Techniques for More Accurate Flood Loss Estimates 
  
More accurate flood loss estimates for specific areas of Corvallis can be made by 
obtaining more detailed inventory information, including elevations of flood prone 
structures.  Then, the economic impacts of floods can be estimated more completely 
using the approaches outlined below. 
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For most residential structures and many similar commercial and public structures, the 
likely amount of building damage from floods of any given depth can be estimated 
approximately using FEMA depth-damage tables.  These depth damage tables are 
derived from Federal Insurance Administration flood insurance claims data for several 
million properties and thus represent typical damage levels for typical structures.  
Although actual damages will vary somewhat from structure to structure, depending 
also on flood conditions such as duration, velocity, and degree of contamination, these 
typical values represent a good starting point to estimate flood damages for typical 
structures and thus to help quantify the level of flood risk.   
 
In estimating flood losses or evaluating flood risk (for a structure or a whole 
community) it is very important to recognize that the economic impact of floods 
includes not only damages to buildings and contents but other economic impacts as 
well, including: 
1. damages to yards, vehicles, and outbuildings (not in depth damage 
data above), 
2. displacement costs for temporary quarters while repairs are made, 
3. loss of business income,  
4. loss of public services. 
 
In some cases, these economic impacts of floods can be a significant fraction of 
building and contents damages, or even larger, especially for critical facilities or critical 
infrastructure.  FEMA’s publication What is a Benefit? Draft Guidance for Benefit-Cost 
Analysis provides an excellent primer, along with typical values and simple economic 
methods, to place monetary values on the loss of function of buildings, critical 
facilities, roads and bridges, and utility systems. 
 
 
6.7 Flood Insurance Data for Corvallis   
 
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) maintains a database of all flood 
insurance policies in the United States.  NFIP data for Corvallis indicate 414 flood 
insurance policies in place as of August 31, 2007.   
 
Three of these structures are on FEMA’s national repetitive loss list, which means that 
they had two or more claims of $1,000 or more within a 10-year time period. 
However, because these claims data do not consider the severity or frequency of the 
flood events causing the flood loss claims, the repetitive loss list is not mathematically 
rigorous.  For example, some properties on the list may have simply been unlucky and 
have experienced two flood events with low probabilities (e.g., 100-year or greater 
events) within a short time period.  Thus, the properties on the repetitive loss list may 
be at relatively high flood risk or they may not.   
 
For reference, we note that the Corvallis GIS data indicate that there are 1679 
buildings with footprints within the 100-year floodplain and 1439 additional buildings 
with footprints within the 500-year floodplain.  Overall, these data indicate over 3100 
flood-prone buildings in Corvallis, of which only about 13% (414) have flood 
insurance.  This low insurance rate probably reflects the absence of major flooding in 
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Corvallis in recent years.  However, this low insurance rate poses risks for Corvallis 
because the absence of insurance will impede recovery after a major flood event. 
 
 
6.8 Summary of Flood Risk for Corvallis 
 
The flood hazard, vulnerability and risk data, estimates and analyses presented above 
are summarized in the following table. 
 
Table 6.8 
Summary of Flood Risk for Corvallis 
 
Question Commentary
a. overbank flooding from Willamette and Marys Rivers and 
numerous smaller streams
About 15% of Corvallis is within FEMA-mapped 
floodplains.  
b. storm water drainage flooding Affects limited portions of Corvallis
    a. FEMA-mapped floodplains See Floodplain maps on pages 6-5 to 6-8.
    b. areas outside of FEMA-mapped floodplains Affects limited portions of Corvallis
    a. Buildings
GIS data indicate that 1679 buildings have 
footprints within the 100-year floodplain with an 
additional 1439 buildings within the 500-year 
floodplain.
    b. Critical facilities See listing in Table 6.5
    b. Roads and other infrastructure
As demonstrated by the 1996 flood,  major 
highways to/from Corvallis, including Highways 20 
and 34, and many secondary roads are subject to 
closure during flood events.
    a. roads Minor road closures occur frequently with major floods affecting key highways
    b. buildings
Quantitative determination of frequency of 
flooding expected requires elevation data for 
buildings
    a. frequent flooding (annual or every few years) Minor flooding affects limited portions of Corvallis
    b  major floods (25-year, 50-year, 100-year etc. events)
100-year and 500-year flood events could result in 
approximately $150,000,000 and $300,000,000 in 
damages and losses, respectively.
How serious is the flooding problem?
What is the source and type of the flood problem?
What is the geographic area affected by the flooding?
What inventory of buildings and infrastructure are at risk?
How frequent is the flooding problem?
 
 
 
6.9 Common Flood Mitigation Projects 
 
Potential mitigation projects to reduce the potential for future flood losses cover a wide 
range of possibilities. 
 
For either major rivers or the creeks, it would be theoretically possible to reduce future 
flood losses by building levees or floodwalls.  In practice, however, such projects are 
often very expensive and have a host of environmental and other regulatory hurdles.   
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For the smaller creeks, channel improvements to improve water conveyance capacity 
and removal of flow-restriction obstructions may be desirable.  Another possibility for 
some of the smaller creeks would be to construct detention ponds upstream to 
temporarily store water during high rainfall periods. Detention ponds are basically 
leaky dams, designed to be dry during normal conditions.  Detention ponds typically 
have restricted outlets with controlled flow rates.  Thus, during periods of high inflow 
into the pond, water is stored temporarily and then gradually released.  The effect of 
detention ponds is to lower peak discharge values and thus to lower peak flood 
elevations. 
 
For areas of Corvallis subject to flooding from storm water drainage, various storm 
water drainage system improvements may be desirable.  Typical improvements 
include upgrades to the size of drainage ditches or storm water drainage pipes and 
upgrades to pumping capacity (for pumped portions of drainage systems).  Another 
possibility for some areas may be construction of local detention ponds. 
 
For critical facilities at low elevations with high flood risk, such as the water and 
wastewater treatment plants, construction of berms or floodwalls to protect the 
facilities may be desirable.   
 
For residential, commercial or public facilities at high flood risk, elevation of structures 
or, for structures at very high flood risk, acquisition and demolition are potential 
mitigation options.  Elevation and acquisition (especially) are expensive mitigation 
options that are generally not cost-effective unless the levels of flood hazard and flood 
risk are rather high.  That is, these mitigation options are most attractive for structures 
deep in the flood plain (i.e., with first floors below the 10-, or 20-, or 30-year flood 
elevations).  For structures outside of mapped floodplains, elevation or acquisition 
would likely be cost-effective only for structures with a strong history of major, 
repetitive flood losses. 
 
For structures near the fringe of the 100-year flood plain, near the 100-year flood 
level, or with some history of repetitive flood losses, various small-scale flood loss 
reduction measures such as elevation of furnaces and utilities may be desirable.   
 
The following table contains flood mitigation action items from the master Action Item 
table in Chapter 4.
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Table 6.11 
Flood Mitigation Action Items 
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Flood Mitigation Action Items:  Within FEMA-Mapped Floodplains
Short-Term     
#1
Inventory critical facilities within mapped floodplains 
or other high flood risk areas, identify and implement 
appropriate mitigation options
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Survey elevation data for buildings within mapped 
floodplains, evaluate flood risk quantitatively, and 
explore mitigation options with property owners.
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X
Flood Mitigation Action Items:  Outside of FEMA-Mapped Floodplains
Short-Term     
#1
Complete the inventory of locations in Corvallis 
subject to frequent storm water flooding
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
For locations with repetitive flooding and significant 
damages or road closures, determine and implement 
mitigation measures such as upsizing culverts or 
storm water drainage ditches
Public Works Ongoing X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
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7.0  WINTER STORMS 
 
7.1 Overview 
 
Winter storms affecting Corvallis are generally characterized by a combination of heavy rains 
and high winds, sometimes with snowfall, especially at higher elevations.  Heavy rains can 
result in localized or widespread flooding, as well as debris slides and landslides.  High winds 
commonly result in tree falls which primarily affect the electric power system, but which may 
also affect roads, buildings and vehicles.  This chapter deals primarily with the rain, wind, snow 
and ice effects of winter storms.  Larger scale flooding is addressed in Chapter 6.  Debris flows 
and landslides are addressed in Chapter 8. 
 
For completeness, we also briefly address other weather events in this chapter, including 
severe thunderstorms, hail, lightning strikes and tornadoes.  The frequency, severity, and 
impacts of such weather events are generally minor for Corvallis, compared to winter storm 
effects (see Section 7.5). 
 
Winter storms can affect the area directly, with damage within Corvallis, or indirectly, with 
damage outside the area but affecting transportation to/from the area and/or utility services 
(especially electric power).  Historically, Corvallis has often been subject to both direct and 
indirect impacts of winter storms. 
 
The winter storms that affect Corvallis are typically not local events affecting only small 
geographic areas.  Rather, the winter storms are typically large cyclonic low pressure systems 
moving from the Pacific Ocean and that thus usually affect large areas of Oregon and/or the 
whole Pacific Northwest. 
 
Historical winter storm data complied by the Portland Office of the National Weather Service 
(www.wrh.noaa.gov/Portland/windstorm.html) list the following major winter storm events with 
substantial wind damage in Oregon:  
1. February 7, 2002 
2. December 12, 1995 
3. November 13-15, 1981 
4. March 25-26, 1971 
5. October 2, 1967 
6. March 27, 1963 
7. October 12, 1962 
8. November 3, 1958 
9. December 21-23, 1955 
10. December 4, 1951 
11. November 10-11, 1951 
12. April 21-22, 1931 
13. January 20, 1921 
14. January 9, 1880. 
 
The website referenced above has informative narrative summaries of each winter storm 
event, including wind speed data and damage reports.  Similar summaries of historical wind 
storm data have been compiled by Wolf Read at Oregon State University 
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(http://oregonstate.edu/~readw/).   This OSU website has a vast archive of historical winter 
storm data for Oregon. 
 
The specific severity and impacts of the major historical winter storm events listed above 
varied significantly with geographic location within Oregon.   However, in terms of sustained 
wind speeds and damage levels, the 1880 and 1962 storms stand out as the most severe such 
events for Oregon. 
 
 
7.2  Rain Hazard Data 
 
Severe winter storms in Corvallis often include heavy rainfall.  The potential impact of heavy 
rainfall depends on both the total inches of rain and the intensity of rainfall (inches per hour or 
inches per day).  In the context of potential flooding, “rainfall” also includes the rainfall 
equivalent from snow melt.  Flash floods, which are produced by episodes of intense heavy 
rains (usually 6 hours or less) or dam breaks are rare in Corvallis (and western Oregon as a 
whole) but do represent a potential meteorological hazard.   
 
Large drainage basins, such as that for the Willamette River typically have response times of 
several days:  the total rainfall amounts (plus snow melt) over periods of several days or more 
are what determines the peak level of flooding along large rivers.  Smaller rivers may have 
response times of several hours up to a day or so.  Smaller, local drainage basins have even 
shorter response times and levels of peak flooding may be governed by rainfall totals over a 
period of an hour to a few hours. 
 
However, for the Willamette River, there are numerous large multi-purpose dams and thus the 
usual natural correlation between rainfall events and flood levels does not completely apply.  
Rather, flooding along such rivers is heavily governed by water release patterns from the 
dams.  For the major rivers, dam operating characteristics and capacities are included in the 
flood modeling for FEMA-mapped floodplains (see Chapter 6). 
 
Corvallis annual rainfall data are shown in Table 7.1 below two representative locations.  As 
shown below, there are substantial variations in annual rainfall from year to year. 
 
Table 7.1 
Corvallis Rainfall Data 
 
Location
Average 
Annual 
Precipitation 
(inches)
Lowest 
Annual 
Precipitation 
(inches)
Highest Annual 
Precipitation 
(inches)
Period of 
Record
Corvallis 40.96 23.68 (1930) 73.21 (1996) 1889-2004
website: www.wrcc.dri.edu
Data for Corvallis (OSU) weather station from Western Regional Climate Center
 
 
The rainfall data shown in Table 7.1 give general overview of the potential for winter storm 
flooding in Corvallis, but whether or not flooding occurs at specific sites depends heavily on 
specific local rainfall and local drainage conditions. 
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Statistical rain fall data for Corvallis are shown in Table 7.2 with these data taken from the 
NOAA maps shown in Chapter 7 of the Benton County Hazard Mitigation Plan.  Table 7.2 
shows the 24-hour rainfall amounts for various return periods:  2-years, 25-years, and 100-
years.  The frequency of rainfall events is interpreted in the same manner as the frequency of 
flood events.  Thus, a 2-year rainfall event simply means that such rainfalls have a 50% 
chance of happening in any given year.  A 25-year or 100-year rainfall event mean simply that 
such rainfalls have a 4% or 1% chance, respectively, of happening in any given year. 
 
Table 7.2 
24-Hour Precipitation Totals for Various Return Periods 
 
Corvallis Map Contour Band (inches)
Approximate 
Value (inches)
2-Year 24-Hour Rainfall <3 2.5
25-Year 24-Hour Rainall <4 3.5
100-Year 24-Hour Rainall <5 4.5  
 
These 24-hour precipitation maps provide useful information for evaluating the potential for 
localized flood impacts from winter storms.  The 24-hour precipitation totals are a reasonable 
measure of flood risk for small drainage basins.  Longer duration precipitation totals govern 
flooding on larger rivers, but such flooding is already included in the modeling behind FEMA’s 
floodplain mapping and covered by the discussion of flood hazards in Chapter 6. 
 
The rainfall totals shown in Table 7.2 are high enough to generate significant potential 
localized flooding problems.  However, whether or not localized flooding does occur depends 
on specific local drainage conditions.  For example, 3" of rain in one area may cause no 
damage at all, while 3" of rain in a nearby area may cause road washouts and flooding of 
buildings. 
 
For Corvallis, identification of specific sites subject to localized flooding during winter storms is 
based on historical occurrences of repetitive flooding events during past winter storm events.   
The flood-prone sites in Corvallis identified in Chapter 6 Floods are for combination of 
overbank flooding from streams and rivers and from local storm water drainage flooding.  See 
Table 6.5 and the maps of Flood Hazards to Critical Facilities and Transportation in Chapter 6. 
 
Additional sites in Corvallis with a history of repetitive flood problems are shown below in Table 
7.3; this list is representative but not complete, there may other repetitive loss sites as well. 
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Table 7.3 
Repetitive Flood Sites in Corvallis 
 
 
Location 
 
Notes 
 
Law Enforcement Building 
 
Police Dept, regional communications, county mainframe 
computer 
 
Dixon Creek between Buchanan Ave. and Circle Blvd. 
 
30 homes threatened 
 
Avery Dr., south to the Mill Race 
 
several homes and businesses threatened, lifeline blocked 
 
 
 
7.3 Wind Hazard Data 
 
Wind speeds associated with winter storms vary depending on meteorological conditions, but 
also vary spatially depending on local topography.  For Corvallis, the wind hazard levels are 
generally lower than those experienced at higher elevations in the western part of Benton 
County. 
 
A regional overview of wind hazards is shown by the wind data maps in Chapter 7 of the 
Benton County Hazard Mitigation Plan.  Wind speed data for Corvallis are shown in Table 7.4 
below for 2-year and 50-year return periods. 
 
Table 7.4 
Corvallis Wind Hazard Data 
 
Return 
Period
Sustained Wind 
Speeds (miles/hr)
Peak Gust Wind 
Speeds (miles/hr)
2-year 37 48
50-year 62 81  
 
These data are sustained wind speeds for the standard meteorological data height of 10 
meters (about 39 feet) above ground level.  Peak gusts are commonly 30% or so higher than 
the sustained wind speeds.  Of course, extreme wind events, with return periods greater than 
50 years will have higher wind speeds. 
 
For Corvallis, the 2-year wind speeds are too low to cause widespread substantial wind 
damage.  However, there may be localized wind damage, especially at sites where local wind 
speeds are higher or where there are especially exposed locations, such at the boundary 
between clear cut and forested areas. 
 
For Corvallis, the 50-year wind speeds are high enough to cause widespread wind damage.  
Damage may be severe at particularly exposed sites.  Thus, for most locations in Corvallis 
winter storms with significant direct wind damage are not likely every year or every few years, 
but perhaps once every decade or so, on average, with major wind storm events happening at 
intervals averaging every few decades. 
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7.4 Snow and Ice Hazard Data for Corvallis 
 
Winter storms can also involve ice and snow, most commonly at higher elevations than 
Corvallis, but sometimes in the Willamette Valley as well.  The most likely impact of snow and 
ice events on Corvallis are road closures limiting access/egress to/from some areas, especially 
roads to higher elevations.  Winter storms with heavy wet snow or high winds and ice storms 
may also result in power outages from downed transmission lines and/or poles. 
 
Average annual snowfalls in Corvallis are generally low as shown below in Table 7.5. 
 
Table 7.5 
Snowfall Data for Corvallis 
 
Location
Average 
Annual 
Snowfall 
(inches)
Lowest 
Annual 
Snowfall 
(inches)
Highest Annual 
Snowfall 
(inches)
Period of 
Record
Corvallis 6.10 0.00 51.90 (1949-50) 1889-2004
website: www.wrcc.dri.edu
Data for Corvallis (OSU) weather station from Western Regional Climate Center
 
 
Since 1889, there have been nine years with 20” or more of snow in Corvallis, as shown below 
in Table 7.6. 
 
Table 7.6 
Significant Snowfall Events for Corvallis 
 
Year
Annual 
Snowfall 
(inches)
Peak 
Snowfall 
Month
Peak 
Monthly 
Snowfall 
(inches)
1892-3 21.0 January 17.0
1908-9 23.0 January 23.0
1915-6 25.6 January 22.4
1919-20 20.0 December 20.0
1942-3 20.0 January 18.0
1949-50 51.9 January 51.9
1968-9 27.7 January 24.0
1970-1 27.5 January 15.3
1991-2 26.3 February 15.0
Western Regional Climate Center website:
www.wrcc.dri.edu
Corvallis
Data for Corvallis (OSU)  weather station from
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In addition to snow events, Corvallis is also subject to ice storm and freezing rain events.  Ice 
storms and freezing rain are fairly common, especially along the Willamette River Valley when 
cold air near the ground coincides with warm moist air at higher altitudes. 
 
The National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) database shows two ice storm or freezing rain 
events for Corvallis between 1993 and 2004.  Both of these were relatively minor events with 
increased traffic accidents due to ice on the roads, with few other damages.  Website 
addresses for NCDC and the state and county storm event database are:  www.ncdc.noaa.gov 
and http://www4.ncdc.noaa.gov/cgi-win/wwcgi.dll?wwevent~storms, respectively. 
 
Probabilistic ice storm data showing ice thicknesses with return periods from 50 years to 400 
years are given in a recent report by the American Lifelines Alliance (Extreme Ice Thicknesses 
from Freezing Rain, 2004).  The 50-year return period ice thickness map (Figure 7.1 below) 
shows about 0.5” of ice for Corvallis, with ice thickness decreasing westward from the 
Willamette River Valley.  100-year and 400-year ice thicknesses for Corvallis are about 0.75” 
and 1.0”, respectively.   
 
For Corvallis, ice thicknesses in 50-year or more severe events are high enough (0.5” or 
greater) to cause substantial damage, especially to trees and utility lines. 
 
 
Figure 7.1 
50-Year Ice Thickness from Freezing Rain 
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 7.5 Other Severe Weather Events 
 
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which includes the National 
Weather Service, also includes the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC).   The NOAA and 
NCDC websites have a vast amount of historical information on severe weather events 
throughout the United States.  These databases can also be searched by State and County to 
obtain more localized information.  Website addresses are: www.noaa.gov and 
www.ncdc.noaa.gov, for NOAA and NCDC, respectively.  The state and county storm event 
database can be found at: 
http://www4.ncdc.noaa.gov/cgi-win/wwcgi.dll?wwevent~storms.  Unless otherwise referenced, 
all of the storm event data below for Corvallis are from the state and county storm event 
database referenced above. 
 
 
 Severe Thunderstorms and Hail Events 
 
The NCDC database lists 6 thunderstorm and high wind events in Benton County since 1982.  
Damage was reported in only one thunderstorm event on May 1, 1998 in Corvallis; this event 
included numerous tree falls and damage to at least one building.  Most thunderstorm events 
in Corvallis are typically too minor to be recorded as significant storm events.  Nevertheless, 
thunderstorm events in Corvallis can occasionally cause locally high winds with tree falls which 
may affect roads, utility lines, and buildings. 
 
The NCDD data base listed two hail events for Benton County :  April 2, 2001 in Corvallis and 
Albany.   No damage reports were available.  Hail events certainly occur in Corvallis, generally 
during summer months.  However, hail damage is generally minor and few practical mitigation 
alternatives are applicable to hail, other than taking shelter and moving vehicles to garages 
when possible.   
 
 
 Lightning 
 
Nationwide, lightning is the number two weather related killer nationwide, second only to 
floods.  NOAA data show that lightning causes about 90 deaths per year, with at least 230 
injuries (NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS SR-193, 1997).  Lightning injuries appear to be 
systematically underreported and thus the actual injury total is most likely significantly higher.   
 
For Oregon, casualties from lightning are very low, with totals of only 7 deaths and 19 injuries 
reported over a 35 year period (NOAA).  Thus, the level of risk posed by lightning strikes in 
Corvallis, while not zero, is very low.  For Benton County, the NCDD data base does not list 
any major lightning events. 
 
Public education about safe practices during electrical storms is the only available mitigation 
measure to reduce casualties from lightning.  Lightning strike damage to buildings or 
infrastructure is generally relatively minor and few practical mitigation alternatives are 
applicable to lightning, other than installing lightning arrestors on critical facilities subject to 
lightning damage.   
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  Tornadoes 
 
Tornadoes also occasionally occur in Oregon.  However, Oregon is not among the 39 states 
with any reported tornado deaths since 1950.  A compilation of historical tornadoes in Oregon 
by the national weather service (http://nimbo.wrh.noaa.gov/ Portland/tornado.html) includes 64 
tornadoes statewide, with only one tornado in Benton County.  The NCDC data base lists a 
small tornado about 15 miles west of Albany on June 1, 1997 and a funnel cloud (which did not 
touch down) west of Corvallis on May 29, 1996. 
 
Climate and weather conditions in Oregon and specifically in Corvallis make the occurrence of 
major tornadoes unlikely.  The most practical mitigation actions for tornadoes are public 
warnings and taking shelter to minimize the potential for deaths and injuries. 
 
 
7.6 Winter Storm Risk Assessment 
 
Winter storm flooding and wind impacts may affect both infrastructure and buildings.  Localized 
flooding from winter storms very commonly affects the transportation system, especially roads.  
Severe winter storms will result in numerous road closures due either to washouts or due to 
depth of water on road surfaces.  Such localized flooding also affects buildings located in the 
flooded areas.   Additional road closures are likely in some events from landslides/mudslides 
as well as from snow/ice storms. 
 
Wind impacts from winter storms arise primarily from tree falls, which may affect vehicles and 
buildings, to some extent, but whose primary impact is often on utility lines, especially electric 
power lines.  Widespread wind damages may result in widespread downing of trees or tree 
limbs with resulting widespread downage of utility lines.  Such tree-fall induced power outages 
affect primarily the local electric distribution system, because transmission system cables are 
generally less prone to tree fall damage because of design and better tree-trimming 
maintenance.  In severe wind storms, direct wind damage or wind driven debris impacts on 
buildings cause building damages, especially for more vulnerable types of construction such 
as mobile homes. 
 
As discussed above in Section 7.1, both winter storm flood hazards and winter storm wind 
hazards have highly localized impacts.  The location and severity of such impacts depend very 
strongly on specific local conditions.  Therefore, it is difficult to make regional risk assessment 
or loss estimates from mapping the hazards and overlaying the inventory: such a risk 
assessment simply requires too much detailed data which are not yet available. 
 
An alternative approach is to document the severity and locations of winter storm flood and 
wind damage from the pattern historical events.  For more quantitative risk assessment of 
localized flooding and wind damages arising from winter storms, the best approach is to 
systematically gather data on sites of repetitive damages due to localized flooding or wind 
damages.  By documenting (and mapping using GIS) the sites of repetitive damage events, 
along documentation of the type and cost of damages and losses, the most seriously impacted 
sites can be clearly identified.  Clearly, such repetitive loss sites with significant damages are 
likely candidates for mitigation actions.   
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The probable impacts of winter storms on Corvallis are summarized below in Table 7.7. 
 
Table 7.7 
Probable Impacts of Winter Storms on Corvallis1 
 
Inventory Probable Impacts
Portion of Corvallis Affected
Entire city may be affected by road closures or loss of electric 
power; otherwise direct damages to buildings and infrastructure are 
likely to be localized and relatively minor
Buildings
Isolated minor damage from tree falls, some buildings affected by 
flood damage in major storms, especially in the storm water 
drainage problem areas identified in Section 6.3
Streets within communities Minor road closures due to tree falls and flooding; limited impact because of short detour routes within communities
Roads within and to/from Corvallis Potential closures of some roads and major highways due to snow, debris flows or landslides, localized flooding and tree falls
Electric Power
Loss of electric power may be localized due to tree falls on local 
distribution lines or affect larger areas if tree falls affect 
transmission lines
Other Utilities Generally minor or no impacts on other utilities from winter storms
Casualties Small potential for casualties (deaths and injuries) from tree falls, contact with downed power lines, or traffic accidents.  
 
1 These winter storm impacts include localized flooding and the effects of wind, snow, and 
ice. 
 
 
7.7 Mitigation of Winter Storm Impacts 
 
Potential mitigation projects for winter storms may address any of the aspects of such storms, 
including floods, winds, and landslides (see Chapter 8).  See also Chapter 13 for additional 
discussion of the disruptions to utility and transportation systems. 
 
For winter storm flooding, the mitigation measures discussed in Chapter 6 (Floods) for local 
storm water drainage flooding are exactly the mitigation measures for the flood aspects of 
winter storms.  Common mitigation projects include:  upgrading storm water drainage systems, 
construction of detention basins, and structure-specific mitigation measures (acquisition, 
elevation, flood proofing) for flood-prone buildings.  For roads subject to frequent winter storm 
flooding, possible mitigation actions include elevation of the road surface and improved local 
drainage.  For utilities subject to frequent winter storm flooding, possible mitigation actions 
include improved local drainage, elevation or relocation of the vulnerable utility elements to 
non-flood prone areas nearby. 
 
For wind effects of winter storms, the most common and most effective mitigation action is to 
increase tree trimming effects, because a high percentage of wind damage to utilities, 
buildings, vehicles, and people arises from tree falls.  Trimming of trees subject to falling on 
utilities, buildings, vehicles, and people is an effective mitigation measure.  However, 
economic, political and esthetic realities place limits on tree trimming as a mitigation action.  
Future wind storm damage in Corvallis could be almost eliminated by cutting down all large 
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trees along roads or in populated areas.  Obviously, such an extreme mitigation measure is 
neither practical nor desirable for many reasons. 
 
Effective tree trimming mitigation programs focus on limited areas where tree falls have a high 
potential to result in major damages and economic losses.  High priority areas include 
examples such as the following: 
1) Transmission lines providing electric power to the area, 
2) Major trunk lines providing the backbone of the electric power distribution system 
within the area 
3) Distribution lines for electric power to critical facilities in the area, 
4) Specific circumstances where falling of large trees poses an obvious threat to 
damage buildings and/or people or close major transportation arteries. 
 
Mitigation measures for snow and ice are limited, although tree trimming efforts, discussed 
above under wind, also reduce the impact of snow and ice on trees, roads, and utility lines.  
For the most part, dealing with snow and ice storms are primarily issues of emergency 
planning, response and recovery. 
 
Similarly, few mitigation measures appear practical for Corvallis for other types of severe 
weather, including severe thunderstorms, hail, lightning, and tornadoes.  For such weather 
events, public education about safe practices and emergency planning, response and recover 
appear to be the most useful pragmatic actions. 
 
 
The following table contains winter storm mitigation action items from the master Action Item 
table in Chapter 4.
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Table 7.8 
Winter Storm Mitigation Action Items 
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Winter Storms Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Inventory and remove hazardous trees in City right of 
way Public Works, Parks Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Complete an inventory of locations in Corvallis subject 
to frequent storm water flooding or repetitive tree fall 
problems from wind/ice
Public Works, Parks Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Enhance tree trimming efforts especially for 
transmission lines and trunk distribution lines and 
consider tree trimming ordinance
Public Works, private utilities Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Encourage property owners to trim trees near service 
drops to individual customers Public Works Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#5
Ensure that all critical facilities in Corvallis have 
backup power and emergency operations plans to 
deal with power outages
Public Works, Benton County 
Emergency Management, 
Community Development and 
private owners
1-2  Years X X X
Long-Term     
#1
For locations with repetitive flooding and significant 
damages or road closures, determine and implement 
mitigation measures such as upsizing culverts or 
storm water drainage ditches
Public Works Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
Consider upgrading electric lines and poles to 
improve wind/ice loading, undergrounding critical 
lines, and adding interconnect switches to allow 
alternative feed paths and disconnect switches to 
minimize outage areas
Private utilities 5 Years X X X X X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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8.0  LANDSLIDES     
                                                                                  
8.1 Landslide Overview and Definitions 
 
The term “landslide” refers to a variety of slope instabilities that result in the downward 
and outward movement of slope-forming materials, including rocks, soils and artificial 
fill.  Four types of landslides are distinguished based on the types of materials 
involved and on the mode of movement.  These types of landslides are illustrated in 
Figures 8.1 to 8.4 and described below. 
  
Rockfalls are abrupt movements of masses of geologic materials 
(rocks and soils) that become detached from steep slopes or cliffs.  
Movement occurs by free-fall, bouncing and rolling.  Falls are strongly 
influenced by gravity, weathering, undercutting or erosion. 
 
Rotational Slides are those in which the rupture surface is curved 
concavely upwards and the slide movement is rotational about an axis 
parallel to the slope.  Rotational slides usually have a steep scarp at the 
upslope end and a bulging “toe” of the slid material at the bottom of the 
slide.  .  Rotational slides may creep slowly or move large distances 
suddenly. 
 
Translational Slides are those in which the moving material slides 
along a more or less planar surface.  Translational slides occur on 
surfaces of weaknesses, such as faults and bedding planes or at the 
contact between firm rock and overlying loose soils.  Translational 
slides may creep slowly or move large distances rather suddenly. 
 
Debris Flows (also called debris torrents) are surficial movements in 
which loose soils, rocks and organic matter combine with entrained 
water to form slurries that flow rapidly downslope or within a stream 
channel.  They may travel hundreds to thousands of feet.   
 
All of these types of landslides may cause road blockages by dumping debris on road 
surfaces or road damages if the road surface itself slides downhill.  Utility lines and 
pipes are prone to breakage in slide areas.  Buildings impacted by slides may suffer 
minor damage from small settlements or be completely destroyed by large ground 
displacements or by burial in slide debris.  Also, as evidenced by 1996 winter storms 
in Oregon, landslides may also result in injuries or fatalities. 
 
There are three main factors that determine susceptibility (potential) for landslides: 
1) slope steepness, 
2) soil/rock characteristics or landform shape, and 
3) subsurface water. 
 
Loose, weak rock or soil is more prone to landslides than is more competent rock or 
dense, firm soils.  For landslides, the term competent rock means solid, coherent rock 
with good bearing strength that is less prone to landslides.  Finally, water saturated 
soils or rock with a high water table are much more prone to landslides because the 
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water pore pressure decreases the shear strength of the soil and thus increases the 
probability of sliding. 
 
Figures 8.1 to 8.4  
Major Types of Landslides 
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The water content of soils/rock is a major factor in determining the likelihood of sliding 
for any given slide-prone location.  Thus, the vast majority of landslides happen during 
rainy months, when soils are saturated with water.  However, landslides may happen 
at any time of the year.  In addition to landslides triggered by a combination of slope 
stability and water content, landslides may also be triggered by earthquakes.  Areas 
prone to seismically triggered landslides are generally similar to those prone to 
ordinary (i.e., non-seismic) landslides.  As with ordinary landslides, seismically 
triggered landslides are more likely to occur when soils are saturated with water. 
 
Debris flows and landslides are a very common occurrence in hilly areas of Oregon, 
and may occur in hilly portions of Corvallis.  Many landslides occur in undeveloped 
areas and thus may go unnoticed or unreported.  For example, DOGAMI conducted a 
statewide survey of landslides from four winter storms in 1996 and 1997 and found 
9,582 documented landslides, with the actual number of landslides estimated to be 
many times the documented number.  For the most part, landslides become a 
problem only when they impact developed areas and have the potential to damage 
buildings, roads, or utilities. 
 
 
8.2 Landslide Hazard Assessment for Corvallis 
 
Overall, the risk of landslides in Corvallis is relatively low.  Areas subject to landslides 
are mostly limited to hilly portions of North Corvallis and a few other locations and 
along localized portions of river or stream channel banks.  The following maps show 
landslide or debris flow hazard areas in or near Corvallis, prepared by various 
agencies.  The maps use different criteria for hazard areas and thus differ somewhat 
in their details.  All are included to give the broadest perspective on potential landslide 
or debris flow hazard areas in or near Corvallis. 
 
Figures 8.5 and 8.6 are landslide hazard and landslide runout hazard maps prepared 
by Corvallis GIS.  Landslide runout hazard areas are subject to debris flows. 
 
Figure 8.7 shows earthquake-induced landslide hazard areas for Benton County, 
which indicates no mapped high- or moderate-hazard areas within Corvallis.  Hazard 
areas for other types of landslides are generally similar to the earthquake-induced 
landslide hazard areas. 
 
Figure 8.8 shows active landslide areas for the North Corvallis area, with about two 
dozen active slide areas outside city limits.  Several of these active slide areas include 
developed residential areas.  There is also one very small active slide area within city 
limits, in a developed residential area. 
 
Figure 8.9 shows debris flow hazard areas for North Corvallis.  This map is an excerpt 
from the map of debris flow hazards for North Corvallis, Adair and North Albany, 
prepared by the Oregon Department of Forestry and the Oregon Climate Service 
which is included in Chapter 8 of the Benton County Hazard Mitigation Plan.  There 
are significant areas with moderate or high debris flow hazards.  All of these areas are 
outside of the Corvallis city limits, but do impinge on developed areas north of the 
City. 
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Figure 8.5 
City of Corvallis Landslide Hazard Areas 
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Figure 8.6 
Landslide Runout Hazard Map for Corvallis 
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Figure 8.7 
DOGAMI Earthquake-Induced Landslide Hazard Map for Benton County1 
 
  
 
1Preliminary Earthquake Hazard and Risk Assessment and Water-Induced Landslide Hazard in 
Corvallis, Oregon.  (Zhenming Wang, Gregory Graham, and Ian Madin, DOGAMI, Open File 
Report O-01-05, 2001) 
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Figure 8.8 
DOGAMI Preliminary Map of Active Slide Areas in North Corvallis Area1 
 
 
 
Preliminary Landslide Hazard Map of the Corvallis-Philomath Urban Areas, Corvallis, Oregon (Ian 
Madin, DOGAMI).
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Figure 8.9 
Debris Flow Hazard Areas:  North Corvallis and Vicinity 
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8.3 Landslide Risk Assessment for Corvallis 
 
The potential impact of debris flows and landslides on Corvallis are summarized below in Table 
8.1. 
 
Table 8.5 
Potential Impacts of Debris Flows and Landslides on Corvallis 
 
Inventory Probable Impacts
Portion of Corvallis affected Landslide prone areas in Corvallis include parts of North Corvallis, a few other areas, and portions of river and stream bank areas.
Buildings Buildings subject to landslides include a few residential buildings in the North Corvallis area.
Streets within communities Minor road closures possible from landslides; limited impact because of generally short detour routes within communities.
Roads within and to/from Corvallis
Minimal risk for highways in immediate vincinity of Corvallis. 
Highways through the coast range or Cascades are subject to 
closures from landslides.
Electric power Very minor otential for localized loss of electric power due to landslides affecting power lines in portions of North Corvallis.
Other Utilities Potential outages of water, wastewater and natural gas from pipe breaks from landslides. Probable impacts are very localized.
Casualties Landslides that impact buildings or roads could result in a small number of casualties (deaths and injuries).  
 
 
8.4 Mitigation of Landslide Risk 
 
In terms of public safety there are two broad types of landslides to be concerned about: 1) those that 
can be sometimes be solved by engineering methods (such as road fill failures and slow moving 
landslides, and 2) those that can typically only be solved through prudent location of buildings, roads, 
and utilities (debris flows, debris torrents).  It is important to make this distinction to understand that 
some landslide problems do not lend themselves to engineering solutions. 
 
Mitigation of landslide risks is often quite expensive.  In some cases, slope stability can be 
improved by addition of subsurface drainage to reduce pore water pressure, by construction of 
appropriate debris dams, retaining walls or by other types of geotechnical remediation.  In some 
cases, buildings can be hardened to reduce damages.  An alternative mitigation strategy for 
already built buildings or infrastructure with high potential for landslide losses is to relocate the 
facilities outside of known slide areas.  
 
Mitigation of landslide risk can also be accomplished by effective land use planning to minimize 
development in slide-prone areas.  Generally, such land use planning requires rather detailed 
geotechnical mapping of slide potential so that high hazard areas can be demarcated without 
unnecessarily including other areas of low slide potential. 
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The impacts of slide damage on road systems can also be partially addressed by identifying 
areas of high slide potential or of repetitive past slide damages so that alternative routes for 
emergency response can be pre-determined. 
 
 
The following table contains landslide mitigation action items from the master Action Items table 
in Chapter 4.
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Table 8.2 
Landslide Mitigation Action Items 
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Landslide Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete a detailed inventory of locations where 
critical facilities and infrastructure are subject to 
landslides
Public Works, Community 
Development 1-5 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Consider landslide mitigation actions for slides 
seriously threatening critical facilities, other buildings 
or infrastructure
Public Works, Community 
Development 5 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#2
Limit future development in high landslide potential 
areas Community Development Ongoing X X X X X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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9.0 WILDLAND/URBAN INTERFACE FIRES 
 
Fire has posed a threat to mankind since the dawn of civilization.  Fires may cause 
significant damage to property and may also result in deaths and injuries.  For the 
purposes of mitigation planning, we consider three types of fires: structure fires, 
wildland fires, and wildland/urban interface fires.   
 
Structure fires are fires in urban, suburban or rural areas where 
structures (and contents) are the primary fire fuel.  Structure fires 
predominantly affect residential and other ordinary buildings.  However, 
structure fires may also affect other types of structures, including bulk 
fuel storage or hazmat facilities.  Fires affecting these types of facilities 
may be particularly hazardous to both firefighters and nearby residents.   
Fires on pipelines and transportation fires (road, rail, air) generally have 
similar characteristics to fires at hazmat sites or structures.   
 
Wildland fires are fires where vegetation (grass, brush, trees) is the 
primary fire fuel.   
 
Wildland/urban interface fires are fires where the fire fuel includes both 
structures and vegetation.  Wildland/urban interface fires are basically 
wildland fires that burn into developed areas. 
 
The emphasis of this chapter is on wildland/urban interface fires because such fires 
are natural disasters that may affect large developed areas and large numbers of 
people.   Thus, wildland/urban interface fires are of special concern for mitigation 
planning.  Most structure fires are limited to one structure.  Structure fires involving 
bulk fuel, hazardous materials, pipelines, and transportation fires have many 
similarities in response strategies and impacts to the more general discussion of 
Hazmat Incidents, as discussed in Chapter 14.  Wildland fires, by definition, affect 
wildlands with generally limited impacts on developed areas. 
  
Chapter 9 of the Benton County Hazard Mitigation Plan includes useful background 
information on various types of fires.  For conciseness, this background information is 
not repeated here. 
 
9.1 Wildland/Urban Interface Fires 
 
 9.1.1 Overview 
 
Wildland/urban interface fires are fires where the fuel load consists of both vegetation 
and structures.  In Oregon, including Benton County and Corvallis, as elsewhere in the 
United States, recent patterns of development have lead to increasing numbers of 
homes built in areas subject to wildland fires.  Development in areas subject to 
wildland fires may pose high levels of life safety risk for occupants as well as high 
levels of fire risk for homes and other structures. 
 
Urban or suburban areas may have a significant amount of landscaping and other 
vegetation.  However, in such areas the fuel load of flammable vegetation is not 
continuous, but rather is broken by paved areas, open space and areas of mowed, 
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often irrigated, grassy areas with low fuel loads.  In these areas, the vast 
preponderance of all significant fires are single structure fires.  The combination of 
separations between buildings, various types of fire breaks, and generally low total 
vegetative fuel loads make the risk of fire spreading much lower than in wildland 
areas. Furthermore, most developed areas in urban and suburban areas have water 
systems with good capacities to provide water for fire suppression and organized fire 
agencies who typically respond quickly to fires, with sufficient personnel and apparatus 
to control fires effectively.  Thus, in such areas the risk of a single structure fire 
spreading to involve multiple structures is generally quite low. 
 
Areas subject to wildland/urban interface fires have very different fire hazard 
characteristics. The defining characteristic of the wildland/urban interface area is that 
structures are built in areas with essentially continuous (and often high) vegetative fuel 
loads.   In other words, structures are built in areas subject to wildland fires.  When 
wildland fires occur in such areas, they tend to spread quickly and structures in these 
areas may, unfortunately, become little more than additional fuel sources for wildland 
fires.  The siting of homes has also changed over time.  Historically pioneering families 
built their homes in low lands, close to water and the fields they intended to work, 
while during the last 30 years or so, rural homes have increasingly been built in 
locations chosen because of the view or other amenities. Thus, many newer homes 
are in locations more difficult to defend against wildland fires. 
 
The fire risk to structures and occupants in wildland/urban interface areas is high not 
only because of the high vegetative fuel loads but also because fire suppression 
resources are typically much lower than in urban or suburban areas.  Homes in 
wildland/urban interface areas are most commonly on wells rather than on municipal 
water supplies.  Thus, the availability of water for fire suppression is often severely 
limited.  Less availability of water resources makes it more likely that a small wildland 
fire or a single structure fire in an urban/wildland interface area will spread before it 
can be extinguished. 
 
Furthermore, because many developments in interface areas have relatively low 
populations and are some distance from population centers, the availability of 
firefighting personnel and apparatus is generally lower than in more populated areas 
and response times are typically much longer.  The longer typical response times arise 
in part because of greater travel distances and, thus, greater travel times, but also 
because most fire agencies in lower population density areas are entirely or largely 
composed of volunteer staff.  Response times from volunteer staff fire agencies are 
typically longer than response times for career staff agencies, where fire stations are 
commonly staffed continuously.  In some cases, narrow winding roads also impede 
access by fire fighting apparatus.  As with water supplies, the lower availability of fire 
fighting personnel and apparatus and the longer response times increase the 
probability that a small wildland fire or a single structure fire in an urban/wildland 
interface area will spread before it can be extinguished.   
 
Residents in many wildland/urban interface areas also face high life safety risk.  High 
life safety risk arises because of the high fire risk, especially from large fires that may 
spread quickly and block evacuation.  Life safety risk in interface areas is often 
exacerbated by limited numbers of roads (in the worst case only one access road) that 
are often narrow and winding and subject to blockage by a wildland fire. 
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Life safety risk in interface areas is also often exacerbated by homeowners’ reluctance 
to evacuate homes quickly.  Instead, homeowners often try to protect their homes with 
whatever fire suppression resources are available.  Such efforts generally have very 
little effectiveness.  For example, the water flow from a garden hose is too small to 
meaningfully impact even a single structure fire (once the structure is significantly 
engulfed by flames) and is profoundly too small to have any impact on a wildland fire.  
Unfortunately, home owners who delay evacuation in well meant but misguided 
attempts to save their homes often place their lives in grave jeopardy by delaying 
evacuation until it may be impossible. 
 
Major fires in the urban/wildland interface have the potential for enormous destruction 
and very high casualties.  For example, the October 20, 1991 East Bay Fire in 
Oakland California burned 1,600 acres with 25 fatalities, 150 injuries, and over 3300 
single-family homes and 450 apartment units destroyed.  Total damages were over 
$1.5 billion.  This fire was fueled by very high vegetative fuel loads and occurred on an 
unusually hot, dry, windy day.  The fire spread extremely quickly, with over 800 homes 
engulfed by fire within the first hour, and completely overwhelmed initial fire 
suppression efforts. 
 
In October 1991, rural counties near Spokane Washington experienced 92 separate 
fires that burned about 35,000 acres and 114 homes.  Between October 25 and 
November 3, 1993, 21 major wildland fires broke out in California.  These fires burned 
over 189,000 acres and destroyed over 1,100 structures with 3 fatalities and hundreds 
of injuries.  The worst wildland/urban interface fire in United States history as far as 
casualties are concerned occurred in 1871 in Peshtigo, Wisconsin.  This fire burned 
over 1.2 million acres and killed over 1,200 people.  In 2003, a series of wildland/urban 
interface fires in southern California (San Bernardino area) burned over 750,000 acres 
and destroyed over 3,000 homes.  These few examples dramatically illustrate the 
potential for disasters in the urban/wildland interface area. 
 
 
9.1.2 Historical Data for Wildland Fires in Oregon 
 
The Oregon Department of Forestry website (www.odf.state.or.us) has a table of the 
most important historical fires in Oregon over the past 150 years.  Of the 12 major 
fires, the five largest fires all occurred between 1848 and 1868.  The two largest fires, 
the 1868 Coos Bay fire and the 1849 Siletz fire consumed 988,000 and 800,000 acres 
of wildland, respectively. The next four largest fires occurred between 1933 and 1945, 
with each fire consuming between 240,000 and 180,000 acres.  The most recent fire 
listed, the 1987 Silver Fire burned 97,000 acres.  None of these major fires occurred in 
Benton County.  More recent major fires include the 2002 Biscuit Fire that burned 
nearly 500,000 total acres (with about 471,000 acres in Oregon and nearly 29,000 
acres in California) and the 2003 B&B Complex fire that burned 90,769 acres. 
 
The Oregon Department of Forestry website (www.odf.state.or.us) has several 
categories of wildland fire data listed, including: numbers of forest fires and numbers of 
acres burned in Oregon forest lands.  However, these ODF data are only for ODF-
responsibility lands and do not include forest lands where primary fire suppression 
responsibility is federal or local. These data provide one measure of wildland fire data 
for Oregon.  For ODF responsibility lands in Oregon as a whole, the 10-year average 
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number of wildland fires is 1,062.  Since 1986, the largest number of acres burned in 
one year was 99,060 in 2002, while the lowest number of ODF-responsibility acres 
burned in one year was 1,410 in 1997.  For the entire state of Oregon, both the 
number of fires and the acres burned are higher than these ODF data alone. 
 
 
9.2 Wildland/Urban Interface Fire Risk for Corvallis 
 
An overview perspective on wildland/urban interface fire risk for Corvallis and vicinity is 
provided by the vegetation map of Benton County, which is shown in Figure 9.1. 
 
Most of the vegetated areas in Benton County are classified as Douglas Fir – Western 
Hemlock, with areas of Douglas Fir – Broadleaf Deciduous, and areas of Douglas Fir –
Oregon White Oak and Oregon White Oak – Douglas Fir.  Along the Willamette River 
Valley there are areas of Cottonwood-Willow Riparian, and Pasture Riparian 
Bottomland, and Agricultural lands with these classifications being as per the Atlas of 
Oregon. 
 
Vegetation Codes for Benton County Include: 
 
 dd  Douglas fir – broadleaf deciduous, 
 dh Douglas fir – western hemlock, 
 do Douglas fir – Oregon white oak, 
 od Oregon white oak – Douglas fir, 
 m Marsh, 
 rc Cottonwood – willow riparian, 
 rb Pasture – riparian bottomland, and 
 ag agricultural. 
 
As shown on Figure 9.1, Corvallis is bordered on the north and northwest sides by 
forested areas, classified as Oregon white oak – Douglas fir (classification “od” on the 
map).  On the east, south and southwest sides, Corvallis is bordered by agricultural 
lands (classification “ag” on the map) with low potential for wildland/urban interface 
fires. 
 
The three primary factors governing the level of hazard for wildland fires or wildland/ 
urban interface fires are: fuels (type and load), weather and topography.  For Corvallis, 
the fuel load in the nearby forested areas to the north and northwest of the city is 
generally high and relatively continuous across large geographic areas.  Because of 
historical logging activities, much of the forest is composed of relatively young trees, 
with a high density of trees per acre.  Such forests may pose a higher fire hazard than 
do old growth forests with fewer, larger trees.   
 
Topography contributes to fire hazard because fires spread much more quickly up 
steep slopes.  Weather is very important in governing the level of fire hazard.  Rainfall 
amounts and patterns contribute to the level of fuel load and also to moisture levels in 
vegetation.  During fires, temperature, humidity and wind speed are major factors 
governing the rate of spread of wildland fires and thus major factors governing the 
ease or difficulty with which a given fire is likely to be contained.   
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Figure 9.1 
Vegetation Cover in Benton County (Atlas of Oregon) 
 
 
11-18-07 9-6
Developments in wildland/urban interface areas face a range of levels of fire risk, 
depending on a number of factors.  Developments that have all of most of the following 
attributes are at the highest level of risk: 
 
1) High vegetative fuel loads, with a high degree on continuity of fuel load (i.e., 
few significant firebreaks).  Risk may be particularly high if the fuel load is 
grass, brush and smaller trees, subject to being at very low moisture levels in 
short duration drought periods. 
 
2) Higher slopes, which cause fires to spread more rapidly than in flatter terrain. 
 
3) Limited fire suppression capacity, including limited water supply capacity for 
fire suppression purposes, limited fire fighting personnel and apparatus, and 
typically long response times for fire alarms. 
 
4) Limited access for fire fighting apparatus and limited evacuation routes for 
residents at risk. 
 
5) Construction of structures to less than fully fire-safe practices, and 
 
6) Lack of maintenance of firebreaks and defensible zones around structures. 
 
Fire protection services for Corvallis and adjacent areas are provided by three local 
fire agencies:  
 Corvallis Fire Department, 
 Corvallis RFPD, and 
 Philomath Fire District. 
 
Specific geographic areas identified by the Corvallis Fire Department and the Corvallis 
RFPD as being at risk for wildland/urban interface fires are summarized in Table 9.1 
(from Benton County Hazard Mitigation Plan). 
 
Table 9.1 
Areas of Special Concern for Wildand/Urban Interface Fires 
 
Corvallis
Geographic Area of 
Concern
Crescent Valley / 
Vineyard Mountain
Area of high value homes 
from 10 to 40 years old in 
forested area in the Corvallis 
RFPD
X X X X X X
Oak Creek West of Corvallis along Oak Creek for about 5 miles X X X X X X X
Skyline West
Northwest of Corvallis off 
Ponderosa Drive in forested 
area with areas of heavy 
underbrush.  Many homes 
have brush adjacent to 
structure and combustible 
roofing.
X X X X X X
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Wildland/urban interface fire risk for at risk neighborhoods near the city boundaries on 
the north and northwest sides is increased by: 
1) Inadequate water supply for fire suppression in many areas, 
2) Lack of defensible space around structures or fire breaks, 
3) Inadequate road system with steep grades, narrow streets, lack of secondary 
access routes, no turnarounds or turnarounds on long dead end streets, and 
4) Prevalence of non-fire rated construction with combustible roofing and exterior 
wall covering materials, with open decks and eves. 
 
The Skyline West subdivision is of particular concern to the Corvallis Fire Department 
because this is a forested residential area with areas of heavy underbrush.  Many 
homes have brush adjacent to structures and combustible roofing.  Fire risk is 
compounded by the steep topography in parts of this area and by limited or 
nonexistent water supplies sufficient for controlling a major fire. The only 
access/egress to Skyline West is via NW Ponderosa Avenue.  Thus, timely evacuation 
in the event of a major fire and restricted access for fire fighting apparatus are both 
problematic. 
 
An aerial view of the Skyline West subdivision showing the heavy vegetative fuel loads 
in close proximity to structures is shown below in Figure 9.2. 
 
Figure 9.2 
Skyline West Subdivision 
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The potential impacts of wildland/urban interface fires on Corvallis are summarized 
below in Table 9.2. 
 
Table 9.2 
Potential Impacts of Wildland/Urban Interface Fires on Corvallis 
 
Portion of Corvallis affected
Highest risk areas are residential areas bordering heavily vegetated 
wildland areas in the north and northwest parts of Corvallis along 
with adjacent portions of Benton County.
Buildings
Small wildland/urban interface fires could affect a few residential 
buildings.  Larger fires could effect entire neighborhoods and 
extreme events (cf. Oakland Hills 1991 fire) could affect hundreds 
of buildings
Streets within communities Minor road closures possible from fires; limited impact because of short detour routes within communities.
Roads within and to/from Corvallis Potential closures of major highways due to fires, especially roads west of Corvallis.
Electric power Potential for localized loss of electric power due to fires affecting power lines in or near Corvallis
Other Utilities
Generally minor or no impacts on other utilities from fires, except 
for possible loss of telephone service due to fires affecting phone 
poles/lines.
Casualties Potential for deaths and injuries in major wildland/urban interface fires, especially if evacuations are not completed expeditiously.
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9.3 Mitigation Strategies  
 
This section outlines suggested strategies for reducing the level of risk to both property 
and life safety in wildland/urban interface development areas that may be at high risk 
from wildland/urban interface fires.  The suggested mitigation strategy has four 
elements: 
1) reduce the probability of fire ignitions, 
2) reduce the probability that small fires will spread, 
3) minimize property damage, and 
4) minimize the life safety risk. 
 
Reduce the probability of fire ignitions 
 
Efforts to reduce the probability of fire ignitions should focus on manmade causes of 
ignition through a combination of fire prevention education, enforcement, and other 
actions.  Fire prevention education actions could include efforts to heighten public 
awareness of fire dangers, especially during high danger time periods and better 
education about fire safe practices, such as careful disposal of smoking materials, and 
adhering to restrictions on burning of rubbish and debris.  Fire prevention enforcement 
action could include strict enforcement of burning restrictions and vigorous 
investigation and prosecution of arson cases.  An important physical action to reduce 
the probability of ignitions is to maintain or upgrade tree-trimming operations around 
power lines to minimize fires starting by sparking from lines to vegetative fuels. 
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Reduce the probability that small fires will spread. 
 
Possible mitigation actions to reduce the probability that small fires will spread include 
enhancement of water supply and fire suppression capabilities for high risk areas, 
expansion of existing firebreaks, creation of new firebreaks and expanding defensible 
spaces around structures in wildland/urban interface areas.  Geographical area 
specific pre-emergency planning by jurisdiction should also be conducted to help 
optimize fire response strategies.   
 
Minimize Property Damage 
 
The education and action items discussed above may help to reduce future property 
damages by reducing the number of fire ignitions and by reducing the probability that a 
small fire will spread.  In addition, specific fire safe building practices should be 
implemented (if not yet implemented) or enforced vigorously (if not yet vigorously 
enforced). Fire safe building practices have two main elements: first, design of 
structures, and second, creation of defensible spaces around structures. 
 
The USFA (www.usfa.fema.gov) and other organizations have many sources of 
information about fire safe practices in the wildland/urban interface.  For example, the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) has an excellent “Firewise” communities 
program with an excellent, highly informative website (www.firewise.org).  The firewise 
website can also be reached from the main NFPA website (www.nfpa.org).  The 
Firewise website has very informative publications and videos for local officials and 
homeowners to help understand, evaluate, and improve the fire safety of structures at 
risk from wildland/urban interface fires.  Similar information is also available at the 
FireFree site by the Safeco Insurance Company:  
(www.safeco.com/safeco/about/giving/firefree.asp)  
 
The NFPA Firewise construction and firewise landscaping checklists are particularly 
recommended as concise summaries of the primary fire-safe designs and practices for 
homeowners at risk from wildland/urban interface fires.  
The NFPA’s Firewise Construction Checklist, makes the following main 
recommendations (among others): 
1) site homes on as level terrain as possible, at least 30 feet back from cliffs or 
ridge lines, 
2) build homes with fire-resistant roofing materials, such as Class-A asphalt 
shingles, slate or clay tiles, concrete or cement products, or metal. 
3) build homes with fire-resistant exterior wall cladding, such as masonry or 
stucco, 
4) consider the size and materials for windows; smaller panes hold up better 
than larger ones, double pane and tempered glass windows are more fire 
resistant than single pane windows; plastic skylights can melt and allow access 
for burning embers, 
5) prevent sparks and embers from entering vents by covering vents with wire 
mesh no larger than 1/8", box eaves, and minimize places to trap embers on 
decks and other attached structures, and 
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6) keep roofs, eaves, and gutters free of flammable debris. 
 
The NFPA’s Firewise Landscaping Checklist includes the following main 
recommendations (among others), based on a four-zone planning concept around the 
house: 
1) Zone 1 should be well irrigated area of closely mowed grass or non-
flammable landscaping materials such as decorative stone, at least 30' in all 
directions around the home,  
2) Zone 2 should be a further irrigated buffer zone with only a limited number of 
low-growing, fire-resistant plants,  
3) Zone 3, further from the house, can include low growing plants and well-
spaced, well-pruned trees, keeping the total vegetative fuel load as low as 
possible, and 
4) Zone 4 is the natural area around the above three landscaped zones.  This 
area should be thinned selectively, with removal of highly flammable vegetation 
and removal of ladder fuels that can spread a grass fire upwards into tree tops. 
 
Minimize Life Safety Risk 
 
The mitigation actions above may help to minimize life safety risk by helping to reduce 
the number of ignitions, by reducing the probability that small fires will spread, and by 
encouraging more fire-safe practices of building construction and fire-safe 
landscaping.  These practices are meritorious for reducing the fire hazards to 
structures.  However, they may also give homeowners a false sense of life safety 
security.  A false sense of security may encourage people to stay in homes at risk 
during wildfires, rather than evacuating immediately at the first fire warning. 
 
The most important action to minimize life safety risk during wildland/urban interface 
fires is immediate evacuation.  However, evacuations must be directed by the 
responsible fire agencies to ensure both egress for residents and access for fire 
apparatus and personnel.  Uncontrolled evacuations can sometimes block access and 
thus potentially increase fire spread.  Thus, reducing life safety risk requires public 
education and emergency planning to encourage and expedite warnings and 
evacuations (voluntary or mandatory).   
 
Life safety risk during wildland/urban interface fires is exacerbated by limited 
evacuation routes.  Improving evacuation roads (widening, straightening) and, most 
importantly, providing as many alternate evacuation routes as possible can 
significantly reduce evacuation times and lower the probability that residents seeking 
to evacuate may be trapped by fire-blocked routes. 
 
 
The following table contains wildland/urban interface fire mitigation action items from 
the master Action Item table in Chapter 4. 
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Table 9.3 
Wildland/Urban Interface Fire Mitigation Action Items 
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Wildland/Urban Interface Fire Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Identify specific parts of Corvallis at high risk for 
urban/wildland interface fires because of fuel loading, 
topography and prevailing construction practices
Fire 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Identify evacuation routes and procedures for high 
risk areas and educate the public Fire Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#3 Develop Corvallis Wildfire Protection Plan Fire 1-2 Years X X X X X
Long-Term     
#1
Encourage fire-safe construction practices for existing 
and new construction in high risk areas Fire, Community Development Ongoing X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
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10.0 EARTHQUAKES 
 
Historically, awareness of seismic risk in Oregon has generally been low, among both 
the public at large and public officials.  This low level of awareness reflected the low 
level of seismic activity in Oregon, at least in recent historical time.  However, over the 
past several years, awareness of seismic risk in Oregon has significantly increased.  
Factors in this increased awareness include the 1993 Scotts Mills earthquake in 
Clackamas County, widespread publicity about possible large magnitude earthquakes 
on the Cascadia Subduction Zone, and recent changes in Seismic Zonation in the 
Oregon Building Code which increased seismic design levels for new construction in 
western Oregon. 
 
Before reviewing the levels of seismic hazard and seismic risk in Corvallis, we first 
present a brief earthquake “primer” that reviews some basic earthquake concepts and 
terms. 
 
 
10.1 Earthquake Primer 
 
In the popular press, earthquakes are most often described by their Richter Magnitude 
(M).  Richter Magnitude is a measure of the total energy released by an earthquake.  
In addition to Richter magnitude, there are several other measures of earthquake 
magnitude used by seismologists, but such technical details are beyond the scope of 
this discussion.  The Scotts Mills (Oregon) earthquake was M = 5.6, while the 
Northridge (California) earthquake was about M = 6.7.  Great earthquakes, for 
example, on the San Andreas Fault or on the Cascadia Subduction Zone, may have 
magnitudes of 8 or greater.  
 
It is important to recognize that the Richter scale is not linear, but rather logarithmic.  A 
M8 earthquake is not twice as powerful as a M4, but rather thousands of times more 
powerful.  A M7 earthquake releases about 30 times more energy than a M6, while a 
M8 releases about 30 times more energy than a M7 and so on.  Thus, great M8 
earthquakes may release thousands of times as much energy as do moderate 
earthquakes in the M5 or M6 range.   
 
The public often assumes that the larger the magnitude of an earthquake the “worse” 
the earthquake.  Thus, the “big one” is the M8 earthquake and smaller earthquakes 
(M6 or M7) are not the “big one”.  However, this is true only in very general terms.  
Larger magnitude earthquakes affect larger geographic areas, with much more 
widespread damage than smaller magnitude earthquakes.  However, for a given site, 
the magnitude of an earthquake is NOT a good measure of the severity of the 
earthquake at that site.  Rather, the intensity of ground shaking at the site depends on 
the magnitude of the earthquake and on the distance from the site to the earthquake.  
An earthquake is located by its epicenter - the location on the earth’s surface directly 
above the point of origin of the earthquake.  Earthquake ground shaking diminishes 
(attenuates) with distance from the epicenter.  Thus, any given earthquake will 
produce the strongest ground motions near the earthquake with the intensity of ground 
motions diminishing with increasing distance from the epicenter. 
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Thus, for a given site, a smaller earthquake (such as a M6.5) which is very close to the 
site could cause greater damage than a much larger earthquake (such as a M8) which 
is quite far away from the particular site. 
 
However, earthquakes at or below M5 are not likely to cause significant damage, even 
locally very near the epicenter.  Earthquakes between about M5 and M6 are likely to 
cause some damage very near the epicenter, with the extent of damage typically being 
relatively minor (e.g., the 1993 Scotts Mills earthquake).  Earthquakes of about M6.5 
or greater can cause major damage (e.g., the Northridge earthquake), with damage 
usually concentrated fairly near the epicenter.  Larger earthquakes of M7+ cause 
damage over increasingly wider geographic areas with the potential for very high 
levels of damage near the epicenter.  Great earthquakes with M8+ can cause major 
damage over wide geographic areas.  For example, a M8+ on the Cascadia 
Subduction Zone could affect the entire Pacific Northwest from British Columbia, 
through Washington and Oregon, and as far south as Northern California.  
 
The intensity of ground shaking varies not only as a function of M and distance but 
also depends on soil types.  Soft soils may amplify ground motions and increase the 
level of damage.  Thus, for any given earthquake there will be contours of varying 
intensity of ground shaking.  The intensity will generally decrease with distance from 
the earthquake, but often in an irregular pattern, reflecting soil conditions 
(amplification) and possible directionality in the dispersion of earthquake energy. 
 
There are many measures of the severity or intensity of earthquake ground motions.  
A very old, but commonly used, scale is the Modified Mercalli Intensity scale (MMI), 
which is a descriptive, qualitative scale that relates severity of ground motions to types 
of damage experienced.  MMIs range from I to XII.   
 
More useful, modern intensity scales use terms that can be physically measured with 
seismometers, such as the acceleration, velocity, or displacement (movement) of the 
ground.  The most common physical measure, and the one used in this Mitigation 
Plan, is Peak Ground Acceleration or PGA.  PGA is a measure of the intensity of 
shaking, relative to the acceleration of gravity (g).  For example, 1.0 g PGA in an 
earthquake (an extremely strong ground motion) means that objects accelerate 
sideways at the same rate as if they had been dropped from the ceiling.  10% g PGA 
means that the ground acceleration is 10% that of gravity and so on. 
 
Damage levels experienced in an earthquake vary with the intensity of ground shaking 
and with the seismic capacity of structures.  Ground motions of only 1 or 2% g are 
widely felt by people; hanging plants and lamps swing strongly, but damage levels, if 
any, are usually very low.  Ground motions below about 10% g usually cause only 
slight damage. Ground motions between about 10% g and 30% g may cause minor to 
moderate damage in well-designed buildings, with higher levels of damage in poorly 
designed buildings.  At this level of ground shaking, only unusually poor buildings 
would be subject to potential collapse.  Ground motions above about 30% g may 
cause significant damage in well-designed buildings and very high levels of damage 
(including collapse) in poorly designed buildings.  Ground motions above about 50% g 
may cause high levels of damage in many buildings, even those designed to resist 
seismic forces. 
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10.2 Seismic Hazards for Corvallis  
 
Earthquakes in Western Oregon, and throughout the world, occur predominantly 
because of plate tectonics - the relative movement of plates of oceanic and continental 
rocks that make up the rocky surface of the earth.  Earthquakes can also occur 
because of volcanic activity and due to other geologic processes.   
 
The Cascadia Subduction Zone is a geologically complex area off the Pacific 
Northwest coast from Northern California to British Columbia.  In simple terms, several 
pieces of oceanic crust (the Juan de Fuca Plate, Gorda Plate and other smaller 
pieces) are being subducted (pushed under) the crust of North America.  This 
subduction process is responsible for most of the earthquakes in the Pacific Northwest 
as well as for creating the volcanoes in the Cascades.  Figure 10.1 shows the geologic 
(plate-tectonic) setting for Oregon. 
 
There are three source regions for earthquakes that can affect Corvallis: 
 
1) “interface” or “subduction zone” earthquakes on the boundary between the 
subducting oceanic plates and the North American plate, 
 
2) “intraslab” or “intraplate” earthquakes within the subducting oceanic plates, 
 which are also known as “Benioff Zone” or deep zone earthquakes, and 
 
3) “crustal” earthquakes within the North American Plate. 
 
The geographic and geometric relationships of these earthquake source zones are 
shown in Figure 10.2  
 
The “interface” earthquakes on the Cascadia Subduction Zone may have magnitudes 
of 8 or greater, with probable recurrence intervals of 500 to 800 years.  The last major 
earthquake in this source region probably occurred in the year 1700, based on current 
interpretations of Japanese tsunami records.  Such earthquakes are the great 
Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake events that have received attention in the 
popular press.  These earthquakes typically occur about 20 to 60 kilometers (12 to 40 
miles) offshore from the Pacific Ocean coastline.  Ground shaking from such 
earthquakes would be very strong near the coast and moderately strong ground 
shaking would be felt throughout Corvallis. 
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Figure 10.2 
                                          Earthquake Source Zones
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The “intraslab” earthquakes, which are also called “intraplate” or “Benioff Zone” 
earthquakes, occur within the subducting oceanic plate.   These earthquakes may 
have magnitudes up to about 7.5, with probable recurrence intervals of about 500 to 
1000 years (recurrence intervals are poorly determined by current geologic data).  
These earthquakes occur quite deep in the earth, about 30 or 40 kilometers (18 to 25 
miles) below the surface with epicenters that would likely range from near the Pacific 
Ocean coast to about 50 kilometers (30 miles) inland.  Thus, epicenters from these 
types of earthquakes could be located in Lincoln County or western Benton County. 
Ground shaking from such earthquakes would be very strong near the epicenter and 
moderately strong ground shaking would be felt throughout all of Benton County, with 
the level of shaking decreasing towards eastern Benton County. 
 
“Crustal” earthquakes within the North American plate are possible on faults mapped 
as active or potentially active as well as on unmapped (unknown) faults.  The only 
mapped fault in Benton County is the Corvallis Fault, which runs in a SW to NE 
direction through northwest Corvallis.  The Corvallis Fault and two other nearby faults, 
the Owl Creek Fault east of Corvallis and the Mill Creek Fault north of Albany, are 
shown on Figure 10.3. 
 
The USGS fault classifications for the above faults are Class B for the Corvallis Fault 
and Class A for the Owl Creek Fault and the Mill Creek Fault.  For the Corvallis Fault, 
the classification means that the fault exists but that there is no evidence or equivocal 
evidence for movements during the Quaternary geologic time period (the last 1.6 
million years).  For the Owl Creek and Mill Creek Faults, the classification means that 
there has apparently been movement within the past few hundred thousand years, but 
not within the past 10,000 years.  Thus, the risk from earthquakes on these faults 
appears very low. 
 
Historically observed crustal earthquakes in Oregon from 1841 to 2002 are shown in 
Figure 10-3 (DOGAMI, Map of Selected Earthquakes for Oregon, 1841 through 2002, 
Open-File Report 03-02, 2003).  During this time period, only six small earthquakes 
have occurred in Benton County as shown on Figure 10.3.  Larger earthquakes in 
nearby counties are also shown.   
 
However, based on the historical seismicity in Western Oregon and on analogies to 
other geologically similar areas, small to moderate earthquakes up to M5 or M5.5 are 
possible almost anyplace in Western Oregon, including almost anyplace in Benton 
County.  Such earthquakes would be mostly much smaller than the Scotts Mills 
earthquake up to about the magnitude of that 1993 earthquake.  The possibility of 
larger crustal earthquakes in the M6+ range cannot be ruled out.  However, the 
probability of such events is likely to be very low. 
 
Because the probability of large crustal earthquakes (M6 or greater) affecting Benton 
County  is low and because any damage in smaller crustal earthquakes is likely to be 
minor and very localized, crustal earthquakes are not considered significant for hazard 
mitigation planning purposes.  Therefore, our analysis focuses on the larger, much 
more damaging earthquakes arising from the Cascadia Subduction Zone. 
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Figure 10-3 
Earthquake Epicenters from 1841 to 2002 
 
 
          
 11-18-07 
 10-8 
 
The characteristics of the subduction zone earthquakes affecting Corvallis are summarized in 
Table 10.1 below.  The maximum magnitudes are estimated from the length and width of the 
mapped fault plane or from similar earthquakes elsewhere in the Pacific Northwest (for the 
intraslab earthquakes).   Recurrence intervals are based on current best estimates. 
 
Table 10.1 
Seismic Sources Affecting Corvallis 
 
 
Fault 
 
Maximum 
Magnitude 
 
Probable Recurrence 
Interval (years) 
 
Cascadia Subduction Zone 
(interface earthquake) 
 
8.5 
 
500 to 800 
 
Cascadia Subduction Zone 
(intraslab earthquake) 
 
7.5 
 
500 to 1000 
 
In addition to these large earthquakes, the Cascadia Subduction Zone also experiences 
smaller earthquakes such as the M6.8 Nisqually earthquake near Olympia Washington which 
occurred on February 28, 2001.  The Nisqually earthquake was an intraslab earthquake which 
occurred at a depth of 52 kilometers (about 30 miles).  Other relatively recent similar Cascadia 
Subduction Zone earthquakes include the M7.1 Olympia earthquake in 1949 and the M6.5 
Seattle-Tacoma earthquake in 1965.  These earthquakes killed 15 people and resulted in over 
$200 million in damages (1984 dollars, www.dnr.wa.gov).  Similar earthquakes are possible in 
Western Oregon, including Benton County. 
 
The following figure shows a generalized geologic map of Benton County and includes the 
Corvallis Fault and other mapped faults.  The mapped faults within or near Benton County are 
relatively small and not very active.  Thus, seismic hazard for Corvallis arises predominantly 
from major earthquakes on the Cascadia Subduction Zone.  Smaller, crustal earthquakes in or 
near Benton County could be locally damaging, but would not be expected to product 
widespread or major damage. 
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Figure 10.4 
Geologic Map of Benton County1 
 
 
 
1 Preliminary Earthquake Hazard and Risk Assessment and Water-Induced Landslide Hazard in Benton 
County, Oregon.  Zehnming Wang, Gregory Graham, and Ian Madin, DOGAMI Open File Report O-01-05, 
2001. 
 
 
10.3 Other Aspects of Seismic Hazards in Corvallis 
 
Most of the damage in earthquakes occurs directly because of ground shaking which affects 
buildings and infrastructure.  However, there are several other aspects of earthquakes that can 
result in very high levels of damage in localized sites: liquefaction, landslides, dam failures and 
tsunamis. 
 
10.3.1 Soil Effects 
 
Liquefaction is a process where loose, wet sediments lose strength during an earthquake and 
behave similarly to a liquid.  Once a soil liquefies, it will tend to settle and/or spread laterally.  
With even very slight slopes, liquefied soils tend to move sideways downhill (lateral spreading). 
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Settling or lateral spreading can cause major damage to buildings and to buried infrastructure 
such as pipes and cables. 
 
In general, areas of high liquefaction potential largely follow river and stream drainage 
channels, marshy areas and areas near lakes.  In addition, similar soil conditions may occur in 
areas where lakes or streams existed in the past but have now been filled in by natural or 
human-caused processes. 
 
In earthquakes, liquefaction, settling or lateral spreading does not occur in all such areas or in 
all earthquakes.  However, in larger earthquakes with strong ground shaking and long duration 
shaking, liquefaction is likely in many of these high liquefaction potential areas.  Settlements of 
a few inches or more and lateral spreads of a few inches to several feet are possible.  Even a 
few inches of settlement or lateral spreading is likely to cause significant to major damage to 
affected buildings or infrastructure. 
 
For Benton County, DOGAMI has prepared county-wide maps of areas known or likely to be 
affected by these soils effect (Preliminary Earthquake Hazard and Risk Assessment and 
Water-Induced Landslide Hazard in Benton County Oregon, Open File Report O-01-05, 2001). 
 This DOGAMI publication includes maps of areas subject to liquefaction, amplification of 
earthquake ground motions, and earthquake induced landslides. 
 
These maps are based on available data and should not be over interpreted to represent exact 
locations of soils subject to liquefaction. Not all areas within given bins of liquefaction potential 
may be as classified:  some areas may have higher potential and some areas may have lower 
potential.  Detailed site-specific geotechnical studies are necessary to determine the level of 
liquefaction, settlement or lateral spread hazard at any specific location. The DOGAMI map 
(Open File Report O-01-05) showing areas in or near Corvallis with moderate or high 
liquefaction potential is shown in Figure 10.5.  A more detailed Corvallis map showing areas 
with liquefaction potential is shown in Figure 10.6. 
 
10.3.2 Landslides 
 
Earthquakes can also induce landslides, especially if an earthquake occurs during the rainy 
season and soils are saturated with water.  The areas prone to earthquake-induced landslides 
are largely the same as those areas prone to landslides in general. As with all landslides, areas 
of steep slopes with loose rock or soils are most prone to earthquake-induced landslides.  
Areas with steep slopes and loose rock or soils that are prone to water-induced landslides or 
debris flows are also subject to earthquake-induced landslides.  For reference, see the 
landslide and debris flow hazard maps in Chapter 8 Landslides. 
 
10.3.3 Dam Failures 
 
Earthquakes can also cause dam failures in several ways.  The most common mode of 
earthquake-induced dam failure is slumping or settlement of earthfill dams where the fill has 
not been properly compacted.  If the slumping occurs when the dam is full, then overtopping of 
the dam, with rapid erosion leading to dam failure is possible.  Dam failure is also possible if 
strong ground motions heavily damage concrete dams.  In a few cases, earthquake-induced 
landslides into reservoirs have caused dam failures. Earthquake-induced dam failures are 
addressed in more detail in Chapter 12 which covers dam failures that could affect Corvallis. 
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Figure 10.5 
DOGAMI Liquefaction Potential Map for Corvallis and Vicinity 
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Figure 10.6 
Areas within Corvallis with Soils Subject to Liquefaction 
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10.3.4 Tsunamis and Seiches 
 
Tsunamis, which are often incorrectly referred to as “tidal waves,” result from earthquakes 
which cause a sudden rise or fall of part of the ocean floor.  Such movements may produce 
tsunami waves, which have nothing to do with the ordinary ocean tides.  In the open ocean, far 
from land, in deep water, tsunami waves may be only a few inches high and thus be virtually 
undetectable, except by special monitoring instruments.  These waves travel across the ocean 
at speeds of several hundred miles per hour.  When such waves reach shallow water near the 
coastline, they slow down and can gain great heights.   
 
Tsunamis affecting the Oregon coast can be produced from very distant earthquakes off the 
coast of Alaska or elsewhere in the Pacific Ocean.  For such tsunamis, the warning time for the 
Oregon coast would be at least several hours.  However, interface earthquakes on the 
Cascadia Subduction Zone can also produce tsunamis.  For such earthquakes the warning 
times would be very short, only a few minutes.  Because of this extremely short warning time, 
emergency planning and public education are essential before such an event occurs. 
 
For Corvallis, not being on the coast, there are no impacts from tsunamis. 
 
Another earthquake related phenomenon is “seiches” which are waves from sloshing of inland 
bodies of waters such as lakes, reservoirs, or rivers.  In some cases, seiches have caused 
damages to shorefront structures and to dams.  However, for the Corvallis the potential for 
seiches of sufficient magnitude to cause significant damage to upstream dams appears low.  
 
 
10.4 Risk Assessment for Scenario Earthquakes 
 
For regional planning purposes, FEMA’s HAZUS-MH (Hazards U.S. Multi-Hazard) software 
can be used to make estimates of county-wide damages in Benton County from two scenario 
earthquakes.  HAZUS is an extensively peer-reviewed nationally-applicable loss estimation 
methodology which draws heavily on census and other nationally-available data on buildings 
and infrastructure. 
 
The two scenario earthquakes considered include:  a) a M8.5 Cascadia Subduction Zone 
Interface Earthquake and b) a M7.5 Cascadia Subduction Zone Intraplate (Benioff Zone) 
Earthquake.  The earthquake loss estimates shown below were calculated in 2001 for Phase 
Two of the Regional All Hazard Mitigation Master Plan for Benton, Lane, and Linn Counties, 
using a methodology very similar to HAZUS. 
 
For each of these scenario earthquakes, building damage estimates for Benton County are 
approximately $400 million.  Injuries were estimated to be about 600 for daytime earthquakes 
and about 160 to 170 for nighttime earthquakes.  Deaths were estimated to be about 12 for 
daytime earthquakes and about 1 for nighttime earthquakes.  Casualties are much lower for 
nighttime earthquakes, because most of the population is in mostly wood-frame residential 
buildings, which typically have lower casualty rates than many other types of structures.  
Summary results are shown below in Tables 10-2 and 10-3. 
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10.4.1 M8.5 Cascadia Subduction Zone Interface Earthquake 
 
The estimated impacts of this earthquake on the building stock in Benton County are 
summarized below in Table 10.2.   The percentage of damage in Corvallis vis-à-vis all of 
Benton County will be higher than Corvallis’ percentage of Benton County’s population 
because most of the larger, older, more seismically vulnerable buildings in Benton County are 
in Corvallis.  Thus, we estimate that approximately 80% of the building damage, deaths, and 
injuries and other earthquake impacts in Benton County are likely to occur in Corvallis. 
 
Table 10.2 
M8.5 Cascadia Subduction Zone Interface Earthquake 
 
Loss Estimate Benton County Corvallis
Building Damage $420,000,000 $336,000,000
Percent Damage1 11.40% 15.00%
Daytime Deaths 12 10
Daytime Injuries 646 517
Nighttime Deaths 1 1
Nighttime Injuries 170 136
Heavily Damaged 
Residential 
Buildings2
1,711 1,369
Estimated number of 
people needing 
emergency shelter3
3,422 2,738
 
 
1 Percent damage is relative to building replacement value. 
2 Heavily damaged buildings are those in the extensive or complete damage states. 
3 Of the total displaced people, perhaps 1/3 will need public emergency shelter, with 
the rest finding shelter with relatives, friends, or in commercial lodgings. 
 
The direct loss estimates shown above are for the building 
stock only.  Including the direct damages to contents, 
infrastructure and direct economic impacts from loss of 
function, the total direct economic impacts of these 
scenario earthquakes may be about double the estimates 
shown above 
 
For such an earthquake, a substantial fraction of the larger buildings in the area will be 
damaged, including many essential service facilities, such as major medical facilities, fire and 
police stations, schools, and emergency shelters.   
 
Utility systems will be significantly damaged, including damaged buildings and damage to utility 
infrastructure, including water and wastewater treatment plants and equipment at high voltage 
substations (especially 230 kV or higher which are more vulnerable than lower voltage 
substations).  Buried pipe systems will suffer extensive damage with approximately one break 
per mile in soft soil areas.  There would be much lower rate of pipe breaks in other areas.  
Restoration of utility services will require substantial mutual aid from utilities outside of the 
affected area.  Expected outages of utility and transportation systems may include 
approximately: 
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Water:   10 days with no water to about 25% of customers in urban areas, 
20 days to restore water service to 99% of customers, 
Wastewater:    loss of function at treatment plant is likely, perhaps for up to  
several days 
Natural gas:  similar to water service, in areas served by natural gas   
    distribution systems, 
Electric power: widespread outages for 8 to 24 hours, local outages in   
    rural areas up to 72 hours, 
Phone systems: system overload for about 72 hours, most customers   
    have normal service after 72 hours, similar situation with  
     cellular customers, 
Highways:   about 10 days to make emergency repairs, about 3 to   
    5% of bridges in complete damage state. 
 
10.4.2 M7.5 Cascadia Subduction Zone Intraplate Earthquake 
 
The estimated impacts of this earthquake on the building stock in Benton County are 
summarized below in Table 10.3.  
 
Table 10.3 
M7.5 Cascadia Subduction Zone Intraplate Earthquake 
 
Loss Estimate Benton County Corvallis
Building Damage $398,000,000 $318,000,000
Percent Damage1 10.80% 14.00%
Daytime Deaths 11 9
Daytime Injuries 602 482
Nighttime Deaths 1 1
Nighttime Injuries 157 126
Heavily Damaged 
Residential 
Buildings2
1,853 1,482
Estimated number of 
people needing 
emergency shelter3
3,706 2,965
 
 
1 Percent damage is relative to building replacement value. 
2 Heavily damaged buildings are those in the extensive or complete damage states. 
3 Of the total displaced people, perhaps 1/3 will need public emergency shelter, with 
the rest finding shelter with relatives, friends, or in commercial lodgings. 
 
The direct loss estimates shown above are for the building 
stock only.  Including the direct damages to contents, 
infrastructure and direct economic impacts from loss of 
function, the total direct economic impacts of these scenario 
earthquakes may be about double the estimates shown above 
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In addition to building damages, utility systems (electric power, water, wastewater, natural gas) 
and transportation systems (bridges, pipelines) are also likely to experience significant 
damage. These types of damage and economic impacts are likely to be similar to those 
summarized above for the M8.5 Interface earthquake. 
 
The potential impacts of major earthquakes on Corvallis are summarized below in Table 10.4.  
 
Table 10.4 
Potential Impacts of Major Earthquakes on Corvallis 
 
Inventory Probable Impacts
Portion of Corvallis affected Entire City of Corvallis and surrounding areas.
Buildings
Many buildings will have no damage or light to moderate damage, 
with heavy damage concentrated in vulnerable buildings (wood 
frame buildings with cripple walls, unreinforced masonry, etc.).  
Total building damage estimated to be about $300 million.
Streets within Corvallis
Minor road damage possible in areas of soft soils.  Many bridges 
may have significant damage, 3% to 5% may be in complete 
damage state.
Roads to/from Corvallis
Minor road damage possible in areas of soft soils.  Many bridges 
may have significant damage, 3% to 5% may be in complete 
damage state.
Electric power Widespread outages for about 8 to 24 hours. Outlying areas may have outages up to 72 hours.
Water utilities
About 10 days with no water to about 25% of customers in urban 
areas, about 20 days to restore water service to 99% of customers. 
Failure of the major water transmission lines on the Marys River 
bridge crossings would result in almost complete loss of water to 
Corvallis, with a high likelihood of long duration water outages.
Other Utilities
Loss of function to wastewater treatment plant. Natural gas system 
damages and outages similar to water systems.  Phone systems 
(land and cellular) will have system overload for about 72 hours, 
then most customers will have normal service.
Emergency Shelter Needs Approximately 3,000  people may need emergency shelter.
Casualties
About 10 deaths for daytime earthquake or about 1 death for 
nighttime earthquake.  Daytime injuries about 500; nighttime 
injuries about 130.  
 
The above summary of potential impacts is for major earthquakes on the Cascadia Subduction 
Zone, as shown above in Tables 10.2 and 10.3.  Smaller earthquakes would have substantially 
smaller impacts on Corvallis than shown above.   
 
In addition, there is a low probability that a major earthquake could result in substantial damage 
or failure of the major dams upstream of Corvallis (cf. Chapter 12 Dams). 
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10.5  Earthquake Risk Assessment: Technical Guidance 
 
For planning purposes, it is sometimes useful to consider three levels of earthquake risk 
assessment.   
 
A Level One Risk Assessment means that nationally available data are used.  
For example, FEMA’s HAZUS loss estimation software uses national data and 
HAZUS risk assessments for a community are Level One.  The risk assessments 
presented in the previous section were Level One Assessments. 
 
A Level Two Risk Assessment is a more refined evaluation using local data such 
as soil maps, assessor’s records, local building code history and so on to more 
accurately reflect local conditions than when using only national data.  Level Two 
Assessments are generally more accurate than Level One Assessments, but still 
rely on generalized, typical data, rather than building specific data. 
 
A Level Three Risk Assessment is building- or facility-specific, using detailed 
data for each facility.  A Level Three Risk Assessment cannot be done for an 
entire community, but rather is typically done for a single building or a few 
buildings or other facilities that may be particularly vulnerable or for which 
mitigation of seismic hazards is a high priority.    
 
10.5.1 Level Two Risk Assessment 
 
The Level One earthquake loss estimates presented above are based on census-tract level 
data.  For a given community, a more accurate loss estimate could be obtained by 
incorporating Level Two local data into the loss calculations.  Such data could include: 
 
1) better inventory data, 
2) spatial distribution of inventory within census tracts, 
3) overlay of soils information with inventory to identify areas subject to amplification, 
liquefaction, settling and displacements, and 
4) refinement of building fragility curves to reflect local inventory. 
 
Such Level Two loss estimates would be more accurate than the Level One assessments 
presented above.  However, the Level One estimates probably provide accurate enough 
estimates of the approximate magnitude of losses for emergency planning purposes. 
Furthermore, conducting a Level Two loss estimate would require very intensive data collection 
and processing efforts, without providing enough detail for specific mitigation projects.  
Therefore, Level Two risk assessments may not be as useful for Corvallis as the Level Three 
Assessments suggested below. 
 
10.5.2 Level Three Risk Assessment 
 
The potential damages and losses from earthquakes affecting Corvallis are very high.  
However, the probability of such earthquakes is relatively low and many types of buildings, 
such as wood frame homes, are generally expected to perform reasonably well in earthquakes. 
 Therefore, widespread mitigation of seismic hazards is probably not called for in the case of 
most ordinary or typical buildings.  That is, seismic mitigation actions are probably necessary 
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only for a small percentage of the total building stock in Corvallis. 
 
Furthermore, buildings constructed since the early 1990s generally meet current seismic 
design requirements and will generally perform fairly well in future earthquakes.  Similarly, new 
buildings will be built in accordance with current Seismic Zone 3 requirements and thus the 
seismic capacity of the building stock in Corvallis will gradually improve over time as the 
existing stock is gradually replaced and/or upgraded. 
 
However, for some types of buildings which are more vulnerable or more important than typical 
buildings, seismic retrofit may be highly desirable.  Prime candidates for possible seismic 
retrofits include: 
• any buildings that are substantially more vulnerable than typical  buildings (e.g., 
unreinforced masonry buildings),  
• buildings on soft soil sites subject to amplification of ground motions and/or  
liquefaction, and  
• essential service facilities such as major medical facilities, police and fire       
stations, schools, emergency shelters and key governmental facilities including 
City Hall, Public Works shops and other government facilities important for post-
earthquake response and recovery efforts.   
 
Specific buildings may be substantially more vulnerable than typical buildings because of their 
structural system.  Examples of vulnerable building types include: unreinforced masonry, 
precast concrete frame, concrete or steel frame with unreinforced masonry infill walls, concrete 
moment resisting frame, and precast concrete tiltup walls.   
 
Buildings may also be substantially more vulnerable than typical buildings because of their 
design characteristics.  Examples include buildings with soft first stories (taller than other 
stories and/or with large expanses of windows without shear walls) and buildings with major 
configurational irregularities, as well as wood frame buildings with cripple wall foundations or 
with sill plates not bolted to the foundation.  Thus, we suggest that Level Three risk 
assessments focus primarily on such buildings, especially for essential service facilities. 
 
A Level Three assessment provides a building-specific evaluation, more accurate than generic 
assessments based on typical buildings.  Ideally, a Level Three assessment would include a 
site specific seismic hazard analysis, taking into account soil conditions, and a building-specific 
evaluation of the seismic vulnerability of each building under evaluation. 
 
In addition to buildings, there are other critical facilities which may be vulnerable to seismic 
damage, including utility and transportation system infrastructure.  Minimizing earthquake 
damage to such facilities is particularly important to a community because loss of function of 
critical utility or transportation system infrastructure may have a very large economic impact on 
the community.  Facilities that should have a high priority for Level Three Risk Assessments 
include:  electric power substations (especially high voltage substations), water and waste-
water treatment plants, water reservoirs, bulk fuel storage tanks and hazmat storage tanks, 
dams and bridges.  For utilities in general, non-structural mitigation measures are often very 
cost-effective and should have a high priority. 
  
For buildings, utilities and other important facilities, the seven-step Mitigation Planning 
methodology outlined in Chapter 1 is appropriate.  For prioritizing between mitigation projects, 
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the principles of benefit-cost analysis apply to mitigation projects for all hazards, including 
seismic hazard mitigation.  FEMA has software available to conduct such analyses of 
prospective earthquake hazard mitigation projects.   
 
10.6 Other Earthquake Risk Comments for Corvallis 
 
A “windshield” survey means a quick, preliminary seismic risk evaluation of a building or other 
facility, based on readily observable external attributes.  A windshield survey may literally be 
done from a vehicle, but more commonly includes a quick walk around inspection.  
Conclusions drawn from such preliminary evaluations must be interpreted carefully as giving 
only a general indication of the probable level of seismic risk posed by the building or facility. 
 
The following comments are based on a very limited windshield type survey of Corvallis’ 
building stock. 
 
Overall, a majority of the building inventory in Corvallis is residential, with most residential 
structures being wood frame buildings.  In general, wood frame buildings perform well in 
earthquakes, with a few notable exceptions.  Wood frame buildings with the following 
characteristics are generally substantially vulnerable to major seismic damage: 
1) sill plates not bolted to foundation, 
2) cripple wall perimeter systems, and 
3) buildings on steep slopes, partially supported on “stilts.” 
 
Cripple wall perimeter systems are short wooden walls which raise the first floor elevation 
above grade by typically about 2 to 4 feet.  Unbolted sill plates and cripple wall construction are 
common in pre-WW2 construction.  Visual inspection and the general vintage of building stock 
in Corvallis suggest that there are likely significant numbers of buildings in Corvallis with cripple 
wall foundations or with unbolted sill plates.  About 9% of the residential building stock in 
Corvallis pre-dates 1940. 
 
Unreinforced masonry buildings are also subject to major damage in earthquakes.  Corvallis 
has at least several dozen masonry buildings (most commercial or industrial in the older 
downtown area) which may be unreinforced or reinforced masonry.  Some of these buildings 
may be highly vulnerable to earthquake damage and thus should have a high priority for 
detailed evaluation, especially those buildings with high occupancies or important functions. 
 
A detailed inventory of wood frame buildings with the above noted seismic deficiencies and 
inventory of unreinforced masonry buildings would be useful to further quantify the level of risk 
posed by such structures in Corvallis. 
 
 
10.7  Earthquake Hazard Mitigation Projects: General Examples 
 
There are a wide variety of possible hazard mitigation projects for earthquakes.  The most 
common projects include: structural retrofit of buildings, non-structural bracing and anchoring 
of equipment and contents, and strengthening of bridges and other infrastructure components. 
 
The seismic hazard (frequency and severity of earthquakes) is moderate in the Corvallis.  
However, the risk (potential for damages and casualties) may be fairly high because some 
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buildings and infrastructure may be highly vulnerable to earthquake damages.  The risk 
assessment methodology outlined above for earthquakes provides the basis for identifying the 
high risk facilities that then become the primary targets for mitigation. 
 
Structural retrofit of buildings should not focus on typical buildings, but rather on buildings that 
are most vulnerable to seismic damage.  Priorities should include buildings on soft soil sites 
subject to amplification of ground motion and/or liquefaction and especially on critical service 
facilities such as hospitals, fire and police stations, emergency shelters, and schools. 
 
Non-structural bracing of equipment and contents is often the most cost-effective type of 
seismic mitigation project.  Inexpensive bracing and anchoring may protect very expensive 
equipment and/or equipment whose function is critical such as medical diagnostic equipment in 
hospitals, computers, communication equipment for police and fire services and so on.  For 
utilities, bracing of control equipment, pumps, generators, battery racks and other critical 
components can be powerfully effective in reducing the impact of earthquakes on system 
performance.  Such measures should almost always be undertaken before considering large-
scale structural mitigation projects. 
 
The strategy for strengthening bridges and other infrastructure follows the same principles as 
discussed above for buildings.  The targets for mitigation should not be typical infrastructure 
but rather specific infrastructure elements that have been identified as being unusually 
vulnerable and/or are critical links in the lifeline system.  For example, vulnerable overpasses 
on major highways would have a much higher priority than overpasses on lightly traveled rural 
routes. 
 
For reference, a detailed analysis of a seismic retrofit project for a building (Monroe High 
School) is included in the Appendix to Chapter 10 of the Benton County Hazard Mitigation 
Plan. 
 
 
The following table contains earthquake mitigation action items from the master Action Item 
table in Chapter 4.
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Table 10.5 
Earthquake Mitigation Action Items 
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Earthquake Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete seismic retrofits for City Hall and the Marys 
River bridge crossings for water transmission lines, 
both of which are critical facilities for Corvallis, 
urgently requiring retrofit
Public Works 1-2 Years X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Complete seismic retrofit for North Hill 1st Level East 
Reservoir Public Works 1-2 Years X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Complete evaluations and implement seismic retrofits 
for important City buildings, including Fire Stations #2, 
#3, and #4, Majestic Theater, Madison Building, 
Municipal Court, City Hall Annex and the Senior 
Center.
Public Works 2-5 years X X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Complete seismic vulnerability analyses of critical 
facilities with significant seismic vulnerabilities, 
including fire, police, medical, and other emergency 
communication/response facilities
Public Works, community partners 1-5 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#5
Complete seismic vulnerability analyses for lifeline 
utility and transportation systems, including: water, 
wastewater, natural gas, electric power, 
telecommunications and bridges
Public Works, ODOT, private 
utilities 1-5 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#6
Support/steer a project using outside 
support/consultants to complete an inventory of 
public, commercial and residential buildings that may 
be particularly vulnerable to earthquake damage
Public Works, Community 
Development 2-5 years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#7
Educate homeowners about structural and non-
structural retrofitting of vulnerable homes and 
encourage retrofit
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X
Long-Term     #1
Obtain funding and retrofit critical public buildings and 
lifeline utility and transportation facilities with 
significant seismic vulnerabilities
Public Works, ODOT, private 
utilities 10 years X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
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11.0 VOLCANIC HAZARDS 
 
11.1 Overview 
 
The Cascades, which run from British Columbia through Washington and Oregon into 
northern California, contain more than a dozen major volcanoes and hundreds of 
smaller volcanic features.  In the past 200 years, seven of the Cascade volcanoes in 
the United States have erupted, including: Mt. Baker, Glacier Peak, Mt. Rainier, Mount 
St. Helens, Mt. Hood, Mt. Shasta, and Mt. Lassen. 
 
Over the past 4,000 years (a geologically very short time period) there have been 
three eruptions of Mt. Hood, four eruptions in the Three Sisters area, and two 
eruptions in the Newberry Volcano area and minor eruptions near Mt. Jefferson, at 
Blue Lake Crater, in the Sand Mountain Field (Santiam Pass), near Mt. Washington, 
and near Belknap Crater.  During this time period, the most active volcano in the 
Cascades has been Mount St. Helens with about 14 major eruptions and many smaller 
eruptions. 
 
Many other volcanoes are deemed active or potentially active.  The Smithsonian 
Institution’s Global Volcanism Project lists 20 active volcanoes in Oregon and 7 in 
Washington.  These volcanoes are listed below in Tables 11.1 and 11.2 
 
Table 11.1 
Active Volcanoes in Oregon 
 
Volcano Type Last Eruption
Mt. Hood Stratovolcano 1866
Mt. Jefferson Stratovolcano
950                     
main volcano inactive for 
>10,000 years
Blue Lake Crater Crater 1490 BC
Sand Mountain Field Cinder cones 1040 BC?
Mt. Washington Shield volcano 620                     main volcano inactive
Belknap Field Shield volcanoes 460?
North Sister Field Complex volcano 350
South Sister Complex volcano 50 BC?
Mt. Bachelor Stratovolcano 5800 BC
Davis Lake Volcanic field 2790 BC?
Newberry Volcano Shield volcano
620                     
crater formation 300,000 to 
500,000 years ago
Devils Garden Volcanic field unknown
Squaw Ridge Lava Field Volcanic field unknown
Four Craters Lava Field Volcanic field unknown
Cinnamon Butte Cinder cones unknown
Crater Lake Caldera
2290 BC                 
Crater formation about      
7,700 years ago
Diamond Craters Volcanic field unknown
Saddle Butte Volcanic field unknown
Jordan Craters Volcanic field 1250 BC
Jackies Butte Volcanic field unknown  
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Table 11.2 
Active Volcanoes in Washington 
 
Volcano Type Last Eruption
Mt. Baker Stratovolcano 1880
Glacier Peak Stratovolcano 1700 + 100
Mt. Rainier Stratovolcano 1825 (?)
Mt. Adams Stratovolcano 950 AD (?)
Mount St. Helens Stratovolcano 1991                    (eruptions started in 1980)
West Crater Volcanic field 5760 BC (?)
Indian Heaven Shield volcanoes 6250 BC + 100  
 
On a longer geological time scale, volcanic activity in the Cascades has been very 
widespread.  A DOGAMI report on prehistoric and historic volcanic eruptions in 
Oregon (see website below) notes that over 3,000 large and small volcanoes have 
erupted over the past five million years, in the Cascades as a whole.  Within historical 
times, between 1843 and 1860 there were a series of 21 eruptions in the Cascades 
and there is some scientific speculation that the Northwest may be entering another 
period of volcanic activity. 
 
A great deal of general background information on Oregon and Washington volcanoes 
and on volcanoes in general is available on several websites, including the following. 
 
Table 11.3 
Volcano Websites 
 
Institution Website
Smithsonian Institution             
(Global Volcanism Project) www.volcano.si.edu/gvp
United States Geological 
Survey (USGS) - general site www.usgs.gov
USGS Cascades Volcano 
Observatory (Vancouver, WA) http://vulcan.wr.usgs.gov
DOGAMI www.oregongeology.com
 
 
The numerous volcanoes of the Cascades differ markedly in their geological 
characteristics. The largest volcanoes are generally what geologists call composite or 
stratovolcanoes.  These volcanoes may be active for tens of thousands of years to 
hundreds of thousands of years.   In some cases, these large volcanoes may have 
explosive eruptions such as Mount St. Helens in 1980 or Crater Lake about 7,700 
years ago.  The much more numerous sites of volcanic activity are generally what 
geologists call mafic volcanoes.  This type of volcano is typically active for much 
shorter time periods, up to a few hundred years, and generally forms small craters or 
cones.  Mafic volcanoes are not subject to large explosive events. 
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11.2 Volcanic Hazard Types 
 
In Oregon, awareness of the potential for volcanic eruptions was greatly increased by 
the May 18, 1980 eruption of nearby Mount St. Helens in Washington which killed 57 
people.  In this eruption, lateral blast effects covered 230 square miles and reached 17 
miles northwest of the crater, pyroclastic flows covered six square miles and reached 5 
miles north of the crater, and landslides covered 23 square miles.  Ash accumulations 
were about 10 inches at 10 miles downwind, 1 inch at 60 miles downwind, and ½ inch 
at 300 miles downwind.  Lahars (mudflows) affected the North and South Forks of the 
Toutle River, the Green River, and ultimately the Columbia River as far as 70 miles 
from the volcano.  Damage and reconstruction costs exceeded $1 billion. 
 
Volcanic eruptions often involve several distinct types of hazards to people and 
property, as well evidenced by the Mount St. Helens eruption.  Major volcanic hazards 
include: lava flows, blast effects, pyroclastic flows, ash flows, lahars, and landslides or 
debris flows.  Some of these hazards (e.g., lava flows) only affect areas very near the 
volcano.  Other hazards may affect areas 10 or 20 miles away from the volcano, while 
ash falls may affect areas many miles downwind of the eruption site. 
 
Lava flows are eruptions of molten rock.  Lava flows for the major 
Cascades volcanoes tend to be thick and viscous, forming cones and 
thus typically affecting areas only very near the eruption vent.  However, 
flows from the smaller mafic volcanoes may be less viscous flows that 
spread out over wider areas.  Lava flows obviously destroy everything in 
their path. 
 
Blast effects may occur with violent eruptions, such as Mount St. 
Helens in 1980.  Most volcanic blasts are largely upwards.  However, 
the Mount St. Helens blast was lateral, with impacts 17 miles from the 
volcano.  Similar or larger blast zones are possible in future eruptions of 
any of the major Cascades volcanoes. 
 
Pyroclastic flows are high-speed avalanches of hot ash, rock 
fragments and gases.  Pyroclastic flows can be as hot as 1500 oF and 
move downslope at 100 to 150 miles per hour.  Pyroclastic flows are 
extremely deadly for anyone caught in their path. 
 
Ash falls result when explosive eruptions blast rock fragments into the 
air.  Such blasts may include tephra (solid and molten rock fragments).  
The largest rock fragments (sometimes called “bombs”) generally fall 
within two miles of the eruption vent.  Smaller ash fragments (less than 
about 0.1”) typically rise into the area forming a huge eruption column.  
In very large eruptions, ash falls may total many feet in depth near the 
vent and extent for hundreds or even thousands of miles downwind. 
 
Lahars or mudflows are common during eruptions of volcanoes with 
heavy loading of ice and snow.  These flows of mud, rock and water can 
rush down channels at 20 to 40 miles an hour and can extend for more 
than 50 miles.  For some volcanoes, lahars are a major hazard because 
highly populated areas are built on lahar flows from previous eruptions. 
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Landslides or debris flows are the rapid downslope movement of 
rocky material, snow and/or ice.  Volcano landslides can range from 
small movements of loose debris to massive collapses of the entire 
summit or sides of a volcano.  Landslides on volcanic slopes may be 
triggered by eruptions or by earthquakes or simply by heavy rainfall.   
 
 
11.3 Volcanic Hazards for Corvallis 
 
Several of the active volcanoes in Oregon and Washington (See Tables 11.1 and 
11.2) are located relatively near Corvallis, including Mount St. Helens and Mt. Hood. 
Approximate distances from Corvallis to three relatively nearby volcanoes are shown 
below in Table 11.4. 
 
Table 11.4 
Distances from Corvallis 
 
Volcano Distance (miles)
Mount St. Helens 112
Mt. Hood 92
Three Sisters 80  
 
Among these relatively nearby volcanoes, Mount St. Helens is the most active.  Mt. 
Hood and the Three Sisters are definitely active. 
 
Corvallis is approximately 80 miles from the Three Sisters, and further away from the 
other volcanoes.  We review the volcanic hazards posed by the Three Sisters the 
nearest active volcano that may affect Corvallis. 
 
 Awareness of potential volcanic activity at the Three Sisters has been raised because 
of the recent discovery of an uplift (bulge) on the west side of South Sister.  In May 
2001, the USGS announced that it had detected a slight swelling or uplift of the west 
side of South Sister.  This bulge, which occurred between 1996 and 2000, covers an 
area about 9 to 12 miles in diameter, with a maximum bulge in the center of about 4 
inches.  The cause of this uplift (bulge) is most likely intrusion of a small amount of 
magma (molten rock) deep under the surface, probably at a depth of about 4 miles.   
 
This observation confirms that South Sister is still an active volcano, but needs to be 
interpreted cautiously.  For comparison, a bulge was also observed on the north side 
of Mount St. Helens in the months prior to the May 18, 1980 eruption.  However, the 
Mount St. Helens bulge was 450 feet high and growing at a rate of 5 feet per day prior 
to the eruption.  Thus, the South Sister bulge of 4 inches is certainly not an indication 
of an imminent eruption. 
 
The UGSG analysis of Volcano Hazards in the Three Sisters Region, Oregon was 
published in 1999 (Open-File Report 99-437).   The main conclusions are summarized 
in the following paragraphs. 
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The Three Sisters area includes two large composite volcanoes (Middle and South 
Sister).  Large composite volcanoes in the Cascades (e.g., Mt. Hood, Mt. Jefferson, 
Newberry Volcano, Crater Lake) are often active for hundreds of thousands of years 
and are subject to sometimes explosive eruptions (e.g., Mount St. Helens in 1980).  
Hazards from eruptions of composite volcanoes include all of the hazards listed above 
in Section 11.2. 
 
Between the major composite volcanoes, the crest of the Cascades is built up of 
hundreds of “mafic” volcanoes.  Mafic volcanoes typically erupt for a few weeks to a 
few centuries, although some can be nearly as large as the composite volcanoes.  
Prominent mafic volcanoes in the Three Sisters area include North Sister, Mount 
Bachelor, Belknap Cater, Black Butte, and Mount Washington.  Mafic volcanoes often 
form broad fields of volcanic vents such as in the Sand Mountain Field near the 
Santiam Pass, north of the Three Sisters. 
 
Mafic volcanoes typically erupt less explosively than do composite volcanoes, so that 
impacts of eruptions are less widespread.  Most mafic eruptions in the Three Sisters 
areas have produced tephra deposits and lava flows that typically traveled 3 to 9 miles 
from the vents and rarely 9 to 12 miles from the vents.  Tephra deposits rarely exceed 
4 inches in thickness at distances 6 miles from the vent. 
 
Belknap Crater, about 1,500 years old, is one of the youngest mafic volcanoes in the 
Cascades.  The Sand Mountain field, a cluster of cones and lava flows west of 
Santiam Pass, was formed during three eruptive periods between about 2,000 and 
4,000 years ago. 
 
The USGS study of Volcano Hazards in the Three Sisters Region includes three 
hazard zones:  proximal hazards, distal hazards, and a regional lava flow hazard zone. 
  
The proximal hazard zone is limited to the immediate area around the 
Three Sisters and is an oval area about 8 miles (east-west) by 10 miles 
(north-south).  The proximal hazard area is the area subject to the most 
intense volcanic hazards including lava flows, tephra flows, pyroclastic 
flows, landslides and debris flows and lahars.  Fortunately, this area is 
predominantly wilderness with very low population. 
 
The distal hazard zones are river valleys extending away from the 
proximal hazard zone that are subject to landslides, debris flows and 
lahars.  The distal hazard zone has three levels for areas subjected to 
lahars (and other flows) of varying sizes.  Areas subjected to lahars 
include Squaw Creek into Sisters, Tumalo Creek into Bend, the valley 
between Sparks Lake and Crane Prairie Reservoir, and the McKenzie 
River (and tributaries) west of the Three Sisters. 
 
The regional lava flow hazard zone includes a band about 30 to 40 
miles wide covering the entire crest of the Cascades.  Locations 
throughout this zone, which includes Sisters, Bend, and the Santiam 
Pass, are subject to lava flows from mafic volcanism could occur 
anywhere in this entire zone. 
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None of these Three Sisters volcanic hazard zones impact Corvallis directly.   
 
Thus, the extent of volcanic hazards for Corvallis appears largely limited to the 
possibility of minor ash falls from eruptions at Three Sisters or at other locations in the 
Cascades  (e.g., Mount St. Helens).  In all but the most extreme events, ash falls in 
Corvallis are likely to be minor with an inch or less of ash likely.  Volcanic events in the 
Three Sisters area or in the Santiam Pass area (Sand Mountain volcanic field) could 
also close eastbound Highway 20 and thus affect transportation to/from Corvallis, at 
least to a very limited extent. 
 
However, to a much lower extent, volcanic activity at Three Sisters could affect 
Corvallis in several ways: 
 
1) Depending on the volume of volcanic ash ejected by an eruption and 
on prevailing wind directions at the time of eruption, various thicknesses 
of ash falls may affect Corvallis.  Possible impacts of ash falls include: 
 
 a) Clean-up and debris removal, 
 
b) Possible respiratory problems for at-risk population such as 
elderly, young children or others with respiratory problems, 
 
c) Possible impacts on public water supplies drawn from surface 
waters, including degradation of water quality (high turbidity) and 
possible increased maintenance requirements at water treatment 
plants, and 
 
d) Possible electric power outages from ash-induced short 
circuits in distribution lines, transmission lines, and substations. 
 
2) Debris flows, landslides, and lahars into the river valleys near the 
Three Sisters may affect the McKenzie River and the Willamette River 
downstream and thus also affect public water supplies downstream. 
 
The following maps show probabilistic data on ash fall in western Oregon, taking into 
account all of the active volcanoes (USGS Open File Report 9-437, Plate 1, 1999).  
Interpolating between the map contours of Figure 11.5, the annual probability of 1 
centimeter (about 0.4 inch) or more of volcanic ash is about 1/5000 in Corvallis.  In 
other words the return period for such ash falls are about 5,000 years for Corvallis. 
 
Interpolating between the map contours of Figure 11.6, the annual probability of 10 
centimeters (about 4 inches) or more of volcanic ash is less than 1/10,000.  In other 
words the return period for such ash falls are greater than 10,000 years for Corvallis. 
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Figure 11.5 
Annual Probability of 1 Centimeter (about 0.4 inch) or More of Volcanic Ash 
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Figure 11.6 
Annual Probability of 10 Centimeters (about 4 inches) or More of Volcanic Ash 
(same scale as Figure 11.5 above) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The low probabilities of significant ash falls (i.e., long return periods) arise because 
ash falls in Corvallis require volcanic eruptions producing ash and wind directions that 
deposit ash westward from the volcanoes.   
 
For the 2004 eruptions of Mount St. Helens (and presumably for future eruptions of 
Mount St. Helens and other volcanoes in the Cascades), NOAA has real time volcanic 
ash forecasts, taking into account eruption locations and wind directions.  These 
forecasts are available at:  http://www.arl.noaa.gov/ready/vaftadmenu 
 
To see specific ash forecasts for Mount St. Helens, click on “Hypothetical Eruptions” 
and then select St. Helens and the desired forecast time frame to view the projections. 
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The probable impacts of potential volcanic eruptions on Corvallis are summarized 
below in Table 11.7. 
 
Table 11.7 
Probable Impacts of Potential Volcanic Eruptions on Corvallis 
 
Inventory Probable Impacts
Portion of Corvallis Affected Entire City of Corvallis and surrounding region may be affected by ash falls from some eruptions.
Buildings Negligible impact, other than minor cleanup required
Streets within Corvallis Negligible impact, other than minor cleanup required
Roads to/from Corvallis Negligible impact, other than minor cleanup required
Electric Power Temporary power outages possible from short circuits caused by ash falls
Other Utilities
Negligible impact, other than minor cleanup required for most 
utilities.  Potential to impact water treatment plants which may 
require additional maintenance to deal with high turbidity water
Casualties Some potential for health impacts, especially for frail people with respiratory problems.  
 
 
 
11.4 Mitigation of Volcanic Hazards 
 
Mitigation of volcanic hazards is predominantly in the areas of monitoring volcanic 
activity, warnings and evacuation, and emergency response.  That is, there are few, if 
any, practical physical measures to mitigate the direct impacts of volcanic activity. 
 
The USGS actively monitors volcanic activity in the Cascades via networks of seismic 
sensors (which can detect earthquakes related to magma movements) as well as very 
accurate ground surface measurements, such as that which has detected the very 
small bulge on South Sister.  The USGS also has a volcanic warning system with 
several levels of alert as a potential eruption becomes more likely and more imminent.  
 
For the Cascades, the USGS volcano warning system (www.usgs.gov) has three 
levels. Level One (Volcanic Unrest) means anomalous conditions that could be 
indicative of an eventual volcanic eruption.  Level Two (Volcanic Advisory) means that 
processes are underway that have a significant likelihood of culminating in hazardous 
volcanic activity, but when the evidence does not indicate that a life- or property-
threatening event is imminent.  Level Three (Volcano Alert) means that monitoring or 
evaluation indicate that precursory events have escalated to the point where a 
volcanic event with attendant volcanologic or hydrologic hazards threatening to life and 
property appears imminent or is underway. 
 
For Corvallis, which is located well outside of any of the likely direct hazard zones for 
any Cascades volcanic events, mitigation for volcanic activity is likely a low priority.  In 
the event of a minor ash fall, public warnings directing people (especially those with 
respiratory problems) to remain indoors, and minor cleanup are most likely the only 
necessary responses for most volcanic effects impacting Corvallis.  In addition, water 
treatment plants should be evaluated to ensure that they can handle possible high 
turbidity events from volcanic ash falls into water supplies. 
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The following table includes the volcanic hazards mitigation action items from the 
master Action Items table in Chapter 4. 
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Table 11.8 
Volcanic Hazards Mitigation Action Items 
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Volcanic Hazards Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Update public emergency notification procedures for 
ash fall events
Public Works, Fire, Police, City 
Manager's Office 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Update emergency response planning for ash fall 
events Public Works, Fire, Police 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Evaluate capability of water treatment plants to deal 
with high turbidity from ash falls and upgrade 
treatment facilities and emergency response plans to 
deal with ash falls
Public Works 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Prepare/pre-script public messages about protection 
from and disposing of volcanic ash Public Works, Fire, Police X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
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12.0 DAM SAFETY 
 
12.1 Overview of Dams 
 
Dams are manmade structures built to impound water.  Dams are built for many 
purposes including water storage for potable water supply, livestock water supply, 
irrigation, or fire suppression.  Other dams are built for flood control, recreation, 
navigation, hydroelectric power or to contain mine tailings.  Dams may also be 
multifunction, serving two or more of these purposes. 
 
The National Inventory of Dams, NID, which is maintained by the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers, is a database of approximately 76,000 dams in the United States. 
The NID does not include all dams in the United States.  Rather, the NID includes 
dams that are deemed to have a high or significant hazard potential and dams 
deemed to pose a low hazard if they meet inclusion criteria based on dam height and 
storage volume.  Low hazard potential dams are included only if they meet either of 
the following selection criteria: 1) exceeds 25 feet in height and 15 acre-feet of 
storage, or 2) exceeds 6 feet in height and 50-acre feet of storage.  There are many 
thousands of dams too small to meet the NID selection criteria. However, these small 
dams are generally too small to have significant impacts if they fail and thus are 
generally not considered for purposes of risk assessment or mitigation planning. 
 
This NID potential hazard classification is solely a measure of the probable impacts if a 
dam fails.  Thus, a dam classified as High Potential Hazard does not mean that the 
dam is unsafe or likely to fail.  The level of risk (probability of failure) of a given dam is 
not even considered in this classification scheme.  Rather, the High Potential Hazard 
classification simply means that there are people at risk downstream from the dam in 
the inundation area, if the dam were to fail.  The NID potential hazard classification 
system for dams is as summarized below in Table 12.1. 
 
Table 12.1 
NID Hazard Potential Classification for Dams1 
  
Hazard Potential 
Classification 
 
Loss of Human Life 
 
Economic, Environmental, or           
Lifeline Losses 
 
Low 
 
None expected 
 
Low and generally limited to dam owner 
 
Significant 
 
None expected 
 
Yes 
 
High 
 
Probable, one or more expected 
 
Yes, but not necessary for this classification. 
 
Dams assigned the low hazard potential classification are those where failure or mis-
operation results in no probable loss of human life and low economic and/or 
environmental losses.   Losses are principally limited to the dam owner’s property. 
 
Dams assigned to the significant hazard potential classification are those where failure 
or mis-operation results in no probable loss of human life but can cause economic 
loss, environmental damage, or disruption of lifeline facilities.  Significant hazard 
potential dams are often located in predominantly rural or agricultural areas. 
Dams assigned to the high hazard potential classification are those where failure or 
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mis-operation will probably cause loss of human life.  Failure of dams in the high 
classification will generally also result in economic, environmental or lifeline losses, but 
the classification is based solely on probable loss of life. 
 
Of the dams in the NID, nearly 60% are privately owned.  In addition to the dams in the 
NID, there are many thousands of dams too small to meet the selection criteria for the 
NID.  Most of these small dams are also privately owned.   
 
The NID is available online through several links at FEMA and the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers.  However, since September 11, 2001, access is somewhat 
restricted.  Basic NID information and links to the database are available at 
http://crunch.tec.army.mil/nid/webpages/nid.cfm      
 
 
12.2 Dam Primer 
 
In the simplest terms, dams are impervious structures that block the flow of water in a 
river or stream and thereby impound water behind the dam.  Dams have been built for 
thousands of years from a wide range of materials, including earth, stone, masonry, 
wood, and concrete.  Large modern dams are almost always embankment dams (built 
primarily from soil, rock, or mixtures) or concrete dams.   
 
Large modern dams almost always have control mechanisms such as gated spillways 
or outlet pipes for releasing water in a controlled fashion.  Typically, dams are 
operated to smooth natural variations in water flow.  During high water flow periods, 
water is stored behind a dam, while in low water flow periods, water is released to 
increase flows.  Controlled releases typically result in lower peak (flood) flows and 
higher minimum flows than in uncontrolled streams.  The specific patterns of water 
storage and release vary from dam to dam, depending on the primary purpose(s) of 
the dam and on a wide variety of economic, regulatory and environmental 
considerations. 
 
12.2.1 Dam Nomenclature and Types of Dams 
 
Modern dams, whether embankment dams or concrete dams, are typically constructed 
on a foundation, which may be concrete, natural rock or soils, or compacted soils.  
Dams are usually constructed along a constricted part of a river valley to minimize 
cost.  Dams are also connected to the surrounding natural valley walls, which become 
the abutments of the dam structure itself.  
 
Embankment dams are commonly termed earthfill or rockfill dams, depending on the 
primary material used in their construction.  Historically, a wide range of earth and rock 
materials have been used to construct embankment dams, with various construction 
techniques including hydraulic fill and compaction.  Embankment dams are broad flat 
structures, typically at least twice as wide at the base as their height.  In cross section, 
embankment dams are typically trapezoidal, with a wide flat base, sloping slides and a 
narrower flat top. 
 
Depending on the permeability of the materials used in an embankment dam, 
impervious layers may be added to the upstream side of the structure or in the center 
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core of the structure.  Embankment dams are subject to erosion by running water.  
Thus, modern embankment dams always have erosion-resistant materials used in the 
water release and control mechanisms of the dam.  Typically, concrete spillways with 
concrete or steel gates are used to control releases. Many dams also have outlet pipe 
systems with concrete or steel pipes as part of the water release control system. 
 
Modern concrete dams fall into two major classes: gravity dams and arch dams.  
Concrete gravity dams are designed on principles similar to embankment dams.  
Concrete gravity dams are broad structures, generally triangular in shape with a flat 
base, a narrow top, a flat upstream side and a broad sloping downstream side.  Much 
of these dams’ capacity to impound water arises from the weight of the dam.  
Typically, gravity dams are keyed into bedrock foundations and abutments to increase 
the stability of the dam. 
 
Concrete arch dams rely primarily on the strength of concrete to impound water. 
Concrete arch dams are much thinner in cross section than concrete gravity dams and 
are always convex on the upstream side and concave on the downstream side 
because concrete is much stronger in compression than in tension.  With this arch 
design, the pressure of impounded water compresses the concrete and makes the 
dam stronger.  Like concrete gravity dams, concrete arch dams are also keyed into 
bedrock foundations and abutments to provide stability.  A less common variation of a 
concrete arch dam is a concrete buttress dam.  Buttress dams are arched or straight 
dams with additional strength provided by buttresses perpendicular to the long axis of 
the dam. 
 
An excellent introduction to dam nomenclature and descriptions of types of dams is 
given in the FEMA publication: Dam Safety: An Owner’s Guidance Manual.3   For 
further details, the reader is referred to this publication and the references therein. 
 
12.2.2 Dam Failure Modes 
 
Dam failures can occur at any time in a dam’s life; however, failures are most common 
when water storage for the dam is at or near design capacity.  At high water levels, the 
water force on the dam is higher and several of the most common failure modes are 
more likely to occur. Correspondingly, for any dam, the probability of failure is much 
lower when water levels are substantially below the design capacity for the reservoir. 
 
For embankment dams, the most common failure mode is erosion of the dam during 
prolonged periods of rainfall and flooding.  When dams are full and water inflow rates 
exceed the capacity of the controlled release mechanisms (spillways and outlet pipes), 
overtopping may occur.  When overtopping occurs, scour and erosion of either the 
dam itself and/or of the abutments may lead to partial or complete failure of the dam.  
Especially for embankment dams, internal erosion, piping or seepage through the 
dam, foundation, or abutments can also lead to failure.  For smaller dams, erosion and 
weakening of dam structures by growth of vegetation and burrowing animals is a 
common cause of failure. 
 
For embankment dams, earthquake ground motions may cause dams to settle or 
spread laterally.  Such settlement does not generally lead, by itself, to immediate 
failure.  However, if the dam is full, relatively minor amounts of settling may cause 
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overtopping to occur, with resulting scour and erosion that may progress to failure. 
For any dam, improper design or construction or inadequate preparation of 
foundations and abutments can also cause failures.  Improper operation of a dam, 
such as failure to open gates or valves during high flow periods can also trigger dam 
failure.  For any dam, unusual hydrodynamic (water) forces can also initiate failure.  
Landslides into the reservoir, which may occur on their own or be triggered by 
earthquakes, may lead to surge waves which overtop dams or hydrodynamic forces 
which cause dams to fail under the unexpected load.  Earthquakes can also cause 
seiches (waves) in reservoirs that may overtop or overload dam structures.  In rare 
cases, high winds may also cause waves that overtop or overload dam structures. 
 
Concrete dams are also subject to failure due to seepage of water through foundations 
or abutments.  Dams of any construction type are also subject to deliberate damage 
via sabotage or terrorism. For waterways with a series of dams, downstream dams are 
also subject to failure induced by the failure of an upstream dam.  If an upstream dam 
fails, then downstream dams also fail due to overtopping or due to hydrodynamic 
forces. 
 
An excellent review of the common mechanisms for dam failures is given in the FEMA 
publication: Dam Safety: An Owner’s Guidance Manual.3   For further details, the 
reader is referred to this publication and the references therein.   
 
A National Research Council study4 of dam failures in the United States and Western 
Europe from 1900 to 1969 compiled historical data on the observed probability of 
failure as a function of type of dam.  Dam failures are quite common in the United 
States.  For example, FEMA data from Tropical Storm Alberto (1994) show 230 dam 
failures in the State of Georgia from this single event.5   Fortunately, most dam failures 
are of small dams where the failure poses little or no risk to life safety and only minor, 
localized property damage.  Most failures are of dams that are too small to be included 
in the NID database or dams in the NID Low Hazard Potential Category. 
 
However, in the United States between 1960 and 1997 there were 23 dam failures that 
caused at least one death, with total fatalities from these 23 failures estimated at 318 
people.5  Since 1874, there have been six dam failures in the United States which 
killed over 100 people.2   The worst dam failure, in terms of casualties, was the 1889 
Johnstown Pennsylvania dam failure which killed over 2,200 people.  Three of the high 
fatality dam failures occurred in the 1970s: Black Hills, South Dakota, Big Thompson 
River, Colorado, and Buffalo Creek, West Virginia.  These three failures alone resulted 
in an estimated 514 deaths.2  (Note: the published death statistics in this paragraph 
from these two FEMA sources are inconsistent, but these differences are not 
significant for the present purposes). 
 
 
12.3 Oregon Dam Data 
 
The National Inventory of Dams (NID) lists 812 dams in Oregon.  Of these NID dams, 
9 are in Benton County.  The statistical breakdown of these dams by NID Potential 
Hazard Categories is shown below in Table 12.2.  For Oregon, there are 128 dams in 
the High Potential Hazard Category. 
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Table 12.2 
Numbers of Dams by NID Potential Hazard Categories 
  
NID Hazard 
 
Oregon 
 
Benton 
County 
 
High 
 
128 
 
1 
 
Significant 
 
151 
 
1 
 
Low 
 
521 
 
4 
 
Undetermined 
 
12 
 
3 
 
Total 
 
812 
 
9 
 
There is only one dam in Benton County in the High Potential Hazard Category, the 
North Fork Dam in Philomath which is the reservoir for Corvallis’ Rock Creek Water 
Treatment plant and is owned by the City of Corvallis.  Information on this dam is 
shown below in Table 12.3. 
 
Table 12.3 
NID High Potential Hazard Dams in Benton County 
 
County Dam Name River City
NID 
Height 
(feet)
NID Storage 
(acre feet)
Benton North Fork Dam North Fork Rock Creek Philomath 83 305  
 
However, Corvallis is also potentially at risk from dams upstream along the Willamette 
River and its tributaries, including 9 dams in Lane County which are in the High 
Potential Hazard Category.  These 9 dams, all of which are federally owned and 
operated are listed individually in Table 12.4 below.   
 
Table 12.4 
NID High Potential Hazard Dams 
Affecting Benton County 
 
County Dam Name River City
NID 
Height 
(feet)
NID 
Storage 
(acre feet)
Lane Cottage Grove Coast Fork Willamette River COTTAGE GROVE 103 50,000
Lane Dexter Middle Fork Willamette River EUGENE 117 29,900
Lane Fall Creek Fall Creek SPRINGFIELD 205 125,000
Lane Dorena Row River COTTAGE GROVE 154 131,000
Lane Lookout Point Middle Fork Willamette River EUGENE 276 477,700
Lane Blue River Dam Blue River SPRINGFIELD 312 89,000
Lane Hills Creek Middle Fork Willamette River OAKRIDGE 341 356,000
Lane Cougar South Fork McKenzie River SPRINGFIELD 519 219,000
Lane Fern Ridge Long Tom River EUGENE 49 121,000  
 
All of these NID High Potential Hazard dams are upstream Corvallis and thus have a 
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potential impact on the city. 
 
12.4 Dam Failure Hazard Assessment:  Corvallis 
 
A 1987 report6 on Dam/Levee Failure by the Oregon Emergency Management Division 
lists 51 historical dam failures in Oregon from 1896 through the 1980s.  As of the time 
of this report, no dam failure fatalities had been recorded in Oregon.  However, the 
potential for dam failure fatalities certainly exists in Oregon and in Corvallis, albeit with 
a low probability of occurrence.  
 
To evaluate the level of risk posed by dams in Corvallis, we consider primarily dams in 
the NID high potential hazard classification.  Dams in the significant and low potential 
hazard categories do not pose a life safety threat and the risk of property damage is 
minimal or low.  
 
Additional data on the ten NID high potential hazard dams potentially affecting 
Corvallis are given below in Tables 12.5 and 12.6.  As shown below, the North Fork 
Dam and all of the Corps dams do have EAPs. 
 
Table 12.5 
Additional Data on NID High Potential Dam in Benton County 
 
County Dam Name River
NID 
Storage 
(acre 
feet)
Date 
Built
Dam 
Type EAP Owner
Benton North Fork Dam North Fork Rock Creek 305 1960 RE Yes Corvallis  
 
Table 12.6 
Additional Data on NID High Hazard Potential Dams Affecting Benton County 
 
County Dam Name River
Storage 
(acre 
feet)
Date 
Built
Dam 
Type EAP Owner
Lane Cottage Grove Coast Fork Willamette 50,000 1942 RE Y Corps
Lane Dexter Middle Fork Willamette 29,900 1955 RE Y Corps
Lane Fall Creek Fall Creek 125,000 1965 ER Y Corps
Lane Dorena Row River 131,000 1949 RE Y Corps
Lane Lookout Point Middle Fork Willamette 477,700 1953 RE Y Corps
Lane Blue River Dam Blue River 89,000 1968 RE Y Corps
Lane Hills Creek Middle Fork Willamette 356,000 1962 RE Y Corps
Lane Cougar South Fork McKenzie 219,000 1964 ER Y Corps
Lane Fern Ridge Long Tom 121,000 1941 RE Y Corps
 
The NID dam type classification includes the following types of dams: 
 RE   rockfill/earthfill embankment dams, primarily rockfill (fill >3” size) 
 ER   rockfill/earthfill embankment dams, primarily earthfill (fill <3” size) 
These dams were completed between 1941 and 1968.  All dams are rockfill/earthfill 
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embankment dams.  All dams are operated by the US Army Corps of Engineers and 
all have emergency operations plans in place.  All Corps dams are maintained on a 
regular schedule and undergo regular inspections, with major re-inspections every five 
years.  Furthermore, the Corps is highly experienced in the construction, operation, 
and maintenance of dams.   
  
As noted previously, the NID classification as High Potential Hazard means only that 
there is probable loss of life if one of these dams fails.  The NID classification contains 
no information whatsoever about the safety or lack of safety of a given dam and no 
information about the probability of failure. 
 
For embankment dams, as discussed above, the most common failure modes are 
overtopping, foundation failures, and seepage through the dam.  For concrete dams, 
the most common failure modes are overtopping and foundation failures.  Under 
normal or flood conditions, failure of the Corps operated dams appears highly unlikely. 
Failure is perhaps possible, however, in extreme flood events well above the design 
basis, especially if the reservoirs were close to full at the onset of flooding.  The 
spillway capacities could be exceeded with a potential for overtopping failures.  
 
There are, however, two other circumstances that may pose significant threats to any 
of these dams: landslides and earthquakes.   
 
A major landslide into a reservoir, whether triggered by seismic activity or not, 
could result in a large surge wave that could result in dam failure from a 
combination of overtopping and hydrodynamic forces. 
 
A major earthquake, either a Cascadia Subduction Zone earthquake, or a 
smaller, interplate or intraplate earthquake in Western Oregon, could cause 
sufficient damage to these dams to pose a risk of failure. 
 
 
12.5 Dam Risk Assessment  
 
Each of these major dams which pose a potential life safety hazard for Benton County 
are operated by the United States Army Corps of Engineers.  The Portland District of 
the Corps, Geotechnical Engineer Branch, Concrete and Dam Safety Section has 
safety responsibilities for these dams.  A variety of dam safety related information is 
also available on the Portland District’s web site at www.nwp.usace.army.mil.  Under 
the Corps normal dam operating practices, dams are inspected annually, with a more 
complete evaluation every five years on a rotating schedule. 
 
12.5.1 Flood Damage to Dams 
 
All of the Corps dams were designed and built with specific flood capacities.  Current 
dam designs are based on Standard Project Floods.  Standard Project Floods, as 
defined in the Corps Engineer Manual 1110-2-1411 (March 1, 1965) are floods 
resulting from the Standard Project Storm.  In turn, the Standard Project Storm is 
defined, somewhat imprecisely, as the most severe flood-producing rainfall-snowmelt, 
depth-area-duration event that is considered “reasonably characteristic” of the 
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drainage basin.  Discussions with Corps staff in the Portland District Office indicated 
that the Standard Project Flood is approximately a 500-year flood event. 
The Corp dams’ discharge design levels include the combination of spillway discharge 
capacity and reservoir outlet pipe discharge capacity.  As an example, for the Hills 
Creek Dam, the Standard Project Flood is 64,500 cubic feet per second.  The 
maximum controlled discharge capacity of the dam is 151,760 cubic feet per second, 
or nearly two and one-half times the Standard Project Flood discharge.  These data 
are included on the Hills Creek Project, Emergency Response Flowchart7.  At 
discharges beyond the maximum controlled discharge capacity of the dam, the dam 
would be overtopped, discharges would be uncontrolled, and there would be a high 
probability of damage to the dam, with some potential for dam failure. The large 
margin of safety in the discharge capacity of the dam suggests that the Hills Creek 
Dam likely has the capacity to withstand floods at least as large as a 1,000 year flood 
event without expected damage.   
 
 
 12.5.2 Earthquake Damage to Dams 
 
All of these dams were designed and built in the 1940s to 1960s.  Seismic design 
considerations were thus significantly lower than current seismic design 
considerations.   A summary tabulation of the seismic design basis and inspection 
history of these dams is given below in Table 12.7 (Corps of Engineers, Portland 
District Office, March, 2001).  
 
Table 12.7 
Seismic Design, Evaluation and Inspection Data 
Corps of Engineers Dams 
 
Seismic Design Basis  
Dam 
Date of Last 
Seismic 
Evaluation 
 
Original 
 
Current 
Date of Last 
Periodic 
Inspection 
Cottage Grove 1981 None 0.21 g 1997 
Dexter 1981 0.10 g 0.21 g 1996 
Fall Creek 1981 0.10 g 0.21 g 1999 
Dorena 1981 none 0.21 g 1997 
Lookout Point 1981 0.10 g 0.21 g 1999 
Blue River 1994 0.10 g 0.24 g 1996 
Hills Creek 2000 0.10 g 0.22 g 1999 
Cougar 1994 0.10 g 0.24 g 1997 
Fern Ridge 2001 none 0.35 g 2000 
 
As shown in Table 12.7, the Corps has conducted at least preliminary seismic 
evaluations of all of these dams.  However, some of these evaluations were conducted 
in the 1980s and thus do not reflect current understanding of the seismic hazard in 
Oregon or current state-of-the-art seismic evaluation engineering principles.  The 
Corps has an ongoing regular inspection program and an ongoing seismic evaluation 
program.  Presumably, updated seismic evaluations of these dams will be completed 
over the next few years. 
 
Seismic considerations were completely absent in the design of two of these dams:  
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Dorena and Fern Ridge.  The others were explicitly designed or probably designed to 
ground shaking levels of 0.10 g, which is the maximum seismic design level for any of 
the Corps dams in western Oregon.  In contrast, the current Corps seismic design 
levels for dams at these sites (i.e., if new dams were to be built today) would be 0.21 g 
to 0.24g for the dams in eastern Lane County and 0.35 g for Fern Ridge .  Thus, 
current seismic design requirements are for levels of ground shaking about two times 
higher than the probable design levels for most of these dams and about three times 
higher for Fern Ridge. 
 
Seismic evaluations of dam safety are a highly technical, highly specialized art.  
Separate evaluations must be done for each dam.  The evaluation requires a detailed 
analysis of the design and construction of the dam, an analysis of the current condition 
of materials and components, geotechnical analysis of the foundation and site, and a 
site-specific seismic hazard analysis.  For emergency planning purposes, a seismic 
evaluation should include the probabilities of failure for a scenario earthquake such as 
a large magnitude event on the Cascadia Subduction Zone. 
  
 12.5.3 Loss Estimates (Preliminary) 
 
Detailed loss estimates for possible failures of these dams are beyond the scope of 
this mitigation plan.  However, we note that in 1987 the Oregon Emergency 
Management Division6, estimated that a completely catastrophic failure of the Hills 
Creek Dam, an extremely unlikely event, could require the evacuation of over 250,000 
people with damages in excess of $10 billion.  Adjusting these 1987 estimates for 
inflation and for population growth suggests that damages could easily exceed $20 
billion.  Detailed casualty estimates have not been made for catastrophic dam failures 
affecting Corvallis.  However, given the large inundation areas, high water depths, and 
the logistical difficulties in evacuating thousands of people to safe ground, it is not 
difficult to imagine that a truly catastrophic dam failure could potentially result in 
several hundred deaths, in the worst case scenario. 
 
An important aspect of potential dam failures upstream from Corvallis is that warning 
times from dam failure to flood arrival times in Corvallis are generally quite long, 12 
hours or more.   
 
The probability of catastrophic failure of these dams is impossible to estimate with any 
accuracy, from present data.  Almost certainly, the probability is less than 0.1% per 
year (less than once in 1,000 years, on average) and perhaps substantially less.  
However, the consequences of failure are so high that careful evaluation is certainly 
warranted. 
 
Each of the Corps dams upstream from Corvallis has studies showing inundation 
areas if dams were to fail catastrophically.  Generally, these inundation maps show 
inundation flood boundaries for dam failures under extreme flood conditions and are 
thus an upper bound for inundation areas under other conditions (e.g., earthquake 
induced dam failure under non-flood conditions).  As an example, a portion of the 
inundation area mapped along the Willamette River is shown below in Figure 12.1. 
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Figure 12.1 
Sample Dam Inundation Area Map 
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The probable impacts of potential dam failures on Corvallis are summarized below in 
Table 12.8. 
 
Table 12.8 
Probable Impacts of Potential Dam Failures on Corvallis 
 
Inventory Probable Impacts
Portion of Corvallis affected
Direct impacts limited to mapped inundation areas for very unlikely 
complete dam failures at the same time as extreme flood events. 
More likely dam failure events would have significantly smaller 
inundation areas.
Buildings Heavy damage in inundation areas, if dam failure occurs.
Streets within Corvallis Damage and closures in inundation areas, if dam failure occurs.
Roads to/from Corvallis Damage and closures in inundation areas,  if dam failure occurs.
Electric power Damage and loss of service in inundation areas,  if dam failure occurs.
Other Utilities
Damage and loss of service in inundation areas, if dam failure 
occurs..  Potential for major damage to water and wastewater 
treatment plants in extreme events.
Casualties
Potential for casualties (deaths and injuries) in extremely unlikely 
major dam failures, depending on warning time available and 
effectiveness of evacuations.  
  
 
 
12.6 Mitigation Strategies 
 
Possible dam failures affecting Corvallis are very low probability events, but the 
potential casualties and economic impacts are high.  The combination of low 
probability but large impacts makes analysis of such situations difficult from both a 
technical and a public policy perspective.  The evaluation is difficult technically 
because it requires detailed engineering analysis of each dam and careful probabilistic 
risk analysis.  As always, communication with the public must be non-alarmist, but 
factual, realistic and informative. 
 
Recommendations 
 
1. The first step in mitigation planning for dam safety is emergency planning.  
Emergency planners in Benton County should obtain copies of the inundation maps for 
each of the major dams to familiarize themselves with the areas of potential flooding.  
Inundation maps which are available from the USACE only as paper copies should be 
scanned or otherwise entered into the Corvallis GIS mapping system.  For emergency 
planning, the estimated flood depths and the time periods from dam failure are 
particularly important.  Flood depths and flood times both vary markedly with distance 
downstream from the dam locations.  For emergency planning, key elements include 
community emergency notification procedures and evacuation planning (routes and 
traffic control).  Because of the very large numbers of potential evacuees, training 
seminars and scenario exercises are strongly recommended. 
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2.  All major dams have Emergency Action Plans.  These plans should be reviewed to 
ensure that they are complete and up to date.  Emergency planning officials in each 
county should be fully informed of the detailed consequences of the potential failure of 
each dam.   Public notification and evacuation plans should be updated and tested.  
For some types of dam failures, for example, those due to extreme floods, there may 
be some warning time.  Decision making procedures, protocols, and procedures for 
issuing watches, warnings, and evacuation notices should be reviewed and updated 
and coordinated among all responsible federal, state, and local agencies. 
 
3.  Because of the age of these dams, the seismic design basis is significantly below 
current seismic design requirements.  Preliminary seismic evaluations have been done 
but without sufficient detail to evaluate the probabilities of dam failures. Because of the 
extreme consequences of potential failure of one or more of these dams, we 
recommend that detailed seismic evaluations be conducted for all of these dams.   
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The table on the following page contains dam safety mitigation action items from the 
master Action Items table in Chapter 4. 
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Table 12.9 
Dam Safety Mitigation Action Items 
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Dam Safety Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Prepare high resolution maps of the dam failure 
inundation areas and update emergency response 
plans, including public notification and evacuation 
routes.
Public Works, City Manager's 
Office, Benton County Emergency 
Management
1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Encourage the Corps of Engineers to undertake a 
though seismic risk evaluations for dams upstream of 
Corvallis and to make seismic and/or flood 
improvements as necessary
Benton County Emergency 
Management Ongoing X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
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13.0 DISRUPTION OF UTILITY AND TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS 
 
The previous chapters dealt with each of the major natural hazards impacting Corvallis 
including floods, severe weather events, landslides, wildland/ urban interface fires, 
earthquakes and volcanic hazards.  These chapters evaluated each of the hazards and 
the risk arising from the hazards as they impact the buildings, infrastructure and people 
of Corvallis. 
 
Each of these hazards may result in not only damage to buildings but also damage to 
and disruption of utility and transportation systems.  Mitigation projects may be 
implemented to reduce or avoid such damage and disruptions and a few examples were 
discussed in the previous chapters.  Evaluating the potential damage and disruption of 
utility and transportation systems from each natural hazard is an important part of the 
risk assessment for each locality affected by a natural hazard. 
 
However, disruption of utility and transportation systems may have impacts on the 
affected community which are far broader than the direct damage and corresponding 
direct loss of service.  In this sense, disruption of utility and transportation systems may 
be viewed almost as a hazard.  As for other hazards, the probability, duration, and 
extent of such outages can be assessed and the impacts (risk) associated with such 
outages can be quantified.   Among the major utilities, loss of electric power generally 
has the most widespread impact on other utilities and on the community as a whole.  
Therefore, this chapter deals with electric power outages in somewhat more detail than 
for the other utility and transportation systems. 
 
 
13.1 Transportation Systems 
 
Streets, roads, and highways are subject to closure during flood events because of 
high water levels on road surfaces.  This type of closure may occur during either a 
major flood event on the larger rivers and streams in Corvallis and surrounding areas 
or during severe weather events as a result of localized flooding on smaller drainage 
systems.  In major floods or major winter storms, such road closures may be 
widespread.  If flow velocities are low, then such closures are usually due primarily to 
water depth and there is generally little damage to the road system; reopening the road 
simply requires waiting for the water level to drop and then cleaning up mud and debris 
on the road surface. 
 
However, if flow velocities are higher then erosion of the road surface or undermining 
of the road may occur.  This type of damage is most common in hilly areas with 
relatively steep slopes and occurs most often on smaller roads rather than on major 
highways. Reopening such roads often requires repair of the damaged road surface.   
 
The flood of February 1996 provided ample evidence of the impact of flooding on roads.  
For example, in Corvallis, there were many flood-caused road closures.  These closures 
included most of the major highways east and south of the city and numerous secondary 
roads. 
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For Corvallis, Chapter 7 (Winter Storms) identified some of the most problematic 
areas where major arteries and other roads have been repeatedly affected by winter 
storms (primarily localized flooding). 
 
Some sites of road closures are difficult to mitigate without large scale flood control 
projects.  However, mitigation is possible at many locations with high potential for road 
closures.  Common measures include raising the road surface to reduce the 
probability of water overtopping the road or improving local drainage (e.g., culvert 
upsizings).  
 
Risk assessments for road closures must include a measure of the importance of the 
road for transportation as well as an evaluation of the direct physical damages to the 
road.  In many cases, the disruption of transportation has a larger economic impact that 
the direct physical damages.  
 
To evaluate and prioritize hazard mitigation projects for roads, we suggest three 
measures of the relative importance of a road: 
 
1) number of vehicle trips per day, 
2) detour time around a road closure, and 
3) road use as primary access/egress, including emergency vehicles. 
 
The number of vehicle trips per day is an obvious measure of the importance of a road.   
All other factors being equal, a road with 500 trips per day is more important than a road 
with 50 trips per day and thus should have a higher priority for mitigation projects.  
However, a better measure of the importance of a road is obtained if the detour time is 
also considered.  If traffic loads were equal, a mitigation project on a road where a 
closure required a one hour detour would have a higher priority than a road where a 
closure only required a five minute detour.  More accurately, it is the combination of 
traffic load and detour time that provides a measure of the impact of road closure.  The 
product of number of trips per day and the detour time gives a measure of the number of 
vehicle-hours of delay that result from a closure.  Consider the following example: 
 
Table 13.1 
Calculation of Vehicle-Hours of Delay from Road Closures 
 
 
Road 
 
Trips  
per Day 
 
Detour Time 
(hours) 
 
Vehicle-Hours 
of Delay per 
day of Closure 
 
A 
 
500 
 
0.10 
 
50 
 
B 
 
100 
 
1.00 
 
100 
  
In this example, Road A has fives times the traffic of Road B, but because the detour 
time is much longer for a closure on B than on A, the number of vehicle-hours of delay 
is greater on Road B than on Road A.  On this basis, mitigation of the hazard causing 
the closure would have a higher priority on Road B than on Road A. 
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The number of vehicle hours of delay is a proxy for the economic impact of the 
closure.  The current FEMA value (for benefit-cost analysis purposes) for the 
economic impact of lost time due to road closures is $32.23 per vehicle hour of delay 
(What is a Benefit?, FEMA 2001).  This value is based on national average wage and 
benefits level and national average vehicle occupancy data, along with the 
assumption that an hour of leisure time is worth the same to a person as an hour of 
work (a common economic assumption).   Then, for example, 100 vehicle hours of 
delay per day has an estimated economic impact of $3,223 and so on.   For the vast 
majority of roads, with “typical” traffic loads, using an economic value of $32.23 per 
vehicle per hour of delay provides a reasonable measure of the economic impact of 
road closures.  Although FEMA has not yet updated the 2001 value for road closures 
to the equivalent current value, the corresponding 2007 value would be about $37.67, 
taking into account inflation over the past six years. 
 
Everything else being more or less equal, roads which serve as primary 
access/egress routes and/or serve many emergency vehicles may be given a higher 
priority for mitigation.  
 
For completeness, we note that roads are networked systems and a more accurate 
analysis of the relative priority of mitigation projects to reduce road closures should 
consider the network characteristics of a local road system.  However, network 
analysis is complex, requires specialized expertise and is expensive.  Network 
analysis may be justified for very expensive projects, such as a multi-million dollar 
relocation of a bridge to reduce the potential for flood washouts. However, the simple 
three parameter prioritization methodology suggested above is probably sufficient for 
evaluation of most small to medium sized mitigation projects. 
 
Other transportation systems (rail, air, ports, ferry) are also subject to disruption due to 
the impacts of hazards.  The analysis of such systems is roughly similar to that 
discussed above, but mitigation projects for such systems are encountered far less 
frequently than are mitigation projects for roads.  Moreover, most such projects are 
not directly applicable to or a low priority for Corvallis and are thus not considered 
further. 
 
 
13.2 Utility Systems - Overview 
 
Evaluation of hazard mitigation projects for utility systems have some commonalities 
between systems that we briefly review before addressing each major utility system in 
turn.   
 
Utility systems such as potable water, wastewater, natural gas, telecommunications, 
and electric power are all networked systems.  That is, they consist of nodes and 
links.  Nodes are centers where something happens - such as a pumping plant, a 
treatment plant, a substation, a switching office and the like.  Links are the 
connections (pipes or lines) between nodes.   
 
Risk assessments for utility systems are similar to risk assessments for buildings, in 
that the inventory of utility components is overlaid on the hazard map and the 
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vulnerability of utility components is evaluated for the hazards impacting the utility.  A 
major difference arises, however, because of the networked nature of utilities.  As a 
simple example, consider an electric utility which suffers damage to 10% of its 
transmission lines.  The extent of service outage might be essentially zero if there are 
redundant lines with sufficient capacity to handle the demand for electric power.  Or, 
the extent of service outage might be 100% if the damaged lines provide the sole 
power feed for a community.  Thus, the operating characteristics and network 
characteristics (especially the amount of redundancy) must be considered. 
  
In conducting risk assessments or evaluating hazard mitigation 
projects for utility systems, the networked nature of such systems 
must be considered.  The extent or lack of redundancy for 
particular elements in a system profoundly affects the extent to 
which a given level of damage results in system outages. 
 
The general procedure for conducting a risk assessment or evaluating a hazard 
mitigation project for a networked utility system is outlined below in six steps. 
 
1) Overlay utility system components with hazard maps, 
 
2) Estimate the vulnerability of each component to impacts from each hazard, 
 
3) From the estimated amount of damage to the system and the system’s 
network operating characteristics, estimate the extent and duration of service 
outage, 
 
4) From the damage estimates and the resources available, estimate the 
restoration time, 
 
5) From the service outage (number of customers and duration) estimate the 
economic impacts of such loss of service, and 
 
6) If a mitigation project is being evaluated estimate the reduction in direct 
damages and the reduction in service interruption attributable to mitigation 
project. 
 
An important caveat for conducting risk assessments or evaluation of hazard 
mitigation projects for networked utility systems is that specialized expertise is often 
required.  The analyst must thoroughly understand the operating characteristics of 
utility system components and their vulnerability to each hazard as well as thoroughly 
understand the network operating characteristics of the system as a whole.  In the 
absence of sufficient experience and expertise risk assessments or evaluation of 
hazard mitigation projects may produce inaccurate and misleading results. 
 
CAVEAT: conducting risk assessments or evaluation of hazard 
mitigation projects of networked utility systems often requires 
specialized expertise to produce meaningful results. 
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For reference, a detailed discussion of how to evaluate seismic hazard mitigation 
projects for water systems is given in the American Society of Civil Engineers 
monograph “Guidelines for the Seismic Upgrade of Existing Water Transmission 
Facilities,” (J. M. Eidinger, editor, 1999; chapter by K. A. Goettel “Seismic Upgrades of 
Water Transmission Systems: When Is It Worth It?”).  Very similar principles apply to 
evaluating hazard mitigation projects for other utility systems for any type of hazard. 
 
The following sections briefly review utility systems with emphasis on identifying the 
system components which are most vulnerable to damage and loss of service from 
hazards covered in this Mitigation Plan: flooding, winter storms, landslides and 
earthquakes.  Such components are thus logical targets for high priority mitigation 
projects whenever important components are subject to the hazards.  
 
 
13.3 Potable Water Systems 
 
Water treatment plants are often located in flood prone areas and are subject to 
inundation when raw water enters the filters, sedimentation or flocculation basins, 
resulting in loss of capability to treat incoming raw water properly.  Water system 
control buildings and pump stations may also be subject to flood damages.  Public or 
private water systems with wells as the water source are subject to outages when 
flood waters contaminate well heads; this is a common problem for smaller water 
systems.   
 
For Corvallis, neither the Taylor nor Rock Creek Water Treatment Plants are within 
the mapped 100-year floodplains, although they could experience flooding in events 
significantly larger than a 100-year flood. 
 
Water transmission or distribution pipes are rarely damaged by flood waters, unless 
there are soil settlements or major erosion, because the lines are sufficiently 
pressurized (for water quality) to prevent intrusion of flood waters.  Water transmission 
or distribution pipes are, however, subject to breakage when they cross landslide 
areas or in earthquakes.  Water treatment plants are also subject to earthquake 
damages to the building and to process and control equipment. 
 
Water systems, including Corvallis’s water systems, are also highly vulnerable to 
electric power outages.  Many water systems include pumped storage systems where 
water is pumped to storage tanks which are typically located 60 to 200 feet above the 
elevation of water system customers.  Such tanks generally contain no more than 1 or 
2 days of storage beyond typical daily usage (for reasons of water quality).  Thus, 
electric power outages of more than 1 or 2 days may result in loss of potable water 
due to the inability of pumping plants to pump water.  The most logical mitigation 
projects to minimize such outages are to provide back-up generators at key pumping 
plants or to provide quick connects so that portable generators (if available) can be 
quickly installed.  Water treatment plants are also subject to outages due to loss of 
electric power. 
 
For Corvallis, both water treatment plants have one commercial power source (CPI or 
PP&L).  The Rock Creek plant has sufficient generator capacity to operate without 
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commercial power.  However, the generator at the Taylor plant provides only minimal 
backup power and the facility cannot operate without commercial power.  This 
limitation poses significant risk to Corvallis for any events which result in prolonged 
power outages.  Four of the critical booster stations have on-site generators with 
enough capacity to operate the pumps.  All of the other booster stations are pre-wired 
for quick connection of portable generators in the event of loss of commercial power. 
 
For the Corvallis water system, seismic upgrades have been done for both water 
treatment plants and most of the reservoirs.  Water pipes almost inevitably suffer 
damage in earthquakes regardless of their materials, although older cast-iron pipes 
typically have higher failure rates than ductile iron, welded steel or PVC pipes.  
Upgrades of pipes are rarely feasible from an economic perspective for seismic 
reasons alone, except for critical locations for transmission pipes where failure may 
result in prolonged outages for many customers.  Critical locations include bridge 
crossings, liquefaction areas, and landslide areas and any other areas where the 
probability of failure is high. 
Common mitigation projects for water systems include flood protection for treatment 
plants, providing back-up power, seismic upgrades for treatment plants and critical 
transmission lines and moving pipes from active landslide areas. 
 
The most critical mitigation projects for the Corvallis water system are: 
1) Seismic upgrades for the critical water transmission lines at the Marys River 
3rth Street and 15th Avenue bridge crossings, 
2) Seismic retrofit for the North Hills 1st Level East 5 million gallon reservoir, and 
3) Adequate backup power at the Taylor Water Treatment Plant. 
 
 
13.4 Wastewater Systems 
 
Wastewater systems are often highly vulnerable to flood impacts.  Rising water may 
cause collection pipes to backup and overflow.  Intrusion of storm water into collection 
systems may result in flows that exceed treatment plant capacities, resulting in 
release of untreated or only partially treated flows.  Treatment plants are often located 
in flood plains, at low elevations, to facilitate gravity flow.  However, such locations 
also facilitate flood damages.  Wastewater treatment plans may be inundated, 
resulting in full or partial plant shutdown or plant bypass with corresponding release of 
untreated or only partially treated flows.   
 
Lift stations and treatment plants are also subject to loss of function due to electric 
power outages, with resulting overflows or releases.  Collection pipes are also subject 
to breakage due to landslides.  However, such impacts are not particularly common, 
since most wastewater collection systems are in more urbanized areas with only 
selected areas subject to slides.  Wastewater pipes are, however, subject to breakage 
in earthquakes.  Wastewater treatment plants are also subject to earthquake damages 
to the building and to process and control equipment. 
 
The Corvallis Wastewater Reclamation Plant is located within the 100-year floodplain.  
A seismic evaluation and retrofit have been completed.  The plant’s electric power is 
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provided by two PP&L feeds, which provides some redundancy.  There are two very 
small generators at the plant, which provide only minimal power.  The plant cannot 
operate without commercial power.   All but one of the wastewater lift stations have 
on-site backup generators with enough capacity to operate the pumps. 
 
Common mitigation projects for wastewater systems include flood protection for 
wastewater treatment plants, providing back-up power for nodes such as lift stations, 
moving collection pipes from active landslide areas, and seismic upgrades for 
treatment plants. 
 
The most critical mitigation projects for the Corvallis wastewater system are: 
1) Improved flood protection for the Wastewater Reclamation Plant, and 
2) Adequate backup power at the Wastewater Reclamation Plant 
 
 
13.5 Natural Gas Systems 
 
Natural gas transmission and distribution pipes are not usually affected by flooding, 
because the pipes are pressurized.  However, compressor stations may be subject to 
inundation damage or loss of electrical power to run electrical and mechanical 
equipment. 
 
Transmission and distribution pipes are also subject to rupture in slide areas and in 
earthquakes.  Buried utility pipes are very subject to failure in small ground 
movements.  Movements as small as an inch or two are often sufficient to break the 
pipes, especially for older cast-iron pipe which is more brittle than welded steel or 
polyethylene pipe.  Possible mitigation actions include pipe upgrades for a few critical 
locations and nonstructural seismic mitigation for control equipment. 
 
 
13.6 Telecommunications Systems 
 
Telephone (land lines and cellular) systems, broadcast radio and TV systems, and 
cable TV systems may all be vulnerable to damages and services outages from 
hazards.  However, in general, such systems have proved to be somewhat less 
vulnerable to service outages than other utility systems.  System nodes (broadcast 
studios, switching offices and such) are subject to flooding if located in flood-prone 
areas.  However, because of the importance of such facilities, few are located in 
highly flood-prone sites. 
 
Similarly, few such facilities are likely to be located in landslide prone areas.  Cellular 
towers in hilly areas, however, may be more subject to landslide hazards. 
 
Buried communications (copper and fiber optic) and cable television cables are 
usually flexible enough to accommodate several feet of ground movement before 
failure.  Thus, while major landslides may rupture such cables, minor settlements or 
small slides are not nearly as likely to impact such cables as they are to break buried 
gas or water pipes.  Thus, such lines typically perform relatively well in earthquakes. 
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Above ground communications and cable television cables are subject to wind-
induced failures from tree falls and pole failures.  However, such failures are a less 
common than failures of electric power lines.  The better performance of 
communications cables arises in part because the electrical cables are always highest 
on the poles, thus a falling branch is usually first resisted by the power cables.  Also, 
because the voltage levels in communications cables are much lower than those in 
power cables, the communication cables are not subject to “burn down” or shorting if 
wind-swayed cables touch each other or get too close. 
 
Some telecommunications facilities are subject to failure as a result of loss of electric 
power.  However, key facilities almost always have backup battery power and/or 
generators.  Therefore, telecommunications facilities are generally much less 
vulnerable to outages from loss of electric power than are water or wastewater 
systems. 
 
Possible mitigation projects for telecommunications systems include flood proofing of 
important nodes, adding back-up power, relocating facilities out of active slide areas 
and seismic retrofits. 
 
For Corvallis, the most critical telecommunications element is probably the telephone 
central office (switching facility) serving the city.   If the telephone central office has 
not had recent seismic evaluations for both the building’s structural and nonstructural 
components, then such an evaluation and retrofit (if necessary) would be a high 
priority. 
 
 
13.7 Electric Power Systems 
 
Overview 
 
The electric power system is central to the functioning of a modern society.  The 
impacts of loss of electric power are large: residential, commercial and public 
customers are all heavily dependent on electric power for normal functioning.  
Furthermore, as discussed above, other utility systems, especially water and 
wastewater systems, are heavily dependent on electric power for normal operations.  
Loss of electric power, therefore, may have large impacts on affected communities, 
especially if outages are prolonged. 
 
Electric power for Corvallis is provided by Pacific Power and by Consumers Power.  
Electric power systems have somewhat complex operating characteristics, which are 
briefly summarized here.  Electric power systems have three main parts: generation, 
transmission, and distribution.   
 
Generation is the production of electric power.  Generating plans can be hydroelectric, 
fossil fuel (oil, gas, or coal), nuclear, or various renewable fuels (wind, solar, biomass, 
etc.).  Most of the electric power consumed within Corvallis is produced elsewhere 
and transmitted via high-voltage transmission lines into the county.  The Bonneville 
Power Administration (BPA) is the primary source of power for Corvallis.  BPA’s power 
comes from hydroelectric facilities (57%) operated by the Corps of Engineers or the 
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Bureau of Reclamation, from a nuclear plant (3%), from interchanges and wheeling 
(37%) of power transmitted by BPA but not owned by BPA and from other sources 
(3%).  Through the Pacific Interties (high voltage AC or DC transmission lines) power 
is moved back and forth between California, the Pacific Northwest and western 
Canada. 
 
The transmission system is a network of high voltage lines (500 kV and 230 kV) and 
substations which transmit power between generation plants and the local distribution 
system. The distribution system is a network of lower voltage lines and substations 
which carries power from transmission system substations to neighborhoods and 
eventually to individual customers. 
 
 Power Outages in Corvallis: Wind and Ice Storm Events 
 
Power outages in Corvallis are may result from disruption of the transmission lines 
carrying power from outside Corvallis or from damage to the local distribution lines 
within Corvallis.  The generating plant system has sufficient redundancy so that 
failures of one or more plants do not usually lead to significant power outages.  
However, because of the absence of generating capacity within Corvallis, major 
disruptions in the transmission system would result in substantial curtailment of 
available power.  A major ice storm in the Columbia River area could conceivably 
results in failure of most of the 500 kV transmission lines feeding Corvallis. 
 
Furthermore, a severe ice storm with 2” to 4" of ice over much of Corvallis could result 
in failure of most 500 kV and 230 kV transmission lines to and within Corvallis.  Such 
a failure, which is unlikely, but certainly not impossible (see Chapter 7), would 
probably entail widespread power outages in Corvallis for at least 2 to 5 days. 
 
The most frequent power outages, however, are due to failure of the local 
subtransmission or distribution system lines.  Winter storms are the most frequent 
cause of significant electric power outages, with wind being the primary culprit.  
Electric distribution lines, the low voltage lines that deliver power to neighborhoods, 
are the most vulnerable electric system component in winter storms.  Failures most 
commonly result from tree falls or from “burn downs” when wind-swayed cables touch 
or get too close to each other and short circuit.  Distribution system failures may also 
be due to utility pole failures.  Distribution lines may also fail due to ice loading in 
excess of design specifications or from landslides or debris flows or flooding which 
knock out utility poles. 
 
Once a portion of a power distribution circuit fails, all customers in all or part of the 
circuit lose power, pending on the circuits design.  The duration of the power outage 
depends on the number of outages and the number of repair crews available for 
repairs.  A typical power utility repair crew (2 or 3 people with a cherry picker) can 
restore power to a distribution circuit with common types of damage in 1 or 2 hours 
after arriving at the damage site.   
 
Electric transmission lines (110 kV and higher) are less vulnerable to winter storm 
damage because of more robust design specifications.  These lines are usually higher 
above the ground and much less prone to tree branches falling on lines.  Furthermore, 
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because of the higher voltage (compared to distribution lines), power utilities must 
diligently pursue tree trimming programs to avoid flashovers from lines being too close 
to trees.  Nevertheless, transmission lines do sometimes fail due to large tree falls, 
rapid growth of trees near lines, unusually high winds or heavy ice loads. 
 
Corvallis is subject to outages of electric power primarily due to line failures.  One 
possible failure mode would be the transmission lines that feed Corvallis from the 
north.  More common failure modes would be failures of the trunk distribution lines 
within Corvallis and failures of distribution circuits or service drops from distribution 
lines to individual buildings.  The local failures are most likely due to tree falls during 
wind storm events. 
 
Mitigation projects to reduce the frequency and duration of electric power systems 
include: augmenting tree trimming programs and hardening lines and poles in 
locations where ice loading or wind effects result in repeated outages.  In some cases, 
adding connections to improve redundancy of power feed paths and adding 
disconnect switches to minimize areas affected by any given failure are also 
worthwhile.  In addition to such “hard” mitigation possibilities, there are also “soft” or 
planning mitigation projects.   For example, enhancing mutual aid agreements with 
nearby utilities can reduce the duration of major outages by increasing the number of 
crews and equipment for making repairs.  Other planning/logistics measures such as 
ensuring that adequate supplies of parts and equipment are available may also 
reduce the duration of future outages. 
 
For Corvallis, augmenting tree trimming programs, especially for the transmission 
lines and the trunk distribution lines is probably the most effective mitigation measure.  
In selected locations upgrading lines and poles to better withstand loads from trees, 
wind and ice may also be appropriate.  If there are key links in the systems that are 
highly prone to repetitive failures, undergrounding of limited portions of such links may 
also be appropriate. 
 
 Power Outages in Corvallis:  Earthquakes 
 
Electric power systems are also subject to outages in earthquakes, primarily from 
damage to substation equipment and distribution system transformers, rather than 
from failures of lines and poles. 
 
The seismic vulnerability of the Bonneville Power System, which supplies much of the 
power for Corvallis is currently undergoing detailed study.  More locally, the seismic 
vulnerability of the CPI and PP&L substations and other components supplying power 
to Corvallis is largely unknown.   CPI has indicated that the distribution system has 
been evaluated throughout their six county service area, with upgrades budgeted and 
prioritized.  Upgrades made in the Corvallis area include substations, transformers, 
control systems, distribution lines and transmission lines.  However, detailed 
information about specific upgrades is not available.  The extent to which PP&L has 
made similar evaluations and upgrades is unknown. 
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13.8 Impacts on Corvallis and Mitigation Action Items 
 
The probable impacts of disruption of transportation and utility systems on Corvallis, 
which were summarized above, are also covered in each of the other hazard Chapters 
(6 -12, 14 and 5).  Each of these chapters includes an impacts table which 
summarizes probable impacts on roads, bridges, and utility systems.  A generalized 
summary of the probable impacts of utility disruptions and road closures on Benton 
Count is given in Table 13.2 below. 
 
Table 13.2 
Probable Impacts of Utility Disruptions and Road Closures 
 
Inventory Probable Impacts
Portion of Corvallis affected
Impacts may be localized for damage to local utility distribution 
systems or street closures, or effect the entire city for damage to 
transmission lines or closures of major highways to/from Corvallis
Buildings Negligible impacts to buildings, but loss of utilities may substantially affect function of buildings
Streets within Corvallis Some incidents may include temporary street closures
Roads to/from Corvallis Some incidents may include temporary road closures
Electric power
Some incidents may include temporary loss of electric power in 
localized parts of Corvallis or for the entire County.  Duration of 
disruptions can range from an hour to up to a probable maximum 
outage of 1 or 2 days for most wind/ice events.   Longer outages 
are possible for extreme wind/ice events or for major earthquakes.
Water
Failure of the major water transmission lines on the Marys River 
bridge crossings would result in almost complete loss of water to 
Corvallis, with a high likelihood of long duration water outages.  
Prolonged power outages would also result in widespread water 
outages.
Wastewater Power outages affecting the treatment plant would result in nearly complete loss of treatment capability.
Natural Gas Localized loss of service from pipe breaks in earthquakes is expected.
Telecommunications
Prolonged power outages would likely affect some modes.  Seismic 
damage to the Corvallis telephone central office might impact 
nearly all telephone communications.
Casualties
Low potential for direct casualties, but some incidents such as loss 
of electric power during cold weather may require evacuations and 
displacement of people (especially fragile or special needs 
population) to temporary shelters.  
 
 
The following table contains action items for mitigation of disruptions of utility and 
transportation systems, from the master Action Items table in Chapter 4.  See also the 
mitigation action items for Winter Storms (Chapter 7) which includes action items 
related to tree trimming efforts to reduce storm effects on the electrical distribution 
systems within Corvallis. 
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Table 13.3 
Mitigation Action Items for Disruption of Utility and Transportation Systems 
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Utility and Transportation System Disruption Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Educate and encourage residents to maintain several 
days of emergency supplies for power outages or 
road closures
Public Works, Fire, Police, Benton 
County Emergency Management Ongoing X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Review and update emergency response plans for 
disruptions of utilities or roads Public Works, Fire, Police 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Ensure that all critical facilities in Corvallis have 
backup power and emergency operations plans to 
deal with power outages
Public Works, Fire, Police 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Write procedures for maintaining water supply during 
extended power outages Public Works 1-2 years X X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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Multi-Hazard Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Establish a formal role for the Corvallis Hazard 
Mitigation Planning Committee to develop a 
sustainable process to encourage, implement, 
monitor, and evaluate citywide mitigation actions
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Identify and pursue funding opportunities to implement 
mitigation actions
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Develop public and private sector partnerships to 
foster hazard mitigation activities, 
Public Works, Community 
Development, City Manager's Office Ongoing X
Short-Term     
#4
Develop detailed inventories of at-risk buildings and 
infrastructure and prioritize mitigation actions
Public Works, Community 
Development 1-2 Years X X X X
Long-Term      
#1
Develop education programs aimed at mitigating the 
risk posed by hazards
Emergency Management, Capital 
Planning and Development, 
Economic Development
Ongoing X
Long-Term      
#2
Integrate the Mitigation Plan findings into planning and 
regulatory documents and programs
Public Works, Community 
Development, Fire Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term      
#3
Integrate hazard, vulnerability and risk Mitigation Plan 
findings into enhanced Emergency Operations 
planning.
Public Works, Fire, Police Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term      
#4
Update website to include mitigation activities, 
opportunities, and success stories
Emergency Management, Planning, 
Information Services X
Long-Term      
#5
Develop a speaker's bureau to provide information on 
mitigation activities, opportunities, and success stories
Public Works, Community 
Development, Fire, Citizen Corps 
programs
X
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Flood Mitigation Action Items:  Within FEMA-Mapped Floodplains
Short-Term     
#1
Inventory critical facilities (if any) within mapped 
floodplains or other high flood risk areas and identify 
mitigation options if such facilities are identified.
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Survey elevation data for buildings within mapped 
floodplains, evaluate flood risk quantiatively, and 
explore mitigation options with property owners.
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X
Flood Mitigation Action Items:  Outside of FEMA-Mapped Floodplains
Short-Term     
#1
Complete the inventory of locations in Corvallis subject 
to frequent storm water flooding
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term      
#1
For locations with repetitive flooding and significant 
damages or road closures, determine and implement 
mitigation measures such as upsizing culverts or 
storm water drainage ditches
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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Winter Storms Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete an inventory of locations in Corvallis subject 
to frequent storm water flooding or repetitive tree fall 
problems from wind/ice
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Enhance tree trimming efforts especially for 
transmission lines and trunk distribution lines and 
consider tree trimming ordinance
Public Works, private utilities Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Encourage property owners to trim trees near service 
drops to individual customers Public Works Ongoing X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Ensure that all critical facilities in Corvallis have 
backup power and emergency operations plans to 
deal with power outages
TBD: need local input here 1-2  Years X X
Long-Term      
#1
For locations with repetitive flooding and significant 
damages or road closures, determine and implement 
mitigation measures such as upsizing culverts or 
storm water drainage ditches
Public Works Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term      
#2
Consider upgrading electric lines and poles to improve 
wind/ice loading, undergrounding critical lines, and 
adding interconnect switches to allow alternative feed 
paths and disconnect switches to minimize outage 
areas
Private utilities 5 Years X X X X X
Long-Term      
#3
Encourage new developments to include underground 
power lines Community Development ongoing X X X X X
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Earthquake Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete seismic retrofit of City Hall and the 
Mary's River crossing for the 24" water 
transmission line, both of which are critical 
facilities for Corvallis, urgently requiring retrofit
Public Works 1-2 Years X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Complete inventory of public, commercial and 
residential buildings that may be particularly vulnerable 
to earthquake damage
Public Works, Community 
Development 1-5 years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Complete seismic vulnerability analyses of critical 
facilities with significant seismic vulnerabilities, 
including fire, police, medical, and other emergency 
communication/response facilities
Public Works 1-5 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Complete seismic vulnerability analyses for lifeline 
utility and transportation systems, including: water, 
wastewater, natural gas, electric power, 
telecommunications and bridges
Public Works, ODOT, private utilities 1-5 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#5
Educate homeowners about structural and non-
structural retrofitting of vulnerable homes and 
encourage retrofit
Public Works, Community 
Development Ongoing X X X X
Long-Term     #1
Obtain funding and retrofit critical public buildings and 
lifeline utility and transportation facilities with significant 
seismic vulnerabilities
Public Works, ODOT, private utilities 10 years X X X X X
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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Landslide Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Complete the inventory of locations where critical 
facilities, other buildings and infrastructure are subject 
to landslides
Public Works, Community 
Development 1-2 Years X X X X X
Long-Term      
#1
Consider landslide mitigation actions for slides 
seriously threatening critical facilities, other buildings or
infrastructure
Public Works, Community 
Development 5 Years X X X X X
Long-Term      
#2
Limit future development in high landslide potential 
areas Community Development Ongoing X X X X X
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Wildland/Urban Interface Fire Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Identify specific parts of Corvallis at high risk for 
urban/wildland urban interface fires because of fuel 
loading, topography and prevailing construction 
practices
Fire 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Identify evacuation routes and procedures for high risk 
areas and educate the public Fire Ongoing X X X X
Short-Term     
#3 Develop Corvallis Wildfire Protection Plan Fire 1-2 Years X X X X X
Long-Term      
#1
Encourage fire-safe construction practices for existing 
and new construction in high risk areas Fire, Community Development Ongoing X X X X X
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Volcanic Hazards Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Update public emergency notification procedures for 
ash fall events Public Works, Fire, Police 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Update emergency response planning for ash fall 
events Public Works, Fire, Police 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Evaluate capability of water treatment plants to deal 
with high turbidity from ash falls and upgrade treatment 
facilities and emergency response plans to deal with 
ash falls
Public Works 1-2 Years X X X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Prepare/pre-script public messages about protecting 
from and disposing of volcanic ash Public Works, Fire, Police X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Timeline
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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Dam Safety Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Prepare high resolution maps of the dam failure 
inundation areas and update emergency response 
plans, including public notification and evacuation 
routes.
Public Works, TBD 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Encourage the Corps of Engineeris to undertake a 
though seismic risk evaulations for dams upstream of 
Corvallis and to make seismic and/or flood 
improvements as necessary
TBD: need local input here Ongoing X X X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Conduct a thorough study of levee/dike systems 
protecting Corvallis for both earthquake and flood 
vulnerabiilty, including impacs of failure on protected 
structuresm and implement mitigation measures as 
necessary
TBD: need local input here 1-2 Years X X X X X
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Utility and Transportation System Disruption Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Educate and encourage residents to maintain several 
days of emergency supplies for power outages or road 
closures
Public Works, Fire, Police Ongoing X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Review and update emergency response plans for 
disruptions of utilities or roads Public Works, Fire, Police 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Ensure that all critical facilities in Corvallis have 
backup power and emergency operations plans to 
deal with power outages
Public Works, Fire, Police 1-2 Years X X X
Short-Term     
#4
Write procedures for maintaining water supply during 
extended power outages Public Works 1-2 years X X
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Hazmat Incident Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Ensure that first responders have readily available site-
specific knowledge of hazardous chemical inventories 
in Corvallis
Oregon State Fire Marshal, Fire, 
Police, Public Works, Water, 
businesses with hazardous materials 
inventory
1 year X X X
Short-Term     
#2
Enhance emergency planning, emergency response 
training and equipment to address hazardous 
materials incidents.
Oregon State Fire Marshal, Fire, 
Police, Public Works, Water, 
businesses with hazardous materials 
inventory
Ongoing X X X
Short-Term     
#3
Encourage owners of sites with significant quantites of 
hazardous materials and of sites with Extremely 
Hazardous Materials to evaluate and upgrade seismic 
bracing/anchoring for hazardous materials storage 
systems.
Oregon State Fire Marshal, Fire, 
Police, Public Works, Water, 
businesses with hazardous materials 
inventory
Ongoing X X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
NOTE:  topics below NOT included in Corvallis 
Hazard Mitigation Plan at this time
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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Terrorism Mitigation Action Items
Short-Term     
#1
Enhance emergency planning, emergency response 
training and equipment to address potential terrorism  
incidents.
Emergency Management, OCEM, 
Law Enforcement agencies, Fire 
Service agencies, Citizen Corps 
programs 
Ongoing X X X X X
Long-Term      
#1
Upgrade physical security detection and response 
capability for critical facilities, including water systems 
and for any high-profile facilities such as major high 
tech facilities and sites with large quantities of 
hazardous materials
Emergency Management, Fire, 
Facilities Maintenance, Water, 
industrial/business hazmat users
5 Years X X X X X
Mitigation Plan Goals Addressed
Hazard Action Item Coordinating Organizations Timeline
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Appendix 1 
Principles of Benefit-Cost Analysis 
 
Benefit-cost analysis is the tool that provides answers to a central question for hazard 
mitigation projects: “Is it worth it?”  If hazard mitigation were free, individuals and 
communities would undertake mitigation with robust enthusiasm and the risks from 
hazards would soon be greatly reduced.  Unfortunately, mitigation is not free, but often 
rather expensive.   For a given situation, is the investment in mitigation justified?  Is 
the owner (public or private) better off economically to accept the risk or invest now in 
mitigation to reduce future damages?  These are hard questions to answer!   Benefit-
cost analysis can help a community answer these difficult questions. 
 
In the complicated real world of mitigation projects, there are many factors which 
determine whether or not a mitigation project is worth doing or which of two or more 
mitigation projects should have the highest priority.  Consider a town which has two 
flood prone neighborhoods and each neighborhood desires a mitigation project. The 
two neighborhoods have different numbers of houses, different value of houses, 
different frequencies and severity of flooding.  The first neighborhood proposes storm 
water drainage improvements at a cost of $3.0 million.  The second neighborhood 
wants to elevate houses at a cost of $3.0 million.  Which of these projects should be 
completed?  Both?  One or the Other?  Neither?  Which project should be completed 
first if there is only funding for one?  Are there alternative mitigation projects which are 
more sensible or more cost-effective than the proposed projects? 
 
Such complex socio-political-economic-engineering questions are nearly impossible to 
answer without completing the type of quantitative flood risk assessment and benefit-
cost analysis discussed below. 
 
In determining whether or not a given mitigation project is worth doing, the level of risk 
exposure without mitigation is critical.  Consider a hypothetical $1,000,000 mitigation 
project.  Whether or not the project is worth doing depends on the level of risk before 
mitigation and on the effectiveness of the project in reducing risk.  For example, if the 
before mitigation risk is low (a subdivision street has a few inches of water on the 
street every couple of years or a soccer field in a city park floods every five years or 
so) the answer is different than if the before mitigation risk is high (100 or more 
houses are expected to have flooding above the first floor every 10 years or a critical 
facility is expected to be shut down because of flood damages once every five years).   
 
All well-designed mitigation projects reduce risk (badly designed projects can increase 
risk or simply transfer risk from one community to another).  However, just because a 
mitigation project reduces risk does not make it a good project.  A $1,000,000 project 
that avoids an average of $100 per year in flood damages is not worth doing, while the 
same project that avoids an average of $200,000 per year in flood damages is worth 
doing. 
 
The principles of benefit-cost analysis are briefly summarized here.  The benefits of a 
hazard mitigation project are the reduction in future damages and losses, that is, the 
avoided damages and losses that are attributable to a mitigation project.  To conduct 
benefit-cost analysis of a specific mitigation project the risk of damages and losses 
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must be evaluated twice: before mitigation and after mitigation, with the benefits being 
the difference.   
 
The benefits of a hazard mitigation project are thus simply  future damages and 
losses which are avoided because a mitigation action was implemented. 
 
Because the benefits of a hazard mitigation project accrue in the future, it is 
impossible to know exactly what they will be.  For example, we do not know when 
future floods or other natural hazards will occur or how severe they will be.  We do 
know, however, the probability of future floods or other natural hazards (if we have 
appropriate hazard data).  Therefore, the benefits of mitigation projects must be 
evaluated probabilistically and expressed as the difference between annualized 
damages before and after mitigation.  The following simplified example illustrates the 
principles of benefit-cost analysis; more details are given in the examples in the 
Appendices. 
 
To illustrate the principles of benefit-cost analysis, we consider a hypothetical single 
family home in the town of Acorn, with the home located on the banks of Squirrel 
Creek.  The home is a one story building, about 1500 square feet on a post 
foundation, with a replacement value of $60/square foot (total $90,000).  We have 
flood hazard data for Squirrel Creek (stream discharge and flood elevation data) and 
elevation data for the first floor of the house.  Therefore, we can calculate the annual 
probability of flooding in one-foot increments, as shown below. 
 
Table A1.1 
Damages Before Mitigation 
 
 
Flood Depth 
(feet) 
 
Annual Probability  
of Flooding 
 
Scenario Damages and 
Losses Per Flood Event 
 
Annualized Flood  
Damages and Losses  
 
0 
 
0.2050 $6,400 $1,312 
 
1 
 
0.1234 $14,300 $1,765 
 
2 
 
0.0867 $24,500 $2,124 
 
3 
 
0.0223 $28,900 $673 
 
4 
 
0.0098 $32,100 $315 
 
5 
 
0.0036 $36,300 $123 
 
Total Expected Annual (Annualized) Damages and Losses 
 
$6,312 
 
Flood depths shown above in Table A1.1 are in one foot increments of water depth 
above the lowest floor elevation.  Thus, a “3" foot flood means all floods between 2.5 
feet and 3.5 feet of water depth above the floor.  We note that a “0" foot flood has, on 
average, damages because this flood depth means water plus or minus 6" of the floor; 
even if the flood level is a few inches below the first floor, there may be damage to 
flooring and other building elements because of wicking of water. 
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The Scenario (per flood event) damages and losses include expected damages to the 
building, content, and displacement costs if occupants have to move to temporary  
quarters while flood damage is repaired. 
 
The Annualized (expected annual) damages and losses are calculated as the product 
of the flood probability times the scenario damages.  For example, a 4 foot flood has 
slightly less than a 1% chance per year of occurring.  If it does occur, we expect about 
$32,100 in damages and losses.  Averaged over a long time, 4 foot floods are thus 
expected to cause an average of about $315 per year in flood damages.  Note that 
the smaller floods, which cause less damage per flood event, actually cause higher 
average annual damages because the probability of smaller floods is so much higher 
than that for larger floods.  With these data, the house is expected to average $6312 
per year in flood damages.  This expected annual or “annualized” damage estimate 
does not mean that the house has this much damage every year.  Rather, in most 
years there will be no floods, but over time the cumulative damages and losses from a 
mix of relatively frequent smaller floods and less frequent larger floods is calculated to 
average $6312 per year.   
 
The calculated results in Table 1.10 are the flood risk assessment for this house for 
the as-is, before mitigation situation.  The table shows the expected levels of damages 
and losses for scenario floods of various depths and also the annualized damages 
and losses. 
 
The risk assessment shown in Table A1.2 shows a high flood risk, with frequent severe 
flooding which the owner deems unacceptable.  Therefore he explores mitigation 
alternatives to reduce the risk: the example below is to elevate the house 4 feet.  
 
Table 1.11 
Damages After Mitigation 
 
 
Flood Depth 
(feet) 
 
Annual Probability  
of Flooding 
 
Scenario Damages and 
Losses Per Flood Event 
 
Annualized Flood  
Damages and Losses  
 
0 
 
0.2050 $0 $0 
 
1 
 
0.1234 $0 $0 
 
2 
 
0.0867 $0 $0 
 
3 
 
0.0223 $0 $0 
 
4 
 
0.0098 $6,400 $63 
 
5 
 
0.0036 $14,300 $49 
 
( )
$112 
 
By elevating the house 4 feet, the owner has reduced his expected annual (annualized) 
damages from $6312 to $112 (98% reduction) and greatly reduced the probability or 
frequency of flooding affecting his house.  The annualized benefits are the difference in 
the annualized damages and losses before and after mitigation or $6312 - $112 = $6200. 
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Is this mitigation project worth doing?  Common sense says yes, because the flood 
risk appears high:  the annualized damages before mitigation are high ($6,312).   To 
answer this question more quantitatively, we complete our benefit-cost analysis of this 
project.  One key factor is the cost of mitigation.  A mitigation project that is worth doing 
at one cost may not be worth doing at a higher cost.  Let’s assume that the elevation 
costs $20,000.  This $20,000 cost occurs once, up front, in the year that the elevation 
project is completed.   
 
The benefits, however, accrue statistically over the lifetime of the mitigation project.  
Following FEMA convention, we assume that a residential mitigation project has a 
useful lifetime of 30 years.  Money (benefits) received in the future has less value than 
money received today because of the time value of money.  To take the time value of 
money into account, we need to do what is known as a “present value calculation.”  
We compare the present value of the anticipated stream of benefits over 30 years in 
the future to the up-front out-of-pocket cost of the mitigation project. 
 
A present value calculation depends on the lifetime of the mitigation project and on 
what is known as the discount rate.  The discount rate may be viewed simply as the 
interest rate you might earn on the cost of the project if you didn’t spend the money on 
the mitigation project.  Let’s assume that this mitigation project is to be funded by 
FEMA, which uses a 7% discount rate to evaluate hazard mitigation projects.  With a 
30-year lifetime and a 7% discount rate, the “present value coefficient” which is the 
value today of $1.00 per year in benefits over the lifetime of the mitigation project is 
12.41.  That is, each $1.00 per year in benefits over 30 years is worth $12.41 now.  
The benefit-cost results are now as follows. 
 
Table A1.3 
Benefit-Cost Results 
 
 
Annualized Benefits 
 
$6,200 
 
Present Value Coefficient 
 
12.41 
 
Net Present Value of Future Benefits 
 
$76,942 
 
Mitigation Project Cost 
 
$20,000 
 
Benefit-Cost Ratio 
 
3.85 
 
These results indicate a benefit-cost ratio of 3.85.  Thus, in FEMA’s terms the 
mitigation project is cost-effective and eligible for FEMA funding.  Taking into account 
the time value of money, which is essential for a correct economic calculation, results 
in lower benefits than if we simply multiplied the annual benefits times the 30 year 
project useful lifetime.  Economically, simply multiplying the annual benefits times the 
lifetime would ignore the time value of money and thus gives an incorrect, spurious 
result. 
 
The above discussion of benefit-cost analysis of a flood hazard mitigation project is 
intended to illustrate the basic concepts.  Very similar principles apply to mitigation 
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projects for earthquakes or any other natural hazards. The role of benefit-cost analysis 
in prioritizing and implementing mitigation projects in Corvallis is addressed in Chapter 
4 (Plan Goals, Mitigation Strategies and Action Items) and in Chapter 5 (Plan 
Adoption, Maintenance and Implementation). 
 
NCity of CorvallisFEMA Floodplain
City of Corvallis, OregonGeospatial Information ServicesPublic Works Department
Major Streets
Lifeline Roads
Railroads
Legend
FEMA Floodplain
100-year Flood
500-year Flood
GF
n
®v ®v!(d!(!(
n!( ®vdn
!(
GF!(!(!( ")
®v
n
!(
!(
")")
GF
®v")
dnn
®v
#*#* d")")
")") ")")
GF
")
d
nn
n
GF!(
!(!(!(!(!(
!(
#*
!(
n
")
n
n
GF
")
")
d
")")
nn
®v
n
n
n
®v
®v
")d
")
")
")
")
n
")
!(
n
n
n
N
CorvallisFlood HazardsandCritical Facilities
City of Corvallis, OregonGeospatial Information ServicesPublic Works Department
Critical Sites
Major Streets
Lifeline Roads
Railroads
Legend
Communications
Fire Resources
Government Buildings
Medical
Schools
Transportation
Utilities
")
#*
!(
FEMA Floodplain
100-year Flood
500-year Flood
d
GF
®v
n
N
City of Corvallis, OregonGeospatial Information ServicesPublic Works Department
Flood HazardstoTransportation
Major Streets
Lifeline Roads
Railroads
Legend
FEMA Floodplain
100-year Flood
500-year Flood
1996 Flood Inundation
NCity of CorvallisLandslide Hazards
City of Corvallis, OregonGeospatial Information ServicesPublic Works Department
Major Streets
Lifeline Roads
Railroads
Legend
Landslide Risk
NCity of CorvallisLandslide Runout Hazard Areas
City of Corvallis, OregonGeospatial Information ServicesPublic Works Department
Major Streets
Lifeline Roads
Railroads
Legend
Landslide Runout Hazards
Confined Channel
Open Channel
NCity of CorvallisLiquifaction Soils
City of Corvallis, OregonGeospatial Information ServicesPublic Works Department
Major Streets
Lifeline Roads
Railroads
Legend
Liquifaction Soils
N
City of Corvallis, OregonGeospatial Information ServicesPublic Works Department
CorvallisMarys RiverFEMA Floodplain
Critical Sites
Streets
Lifeline Roads
Railroads
Legend
d Communications
GF Fire Resources
Government Buildings
®v Medical
n Schools
Transportation
Utilities
")
#*
!(
FEMA Floodplain
100-year Flood
500-year Flood
N
City of Corvallis, OregonGeospatial Information ServicesPublic Works Department
Northeast CorvallisFEMA Floodplain
Critical Sites
Streets
Lifeline Roads
Railroads
Legend
dCommunications
GF Fire Resources
Government Buildings
®v Medical
nSchools
Transportation
Utilities
")
#*
!(
FEMA Floodplain
100-year Flood
500-year Flood
!!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !! !
!
!
!!
! ! !
! ! !
! !!
!! !
! !
!!! !
!! !
!
!
! !
!!! !!!
! ! !!
!
! ! !!
!!
!!
!!
!
!!!
! !
! !! !
! !
!
!! ! !
! !
!!!!
!!
! !
! !!
!
!
! !
!
! !
!
! !
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
! !
!!
!
!!
!
! !
!
!!
!
!
!
!!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
If
CÈ
?©
CÈ
If ?©
p
SS
tt aa
tt ee  
HH
ww
yy  
99
99
WW
55
tt hh  
SS
tt rr
ee
ee
tt
W aa ll nn uu tt  
BB ll vvdd
HH
ii gg
hh
ll aa
nn
dd   
DD
rr
ii vv
ee
DIXON 
CREEK KK ii
nn
gg
ss   
BB
ll vv
dd
33
55
tt
hh   
SS
tt
rr
ee
ee
tt
C a m p u s  W a y
C rr e scceennt t  
V V
a a
l ll le e
y y  
D rr ii vv ee
H e rr b e rr tt  A v e n u e
R ee s
s ee rr vv o i
i rr  A v e n u e
R e s e a rr c h  W a y
OO aa kk  
CC
rreeee kk  
DD
rr ii vv ee
MULKEY CRE EK
MOUNTAIN VIEW CREEK
K ii g e rr  II s ll a n d  Drr ii vv ee
HH
ii gg
hh
ll aa
nn
dd   
DD
rr
ii vv
ee
HH
ii gg
hh
ll aa
nn
dd   
DD
rr
ii vv
ee
CC
rr
yy
ss
tt
aa
ll   
LL
aa
kk
ee   
DD
rr
ii vv
ee
W ee ss tt  H ii ll ll ss  R oo aa d
JACKSON CR EEK
BB
rr oo
oo
kk
llaa
nn
ee   
DD
rr
ii vv
ee
BB
ee
ll
hh
aa
vv
ee
nn   
DD
rr
ii vv
ee
33
00
tt
hh   
SS
tt
rr
ee
ee
tt
22
nn
dd  
SS
tt rr
ee
ee
tt
33
55
tt
hh   
SS
tt
rr
ee
ee
tt
WW
ii tt
hh
aa
mm  
HH
ii
ll
ll  
DD
rrii
vv
ee
5
3
r d
 S
t r
e
e
t
5
3
r d
 S
t r
e
e
t
C o n ii ff e rr  B ll vvdd
SS
aa
tt
ii nn
ww
oo
oo
dd   
SS
tt
rr
ee
ee
tt
C ii rr c ll e  B ll v d
B u c h a n a n  A v e n u e
G rr a n tt  A v e n u e
F ii ll ll m o rr e  A v e n u e
P o n d e rr o s a  A v e n u ee
W a ll n u tt  B ll v d
KK
ii nn
gg
ss  
BB
ll vv
dd
WW
aa
ll nn
uu
tt   
BB
ll vv
dd
W a ll n uu tt  B ll vv dd
M ILLRACE
We s tt e r
r n  B ll v d
22
99
tt
hh   
SS
tt
rr
ee
ee
tt
C rr y s tt
aa ll   
LL akk ee  
DD
rr ii vv ee
W e s tt  H ii ll ll s  R o a d
33
66
tt
hh   
SS
tt
rr
ee
ee
tt 99
tt hh  
SS
tt rr
ee
ee
tt
FRAZIER 
CREEK
M oo nn rr oo ee  A vv ee nn uu ee
DUNAWI 
CREEK
EE
ll ll
ii oo
tt
tt   
CC
ii rr
cc
ll ee
We s tt e rr n  B ll v d
OAK 
CREEK
W a s h ii n g tt o n  W a y
55
33
rr
dd   
SS
tt
rr
ee
ee
tt
Corva l l i s
Munic ipal  Ai rpor t
¨
0 0.25 0.5 0.75 10.125 Miles
 W
i l l
a m
e t t
e    
R i v e
r
M ar y s  R iv e r
GEOSPATIAL INFORMATION SERVICES
P u b l i c  W o r k s   D e p a r t m e n t
C O R V A L L I S   C I T Y   L I M I T S
C O R V A L L I S   C I T Y   L I M I T S
C 
O 
R 
V 
A 
L L
 I 
S 
  C
 I 
T Y
   
L 
I M
 I 
T S
C O R V A L L I S   C I T Y   L I M I T S
C O R V A L L I S   C I T Y   L I M I T S
Note:  
Map refinements can occur as provided in Chapters 4.5 and 4.13 of the Corvallis Land Development Code.
Significant Natural Resource and Natural Hazard areas information is based upon December 31, 2004 mapping and the Notices of Disposition for the Land Development Code Update signed by Mayor Berg on December 16, 2004. 
Underlying Development Zones (formerly Districts) reflect the Land Development Code Zoning designations effective October 16, 2006, and as amended by the Notice of Disposition to adopt this map signed by Mayor Berg on October 17, 2006.
Date of preparation: October 2006
1  I  n  c h  =  2 0 0  0   F e e t
O R V A L L I S, C OR E G O N
O N I N GZ F F I C I A LO
NOTE: Dunawi Creek, and the associated riparian corridormay be relocated through wetland (WC-SQU-W-13) to original alignment.
** T he Mixed Use Commercial Zone (MUC) and the development st andardsfor the MUC effecti ve October 16, 2004, shal l apply to properties desi gnatedas such unt il a new zone is  determined for these propert ies througha Di st r ict C ha nge Approva l.
Natura l Resource Overlay
(proceed to  Significant  Vegetation Area ma pand R ipari an Corridor and Wetl ands map)
(proceed to  Natural Hazards map)
Natura l Hazard Overlay
No mun icipa l  water serv ice area
RS-3.5 - Low Density Residential
RS-5 - Low Density Residential
RS-6 - Low Density Residential
RS-9 - Medium Density Residential
RS-9U - Medium Density Residential               (University)RS-12  - Medium-High Density Residential
RS-12U  - Medium-High Density Residential                  (University)
RS-20 - High Density Residential
MUR - Mixed Use Residential
L E G E ND
Res ident ial
Off i ce/Commerc ial
Industr ial
NC-Major - Major Neighborhood Center
NC-Minor - Minor Neighborhood Center
MUCS - Mixed Use Community Shopping
MUGC - Mixed Use General Commercial
CB - Central Business
CBF - Central Business Fringe
RF - Riverfront
MUC - Mixed Use Commercial **
P-AO -  Professional and Administrative Off ice
Corvall is  C ity  Lim its
Urb an Growth Boundary
Streams
Other  Des i gnat ions
OSU - Oregon State University
AG-OS - Agriculture - Open Space
PD Overlay
LI - Limited Industrial
LI-O - Limited Industrial - Office
MUE - Mixed Use Employment
GI - General Industrial
II - Intensive Industrial 
RTC - Research Technology Center
MUT - Mixed Use Transitional
Solar Overlay
Historic District
! Historic Designations
Willamette River Greenway
NCity of CorvallisSlopes & Fault Line
City of Corvallis, OregonGeospatial Information ServicesPublic Works Department
Legend
Slopes
15-25% Slope
25-35% Slope
Greater than 35% Slope
Major Streets
Lifeline Roads
Railroads
Fault Line
